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Abstract 
Computer viruses and other forms of malicious software have been a significant com-
puter security problem for over ten years. We discuss computer viruses and the strate-
gies that can be employed by a virus to complicate automated detection. In particular, 
the organisation of Macintosh operating system software and the strategies that have 
been employed by viruses on this platform are considered. Macro viruses, one of the 
relatively recent developments in the area of computer viruses, are described. 
A previously unknown attack that could be implemented on a Macintosh and that 
would allow the infection of application programs without altering any executable code 
is described. We also discuss a simple countermeasure to this attack. We subsequently 
extend this attack and consider the effect of operating system changes on Macintosh 
viruses. 
There are many other types of malicious software. Applets written in Java can be 
used to implement a variety of attacks against Internet users. We consider the potential 
of a Java applet to be used in conjunction with a Web Spoofing attack to perform covert 
distributed computing. 
We continue by discussing two combinatorial search problems: finding sequences 
with zero autocorrelation function, and finding Hadamard matrices using Williamson's 
method. We report many new results for the search for sequences with zero autocor-
relation function, and note that this search, if it is to be extended, would require the 
application of distributed computing techniques. We describe a distributed search for 
Hadamard matrices based on Williamson's method; although we do not find any new 
matrices, we provide independent verification of results presented by others. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
There are many forms of malicious software; perhaps the best known of these is the 
computer virus. Computer worms, which in some ways are very similar to computer 
viruses, may also be familiar. 
Computer viruses have existed as a practical threat to computer systems for over 
ten years. A large number of viruses are known to exist for computers descended 
from the original IBM PC. A much smaller number of viruses are known to exist for 
Macintosh computers. Very few viruses are known for UNIX-like operating systems, 
however it is clear that these systems are far from immune. Computer viruses have also 
been implemented in the macro language of application packages such as Microsoft 
Word, and for the most part are able to run successfully on any computer platform 
to which the host application has been ported. Recendy, the trend towards ubiquitous 
network connection has been exploited by writers of malicious software to create some 
very rapidly-spreading viruses and worms. 
Computer viruses and other forms of malicious software have been extensively 
studied both from a theoretical standpoint, and from a more practical one with the 
aim of detecting and eradicating a computer virus infection. Strategies employed both 
by anti-virus software to detect computer viruses and by computer viruses to evade 
detection have become very sophisticated. 
In Chapter 2, we look at how computer viruses work, and the techniques that are 
used by anti-virus software to detect viruses. We look in some detail at techniques used 
by computer viruses on Macintosh computers, and the effects that operating system 
changes have had on these viruses. 
In Chapter 3, we examine an attack that allows the infection of Macintosh appli-
cation programs without altering existing files in any way. We also suggest a simple 
countermeasure to the attack. This attack is similar in spirit to one known for DOS for 
some time. We consider the utility of being aware of potential security problems to 
outweigh the risk that the discussion may be used to implement new computer viruses. 
This chapter is based on a previously published paper: 
Jeffrey Horton and Jennifer Seberry. Companion viruses and the Macin-
tosh: threats and countermeasures. In Information Security and Privacy, 
ACISP '99, volume 1587 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 
202-212. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1999. 
95% of the work was performed by Jeffrey Horton and 5% by Jennifer Seberry. 
In Chapter 4, we extend the attack described in Chapter 3 and comment on difficul-
ties in the implementation of Macintosh viruses composed of native PowerPC code. 
We also comment on the future of viruses for this platform in light of changes expected 
as a result of coming major operating system revisions. 
In Chapter 5, a technique for implementing a covert distributed computation using 
downloadable applets written in Java is examined. Such software would be classed as 
malicious, as its intent is to steal computational resources from unsuspecting computer 
users. 
This chapter is based upon a previously published paper: 
Jeffrey Horton and Jennifer Seberry. Covert distributed computing using 
Java through Web Spoofing. In Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 
'98, volume 1438 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 48-57. 
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1998. 
95% of the work was performed by Jeffrey Horton and 5% by Jennifer Seberry. 
In Chapters 6, 7 and 8 we alter our focus to examine some problems to which 
distributed computing, covert or otherwise, could be applied. Using distributed com-
puting to search for encryption keys is a very well-known application. We look instead 
at some combinatorial search problems. 
Chapter 6 provides an extensive mathematical background to the material subse-
quently covered in Chapters 7 and 8. Some examples of practical uses of sequences 
and Hadamard matrices are provided. 
In Chapter 7 we search for sequences with zero autocorrelation function. A number 
of necessary conditions are known which these sequences must satisfy; however, these 
necessary conditions are not by themselves sufficient: the autocorrelation function 
must be evaluated. We find a number of new sequences, and demonstrate the non-
existence of others. 
This chapter is based upon a published paper: 
Jeffrey Horton and Jennifer Seberry. When the necessary conditions are 
not sufficient: sequences with zero autocorrelation function. Bulletin of 
the Institute of Combinatorics and its Applications, 27:51-61, 1999. 
80% of the work was performed by Jeffrey Horton and 20% by Jennifer Seberry. 
In Chapter 8 a distributed search for Hadamard matrices that uses Williamson's 
method is described. Hadamard matrices have extensive applications in inany ar-
eas. They may, for example, be employed in coding and communications. We have 
searched for Hadamard matrices in all orders up to and including order 148. These 
searches consume considerable computer time: the initial search of order 148 required 
over a month of time on in excess of 20 computers. 
Although we do not find any new matrices, these searches are still important, be-
cause they provide independent verification of other results. Some previous exhaustive 
searches for Hadamard matrices have produced incomplete results. 
This chapter has formed the basis of a paper which has been submitted for consid-
eration for publication. 90% of the work described was performed by Jeffrey Horton 
and 10% by Jennifer Seberry. Our results for order 100 have also been independently 
verified by Christos Koukouvinos, with whom we collaborated when writing the paper. 
Parti 




Introduction to Computer Viruses 
2.1 Introduction 
Computer viruses are not a new problem in the area of computer security; computer 
viruses have been causing problems for users of personal computers at home and in the 
business and education communities since the mid 1980s, and have been discovered 
on computers around the world. Users of personal computers, be they IBM PC com-
patibles, Macintoshes or something else, are all at risk from computer vims infections. 
A commonly accepted informal English definition of a "computer virus" is due to 
Dr. F. Cohen, as follows: 
We define a computer "virus" as a program that can "infect" other pro-
grams by modifying them to include a possibly evolved copy of itself. [1] 
The key property of a computer virus here is that it infects another program in some 
way. There is, for example, no requirement in this definition that a computer virus be 
capable of performing any actions beyond being able to infect them. 
Computer viruses are often described as one form of malicious software or mal-
ware. Certainly many computer viruses are written with malicious intent. The Brain 
virus, one of the first viruses affecting the ffiM PC, was capable of destroying data de-
scribing the location of sectors making up files on a diskette, and might even overwrite 
parts of a file in the process of infection [2, 3]. Many other types of malicious action 
are possible, and a great many have been explored by writers of computer viruses over 
the years. 
Furthermore, the nature of what is classified as malicious behaviour varies depend-
ing on the environment in which the behaviour occurs. For example, a virus that asks 
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permission before infecting an executable file might perform what its creator consid-
ered was a useful function, but to those whose work is interrupted by the virus, it is a 
time-wasting nuisance. There is the potential that interruptions to some critical process 
could even be life-threatening. 
Considerable effort has been devoted to the problem of detection and removal of 
computer viruses. Techniques and strategies used by anti-virus software will be cov-
ered in Section 2.6. 
While many computer viruses have been created with malicious intent, it should 
be noted, however, that nothing in the definition above requires that a computer virus 
be malicious. 
Some supposedly benevolent uses of computer viruses have been proposed. Cohen 
presents as examples a virus that compresses executable files on infection and which 
decompresses the file upon execution [1], or the potential use of viruses in imple-
menting a distributed database [4]. These ideas and others have failed to win popular 
acceptance, however. 
Why is "possibly evolved" included in the definition? The key property of a com-
puter virus is that it is capable of infecting another program in some way — there is 
no requirement that the program being infected be infected with a literal copy of the 
computer virus. In fact, there are a variety of computer viruses that alter the code of 
copies of itself when infecting some other program. This is a common technique used 
by computer virus writers to make detection of the virus by anti-virus software more 
difficult. 
One shortcoming of the definition above is that it fails to encompass a program 
that is able to attach itself to a host program by some means other than altering the 
code of the host program, but which otherwise would seem well-described by the tag 
of "computer virus". The "companion" strategy of infection is an excellent example 
of this. For this reason, the definition above can be extended to include as viruses 
programs that infect by alternatively modifying the environment in which the host 
program exists. 
The definition above does not require that the result of a virus infecting an exe-
cutable file is itself a virus capable of further replication. This is an ambiguity that is 
present in this informal definition — a formal mathematical definition exists [5] which 
2.1. Introduction 8 
does not suffer from this ambiguity. The informal definition is adequate for purposes 
of discussion. 
A virus that contains code to perform some additional actions beyond merely repli-
cating is often referred to as having a payload. A virus' payload might be triggered 
by, for example, the computer system's clock reading a certain time, or on a particular 
day. There is no requirement that a virus have a payload. 
Computer viruses and computer worms are often confused. The distinction be-
tween them is, however, sometimes unclear. 
Computer worms made their first appearance at the Xerox PARC as a tool for 
implementing distributed tasks across a network of workstations. The task might be the 
performance of a distributed computation, such as producing multi-frame animation 
with the workload spread over multiple machines, or perhaps as a network diagnostic 
tool [6]. Here worms were intended as a tool to perform useful work. 
Perhaps the most famous worm, however, is the Internet Worm that caused much 
disruption to the Internet in November of 1988 [7, 8, 9, 10]. Despite some argu-
ments [7] that this incident was caused by a program that is better classified as a virus, 
it has become generally accepted that the program responsible for the incident was 
best classified as a worm. 
The Internet Worm exploited a number of known security holes in some implemen-
tations of the UNIX operating system of the time in order to spread itself from machine 
to machine. Bugs in the worm's code meant that it consumed so many resources on 
infected computers that it was easily noticed. Less than 5% of the machines on the 
Internet at the time were affected for a period of several days [10], however. 
Other notable worm incidents include the WANK and OILZ worms [11]. 
As many incidents have occurred with worm programs running out-of-control on 
computer networks, wasting bandwidth and causing denial-of-services to legitimate 
users at the very least, it is unsurprising that worms have also come to be referred to 
as another type of malicious software, despite the ideas behind the original work on 
worms. 
So how might a worm be defined? There exists a formal definition of computer 
worms along with proofs of some results using this definition [12], but here an informal 
2.1. Introduction 
English definition is likely to serve best. We define a worm as a self-replicating, self-
contained program that is capable of spreading itself to other machines. A network is 
often involved in the replication process. It may or may not be capable of self-initiation 
on the remote machine. Unlike a virus, a worm does not "infect" or otherwise depend 
on a host program — it is self-contained. 
A more recent worm incident occurred with the discovery of the AutoStart worm 
for the Macintosh [13]. This was a self-contained program that exploited the ability, 
provided by the operating system, to designate a program on a diskette, removable 
media or hard disk to be executed when the disk was mounted by the operating system. 
It relied on the transfer of infected media from machine to machine — it did not use 
the network to spread. It did not depend on a host program in the same sense as a 
virus. There is, however, some discussion as to its appropriate classification. 
The final class of malicious software to be covered here is the Trojan Horse. This 
is a program that claims to perform a particular function, sufficiently attractive to the 
computer user to ensure that the user executes the program; instead of or perhaps 
in addition to performing this function, a trojan horse program takes some form of 
undocumented action, often malicious, that was intended by the programmer^ Trojan 
horses, unlike viruses or worms, do not replicate themselves. The action taken by a 
Trojan horse might, however, be the installation of a virus. 
A Trojan horse may be much more subtle than simply deleting files or formatting a 
disk; they need not be obviously malicious. It is not difficult to imagine a Trojan horse 
that collects private or personal information (like PGP^ private key files, for example) 
from a user's hard disk, and sends this information out over the Internet for collection 
at a remote site. The Trojan horse program would otherwise perform a useful function. 
A Trojan horse like this would be very difficult to detect. 
The name "Trojan horse" comes of course from the events surrounding the fall of 
the city of Troy — the Greeks, unable to reduce the city by siege, ultimately invaded 
the city concealed inside a wooden horse, a supposed gift to the Trojans from the 
Greeks to mark the abandonment of the siege. 
^This is distinguished from a simple bug in a program that results in some form of destructive event. 
^PGP is an acronym for Pretty Good Privacy, a program which among other abilities is used to 
facilitate secure and/or authentic exchange of e-mail using public-key cryptography. 
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2.2 A Little Bit of Theory 
It can be shown using a formal definition of a computer virus that it is impossible 
to distinguish with 100% accuracy between a program that is a computer virus, or is 
infected with one, and one that is not [5, 4, 14]. 
What does this mean for writers and users of anti-virus software? As it is impossi-
ble to always correctly determine whether or not a given program is a virus, there will 
be some number of false positives and false negatives occurring. 
A false positive occurs when anti-virus software identifies a given file as having 
been infected with a virus, and is mistaken. That is, the file is not infected with a virus. 
A false negative occurs when anti-virus software determines that a given file has 
not been infected with a virus, and is mistaken. That is, the file has been infected with 
a virus. 
So the goal for developers of anti-virus software is to minimise the number of false 
positives and false negatives produced by their software package. This can work quite 
well in practice — theory says that 100% accurate identification is impossible, not that 
it cannot be very closely approached. 
2.3 Platforms Affected 
Users of IBM-compatible PCs are the worst affected by the computer virus problem. 
There are claims [15] of more than 10,000 DOS-based computer viruses having been 
created as at November 1996! Many of these, however, would be variations based on 
some original virus strain. The vims problem is certainly worse now — the figure 
above neglects macro viruses entirely. 
Macro viruses are a recent development in the field of computer viruses. Previ-
ous to this development, a computer virus was capable only of infecting a particular 
hardware platform — a computer virus intended to run on an IBM-compatible PC 
was no threat to a user of a Macintosh, for example^ Macro viruses are written in 
interpreted languages supplied by some common programs that are available across 
^ A Macintosh user running a program designed to closely emulate an IBM-compatible PC would in 
many cases be at risk from a computer virus designed for that platform — the emulated PC would be 
mfected, but Macintosh executables and files would not be at risk. 
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multiple platforms. The intention was that these languages should increase the power 
and flexibility of the program. A good example is Microsoft Word — it is available 
for both IBM-compatible PCs and Macintosh computers, and macro viruses for this 
package can affect both PCs and Macintoshes. 
Macro viruses have now become one of the commonest types of computer virus. 
Macintosh users have also been affected by the computer virus problem, but not 
to the same extent as users of IBM-compatible PCs. Estimates vary, but there are 
certainly fewer than 100 viruses targeted specifically at the Macintosh computer at 
this time. 
UNIX users are fortunate in that there are no common virus threats against this 
platform. However, the potential exists for viruses to be written for this platform — 
there has been some practical explorations of the possibility by researchers [1,4, 16, 
17]. Some experiments with computer viruses were performed by Cohen as part of 
his original research on computer viruses, and demonstrated that access to the entire 
system was achieved by the attacking virus in under one hour [1]. Viruses required 
a modest number of lines of code to implement, and could be programmed quickly. 
Similar results were achieved on related platforms. 
There exist some threats against users of other computing platforms. However, 
these are of minor interest only. In principal any computer platform where programs 
are stored on modifiable media is subject to attack by computer viruses. 
2.4 Computer Virus Types and Strategies 
A computer virus can only become active on a computer system if the virus is executed. 
Part of the definition of a computer virus states that a computer virus is attached to a 
host executable — if the host is executed, then the virus would also be executed. Virus 
code that has been added to a non-executable object (such as a plain text file) poses no 
threat. 
A few years ago when talking about non-executable objects and computer viruses, 
we could have said "like a word-processor file". Unfortunately, word-processor files 
produced by some common word-processing packages can now contain a form of 
executable code! There are other common packages that have a similar problem. This 
3 0009 03254834 4 
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development has allowed viruses to be written for the environment provided within 
each of these packages. Such viruses are called "macro viruses". They are a relative 
newcomer to the computer virus field, and have proved to be very successful. They are 
a problem for users not of a particular hardware platform, but for users of the particular 
application package for which the macro virus is written, regardless of the operating 
system or hardware on which that package is running. 
For any given operating system release and computer platform, there are com-
monly a variety of different executable objects that might be the target of infection by 
a computer virus. New operating system releases or even application packages can 
add new types of executable object. 
Many viruses employ a number of strategies that are intended to make the detection 
of the virus more difficult. We'll consider two of these strategies — polymorphism 
and stealth. 
Computer viruses are a major problem for users of IBM-PC compatible comput-
ers, so we'll look at how viruses operate on this platform first. Computer viruses are 
currentiy much less of a problem for users of Apple Macintosh computers, so the op-
eration of viruses on this platform will be examined next. Finally, macro viruses will 
be examined. 
2.4.1 IBM-PC Viruses 
Viruses targeting this platform can be divided into two major groups, with some over-
lap: 
• File infecting viruses; 
• Boot sector infecting viruses. 
A virus that is capable of employing either strategy — infecting both executable files 
and boot sectors — is referred to as a multipartite virus. Natas [18] is an example 
of a multipartite virus, capable of infecting both executable files, such as . COM and 
. EXE files, and boot sectors. 
DOS file infecting viruses and boot sector infecting viruses were each responsi-
ble for about 50% of reported virus incidents when running some version of DOS. 
Following the introduction and widespread acceptance of Windows, however, boot 
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sector infecting viruses were responsible for a much higher percentage of virus inci-
dents, despite what might seem to be very limited opportunities to spread, while file 
infecting viruses declined significantly; this is believed to be because Windows 3.x 
does not work well, possibly not at all, in the presence of a typical DOS file infecting 
vims, while in many cases boot sector infecting viruses will coexist with Windows 
3.x. Changes in the world's computing environment, which includes both computer 
hardware and operating system software, has an effect on the viruses and classes of 
viruses that are common [19, 20]. 
Now it seems that macro viruses, discussed in Section 2.4.3, are responsible for a 
much higher percentage of reported virus incidents than any other class of virus" .̂ 
A virus may be either memory resident or non-memory resident. A memory 
resident virus is so named because it has the ability to remain active in the computer's 
memory even after its original host program has exited. A non-memory resident vims 
is active only while its host is executing. A non-memory resident vims might also be 
referred to as a direct action vims, because the vims has opportunities to infect other 
objects or perform damage only when viral code is called while its host is mnning. 
We'll also look quickly at some more unusual infection strategies: 
• Companion vimses; 
• "Link" vimses. 
Summaries of the techniques we discuss here, as well as some more exotic tech-
niques that we do not discuss in detail, such as vimses that infect source code with a 
source form of the vims, can be found in [21, 22, 23, 24]. 
2.4.1.1 File Infecting Viruses 
There are a number of executable file formats for users of MS-DOS and Windows. 
Common varieties of executable file that readers may be familiar with are . COM and 
. EXE. Rather than examine in detail how vimses interact with files of each type, which 
can be confusing both because of the variety and complexity of the available file for-
mats, we'll instead look at a more general picture of how vimses on this platform infect 
files. 
"̂ Virus prevalence information gathered from Virus Bulletin-, macro viruses responsible for in excess 
of 65% of reported virus incidents in the months January to December, 1999. 
2.4. Computer Virus Types and Strategies 14 
The simplest type of file infecting virus is one which overwrites part of the object 
that is the target of infection, and does not store the code that was overwritten so that it 
can restored later when the infected file is executed. Figure 2.1 illustrates this strategy. 
1. Program before infection by overwriting virus. 
Program Code 
2. Program after infection by overwriting virus. 
Program Code 
Figure 2.1 : An overwriting virus. The start of the host program's code is replaced with 
viral code. 
We depict the beginning of the file being overwritten by the virus — in this case, 
the virus would receive control when the host program is executed. The host program 
itself would likely be so badly damaged that it would be unable to perform its own 
functions. However, the viral code might also be placed elsewhere in the file, in the 
hope that the host program would be able to perform most of its original functions. 
However, as the infected program has been partially destroyed by the virus, it is 
most unlikely to function 100% correctly. The best way of repairing programs dam-
aged in this manner is to restore them from backups. 
More sophisticated viruses attach to a host program in such a way that the host 
program can be repaired by the virus and executed successfully. A simple way of 
infecting an executable file so that any changes made are repairable is to append the 
virus code to the end of the file, save the first few bytes of code for later restoration, 
and replace them with a jump to the appended viral code. When the host program is 
executed, the viral code receives control first, can repair the code of its host and call it. 
This process is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
It is also possible to prepend the viral code to the host file. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2.3. The appended host code must be copied over the viral code and executed. 
The Necropolis virus is an example of a virus that uses a prepending technique [25]. 
Appending or prepending the viral code to the host file in such a manner that the 
host file is repairable means that the host file changes in size. This might be noticed 
by an observant user or a program monitoring the sizes of executable files, and might 
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1. Program before infection by appending virus. 
[ Program Code 
2. Program after infection by appending virus. 
Jump to start of viral code 
I Program Code 
S. On execution, control passes to viral code. Virus repairs program code. 
[ Program Code 
4. Virus executes original program. 
i 
Program Code 
Figure 2.2: An appending vims. The start of the host program's code is replaced with 
a jump to appended viral code; the original start of the host is preserved. 
1 a. Program before infection by prepending virus. 
Program Code 
2a. Viral code prepended, program code shifted. 
Program Code 
lb. Program before infection by prepending virus. 
P. Code #1 P. Code #2 
2b. Viral code prepended; only overwritten program code shifted. 
p. Code #2 P. Code #1 
Figure 2.3: A prepending virus. The host's code is effectively appended to the viral 
code. 
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result in detection of the vims. Are there ways in which a file can be infected in such 
a way that its length doesn't change, yet the file's code can be repaired by the virus at 
time of execution? 
There are several ways that this might be achieved. The first is to find an area of 
constant data within an executable file that is large enough to contain the virus body, to 
record the value that was originally stored there and replace the constant data with the 
virus code. The Lehigh virus [4, p. 42] [3, 26] operated in such a manner. It infected 
the MS-DOS command interpreter, COMMAND. COM. If a single area is not available, 
there may be several smaller areas of sufficient size. Before the viral code executes 
its host program, the original value stored within the constant area or areas can be 
restored if necessary. 
The second is to store the viral code inside unused spaces within an executable file. 
Several smaller spaces might be used if a single large space is not available. Some of 
the more sophisticated executable file formats can require the different components of 
the executable file to be padded to a particular length, even if only a small amount of 
the available space is required. This is the technique used by the CIH virus [27]. 
Viruses that employ techniques such as this may be referred to as cavity viruses, 
as they make use of the small "cavities" inside executable files to store the virus code 
to avoid changing the length of infected file. 
A third possible technique would be for the virus to compress all or part of the 
file's original contents so that the virus code can be added without changing the length 
of the original file. The compressed component can be uncompressed at runtime. 
2.4.1.2 Boot Sector Infecting Viruses 
A boot sector infecting virus works by infecting the small components of code that 
are used to help load an operating system from a floppy disk or hard disk when the 
computer is switched on. This process may be referred to as "bootstrapping". We give 
a very basic overview of the booting process [28, 29, 30, 21]. 
The loading of an operating system from disk happens in several stages. In the 
case of a floppy disk, the first logical sector on the disk, referred to as the boot sector 
or DOS boot sector, consists of a small program that is responsible for starting the 
next phase of the process of loading the operating system. In the case of a floppy disk 
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that doesn't have an operating system, this sector contains a small program responsible 
for informing the user that this is not a bootable disk, prompting for the insertion of 
another disk. 
Hard disks, because of their large physical size, are often divided into a number 
of smaller logical chunks referred to as partitions. Reasons for dividing a hard disk 
into smaller partitions would include a desire to be able to install multiple operating 
systems, such as MS-DOS and Linux, on a single hard disk, or to break a disk that is 
too large to be handled by a particular operating system into smaller chunks. In this 
case, the first physical sector on the disk contains a record of the partitions into which 
the disk has been divided, and a small program responsible for locating a bootable 
partition and booting from that partition. The first physical sector of the hard disk is 
referred to as the Master Boot Record (MBR) or Master Boot Sector (MBS). The 
first logical sector of a bootable partition is then the boot sector that is used to load the 
next stage of the operating system. 
Figure 2.4 shows a very simple illustration of the boot process for floppy disks and 
hard disks. 
Floppy Disk Startup: 
ROM Bootstrap DOS Boot Sector OS-specific startup 
Hard Disk Startup: 
ROM Bootstrap Master Boot Record DOS Boot Sector OS-specific startup 
Figure 2.4: Simple illustration of boot process for floppy and hard disks. 
The booting process may be customised by modifying the DOS boot sector of a 
floppy disk, or either of the Master Boot Record or DOS boot sector present on a 
hard disk. For example, users with multiple operating systems installed on different 
partitions on their hard disks might install a small program which allows the operating 
system to be used for this session to be selected during the booting process. 
The basic operation of a boot sector virus is then very plain: these viruses infect 
the code found in the Master Boot Record for hard disks or in the DOS boot sector 
for floppy and hard disks. The original contents of the infected sector are commonly 
stored elsewhere so that the virus can continue the boot process using the original boot 
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sector code. However, it is not unknown for a virus to dispense entirely with the code 
from the part of the boot sequence it modifies, and to attempt to perform the boot 
functions itself. The AntiCMOS virus functions in this manner [31]. 
Note that it is unnecessary for a boot sector virus to be capable of infecting a hard 
disk — the Brain virus was once very successful even though it only infected floppy 
disks [2, 3]. However, the inadequacy of the floppy disk for today's operating system 
and data storage needs means that a floppy-only boot sector virus is unlikely to be very 
successful. 
Even non-bootable floppy disks have a small program in the boot sector to prompt 
for the insertion of a bootable disk, so these can be infected by a boot sector virus. 
Commonly, PCs will check the floppy drive first, searching for a disk from which 
to boot. If an infected floppy disk has been left in the drive, then the PC will attempt 
to boot from the floppy drive, causing the viral code to be executed. Many viruses will 
infect a hard disk, if one is present, at this point. So it is certainly desirable to avoid 
booting from a floppy disk if one is unintentionally left in the drive. 
It is frequently possible to configure a PC so that an attempt will be made to boot 
first from the hard disk, rather than checking for the presence of a floppy disk first. 
Configuring a PC in this manner can help prevent infection by a boot sector infecting 
virus. 
Removal of boot sector infecting viruses can be difficult. For example, a virus 
could encrypt the partition table data, or copy it elsewhere, so that this information is 
available only when the virus is present. The Monkey virus [32] is a well-known boot 
sector virus that copies the partition table data elsewhere, so that an infected hard disk 
is inaccessible if the computer is not booted from the virus-infected hard disk. The 
Hare Krsna virus [33] is another example of a virus that tampers with the location of 
the partition table data. 
Finally, some boot sector viruses are able to infect a hard disk by altering not the 
code in the Master Boot Record, but the partition table data! This technique is used by 
the Starship virus [22] and, more recently, by the Nutcracker.ABO viruses [34]. 
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2.4.1.3 Companion Viruses 
A companion virus is of interest because it does not modify any of the files which it 
infects. Instead, a separate executable file is created to hold the virus body. Implemen-
tations of such a virus depend on the operating system; two basic types of companion 
virus which could be created under MS-DOS are [35, 36]: 
Regular Companion [35] or Corresponding File Virus [36]: 
Creates a file in the same directory as the target of infection but with a filename 
extension which the operating system chooses to execute before that of the orig-
inal file when the extension is not explicitly specified (for example, under MS-
DOS a . COM file with the same name as a . EXE file and in the same directory 
is executed before the . EXE file if the file extension is not specified [29, p. 15]). 
PATH Companion: 
Create a file with any executable extension in a directory that is searched for 
executable files before the directory containing the target of infection. Named 
after the PATH environment variables found in operating systems such as MS-
DOS and UNIX. 
Magruder [36] also discusses "surrogate file viruses", a type of companion virus 
which renames the executable file being infected and replaces it with a copy of the 
virus program. 
2.4.1.4 "Link" Viruses 
This technique is now of mainly academic interest. It represents another way in which 
a virus can infect an executable file like a . COM or . EXE file without making any 
changes to the files themselves. 
The MS-DOS operating system records which disk clusters are occupied by a par-
ticular file by means of the File Allocation Table, or FAT [29, 30]. A cluster may be 
used by a particular file, in which case it holds a record of the next cluster in the file, 
or may be unused or bad. A file's directory entry records the file's first-cluster. 
A link virus, such as DIR-II [37, 23], replaces the starting cluster in an executable 
file's directory entry with that of the virus, saving the original starting cluster elsewhere 
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for later use. A request to execute the infected file results in the virus code being run 
instead, as the starting cluster recorded in the infected file's directory entry points at 
the starting cluster of the file containing the virus code. The virus can then arrange for 
the execution of the infected file. 
Many executable files on a disk may be infected with a single copy of the virus 
code. 
2.4.2 Apple Macintosh Viruses 
2.4.2.1 Introduction 
The first Macintosh viruses appeared in the late 1980s. There has, however, been little 
activity since then on the part of Macintosh virus writers when compared with their 
IBM PC counterparts. There are many thousands of PC viruses; at the present time, 
there are fewer than 100 viruses "native" to the Macintosh. 
Techniques used by Macintosh virus writers are in some ways less sophisticated 
than those used by their PC counterparts. For example, the first Macintosh viruses 
to exhibit even crude polymorphic techniques, members of the SevenDust family of 
viruses, appeared in late 1998. Polymorphic techniques are discussed in more detail 
in Section 2.4.4.1. These techniques have been popular with IBM PC virus writers for 
many years. Furthermore, the boot sector virus, a variety of virus that has been very 
successful on the IBM PC, has no Macintosh counterparts at present. 
As a result of the slow creation of new Macintosh viruses, and the limited popular-
ity of the platform in the past, when compared with that of the IBM PC, information 
on Macintosh viruses can be very hard to find. A very useful, although now some-
what dated reference for Macintosh viruses, which goes into some detail not only of 
the workings of Macintosh viruses, but also potential threats, is [38]. Another source, 
the Computer Virus Catalog [39], also contains some useful and detailed information 
on Macintosh viruses; again, it is somewhat out-of-date. Both sources include out-
of-date PC virus information. Some more current but still out-of-date information on 
Macintosh viruses can be found in [40]. 
The variety of techniques used by Macintosh viruses in the process of infection 
make viruses on the Macintosh of considerable interest. Changes to the Macintosh op-
erating system have rendered techniques used by some once effective and widespread 
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viruses, like the WDEF virus, ineffective. Some Macintosh viruses, even those written 
many years ago, are still capable of posing a threat to modem versions of the operat-
ing system. Additionally, new opportunities for vims infection have become available; 
these will not be examined in detail here, however. 
Before making an attempt to cover how Macintosh vimses operate, some back-
ground on their operating environment, the Macintosh operating system, is required. 
There are very distinct differences between the Macintosh and PC operating systems 
from a programming perspective, despite their similarities. 
When discussing details of the Macintosh and vimses affecting the Macintosh, a 
t y p e w r i t e r f o n t l i k e t h i s will be used when talking about resource types, 
and a bold font like this will be used when talking about vimses, some of which 
happen to have been named after a resource type used by the vims writer to implement 
an attack, to clearly distinguish between the two. 
2.4.2.2 Macintosh Files 
Every Macintosh file is composed of two components. These are referred to as forks. 
Each file has a data fork and a resource fork, also referred to as a resource file. [41, 
p. 1-4] 
The data fork is used to store a file's data. The format of the data stored in a file's 
data fork is at the discretion of the application program that created the file — to the 
operating system, it is merely a sequence of bytes. [41, p. 1-5] 
The resource fork is used to store a file's resources. System software expects that a 
file's resource fork will have a certain intemal stmcture. There are a variety of system 
software routines that manipulate the contents of the resource fork. Resources are 
discussed further in Section 2.4.2.3. 
In the case of an ASCII text file, for example, the data fork would be used to 
store the file's text. The resource fork could be used to hold resources that described 
the cursor position and window size when last the file was edited, and formatting 
information like the font and font size used by the text of the document. 
Another oddity of the Macintosh file system is that with each file is associated a 
type and creator. These are both expressed as four-letter codes. 
Common examples of file types are: 
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APPL This type indicates that the file is an application program. There are other 
similar types; this is the commonest. 
TEXT Files of this type usually consist of plain ASCII text. 
A file's creator indicates the application program that "owns" the file — this is the 
application program that will be executed when the file is opened by double-clicking 
on the file, for example^. Application programs are expected to have unique creator 
codes; this ensures that the correct application will be used to process a file marked 
with that creator. Many different file types may be associated with a single application 
program. 
2.4.2.3 Resources 
A resource can contain data of any description. Resources within a resource fork are 
described by: 
• A resource type, which is a four-letter code; 
• An ID number, which is a two-byte integer; 
• A name, which is a string of characters (optional). 
To identify a particular resource, it is sufficient to specify a resource type and either an 
ID number or a resource name. 
What sort of data is commonly stored in a resource? A variety of information is 
stored in an application's resource fork, for example: 
MENU Stores information about the items in a particular application menu. For exam-
ple, a MENU resource for an application's "File" menu would contain items such 
as "Open" and "Save". 
MBAR Lists the menus that are present in an application's menu bar. 
WIND Describes the dimensions and other characteristics of a window created by an 
application. 
^Files may also be opened in other ways. 
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CNTL Defines a control, which is a user interface element such as a button, checkbox 
or scrollbar, created by an application. 
CODE Contains main components of an application's executable code. 
There are many other standard resource types. Developers are also free to create their 
own resource types to hold data specific to their application. 
Programmers on other computer platforms will be familiar with the way in which 
operations, such as reading data from a file, are performed on a file — the programmer 
specifies explicitly the file on which the operation is to be performed. This is also the 
case when working with the data fork of a Macintosh file. 
Some operations on resource forks are a little different, however. When loading 
a resource from a file into memory, for example, more than one file can potentially 
be involved — a search path is followed to locate the resource. The first file to be 
searched is referred to as the current resource file. The current resource file is usually 
the resource file most recently opened by an application. An application's resource file 
is opened by the operating system when the application is executed, so it is present in 
the resource search path. The final entry in the resource search path is the so-called 
"System" file. The System file contains resources that form a part of the operating 
system and are used by many application programs. [42, p. 1-10] 
So if a resource is not found in the current resource file, resource files earlier in 
the search path will be searched for the required resource. The search stops when 
a resource is found, or all the files in the resource search path have been examined 
without result. [42, p. 1-10] 
This search scheme enables applications to override resources that are present in 
the System file with application-specific resources, or, if the application has been de-
signed to accommodate it, to override resources in the application with document-
specific resources. Remember that the search for a resource stops as soon as one is 
found. [42, p. 1-10] 
Resources that contain executable code are of particular interest in any discussion 
of computer viruses on the Macintosh. There are a large variety of such resources, 
only some of which will be examined here. CODE resources, which contain much of 
an application's executable code, have already been mentioned above. First resources 
containing executable code used to draw graphical user interface elements will be 
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examined. 
The graphical user interface presented by an application can be customised to a 
degree by an application developer. How is this done? Many of the graphical user 
interface elements, such as menus, windows and controls like buttons, checkboxes and 
scrollbars, are drawn by definition procedures. The executable code of a definition 
procedure is stored in a resource and loaded by the system software when required to 
draw a user interface element. The system software provides default implementations 
of the definition procedures — an application only needs to provide an implementation 
of a specific definition procedure if different functionality is required. 
Some of the definition procedures that are involved in presenting the graphical user 
interface are: 
• A menu definition procedure is stored in an MDEF resource, and is responsible 
for the drawing of menu items within a menu [43, p. 3-9]. The menu definition 
procedure that is to be used to draw a particular menu is specified by resource 
ID in the menu's MENU resource [43, p. 3-88]. 
• A menu bar definition procedure is stored in an MBDF resource, and is respon-
sible for the drawing activities related to the display of menus, such as saving or 
restoring the portions of the display behind a menu [43, p. 3-9] [43, p. 3-87]. 
• A window definition function is stored in a WDEF resource, and is responsible 
for such tasks as drawing the window frame or resizing a window. The WDEF 
resource to be used by a particular window is specified by resource ID in the 
window's WIND resource. [43, pp. 4-120-4-127] 
• A control definition function is stored in a CDEF resource, and is responsible 
for such tasks as drawing the control and testing for where the mouse has been 
clicked by the user within a control. The CDEF resource to be used by a partic-
ular control is specified by resource ID in the control's CNTL resource. [43, pp. 
5-109-5-115] 
Another important type of resource containing executable code is the INIT re-
source. These are resources that contain code that is intended to be executed at system 
startup time, to provide extra services or modify existing operating system services via 
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a mechanism that will be discussed in Section 2.4.2.6. INIT resources can be located 
within the System file itself, or in files of particular types, for example of type INIT^, 
within the System folder. Extensions folder or Control Panels folder. A now somewhat 
dated description of the system startup procedure, which includes more information on 
INITs and the process of INIT loading, can be found in [44, Ch. 9]. 
2.4.2.4 The Macintosh Finder and the "Desktop" 
The Finder is an application that is provided with the Macintosh system software and 
which works with the system software to manage the display of the computer user's 
"desktop", keep track of the location, both on the screen and on the disk's directory 
structure, of files and folders as they are manipulated by the computer user [42, p. 7-
3] [45, p. 6]. The Finder also ensures that the appropriate application is used to work 
with files which it has created when the file is double-clicked by the user, for example. 
Figure 2.5 shows a Finder desktop display with some open windows. 
^ F i l e E d i t U i e u j l a t i e l S p e c i a l 4 : 2 6 P M t a 0 
D DialoqUtiKc 
D DialogUtilJi 




•...A\ D ExtrM.c 
. . ^ ' l i D ExtrasJi 
. . l | D FindPrffsFili.o 
^ U D FindPr.fsFite.h 
,:.:"i| • KeyCri^pto.<> 
24K CodeWirrior IDE 3 1 ... -
S /i, . W 5 >owm-BOOI<HD 1 
• 
414 .5 MB in disk 83.4 MB available 
MisterS< >ocs.tex 
CrsaliVirtualDisk.EPSF 






MisterSoftierAT'Í20199 DTTest 68K HasherPPC 
3 O / i ^ O 
, THINK Ref.A MPV Sheni> t,MxeS FAT- i ps2pdf . T, . . t 




: - .RAM D i s k i ^ 
• 8 ' V 
O , O 
PovwBookHO 2 
o Q o 
^ PowerBookHD 3 5 
B . 
Mi 
CommuniCard RfC^rtt í 




Figure 2.5: Finder "desktop" display with some open windows. 
Under Macintosh system software prior to System 7, "Finder" refers to a version of 
the software that would permit only one application at a time to execute. That is, users 
could run the Finder or some other application, but not both at once. "MultiFinder" 
^INIT resources may also be located in files of certain types other than INIT. However, this will 
not be examined in detail here. 
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refers to a refinement of the Finder that would permit more than one application, in-
cluding MultiFinder itself, to execute at a time. It otherwise performs the same task as 
does Finder. MultiFinder was introduced with System 5 and was subsequently avail-
able with System 6 [46]. System 7 and later use "Finder" to refer to a version of the 
software descended from MultiFinder. System 7's Finder allows more than one ap-
plication at a time, including the Finder, to be executed. All subsequent releases of 
Finder had this ability. 
Application developers are able to designate an icon for each type of file that is 
created or "owned" by that application; these icons will be displayed by the Finder to 
represent the user's documents. Icon information is provided by resources from the 
application's resource fork; the Finder extracts this and a variety of other information 
from the application's resource fork, and stores it in a database for easy access. The 
location of the application on disk is also stored. 
To determine the icon to display for a document, the Finder checks its database 
for an icon corresponding to the document's type provided by the application with 
the same creator code as the document. When a document is double-clicked by the 
user, the Finder searches its database for an application whose creator code is the same 
as the document's creator code, and if found executes that application to process the 
document. 
Under system software prior to System 7, the Finder's database was stored in the 
resource fork of a file named "Desktop". This was an invisible file located in a disk's 
root directory. System 7 and later store the Finder's database in the data fork of two 
separate files, also invisible and located in a disk's root directory, unless the disk's 
size is less than 2 megabytes, in which case the old pre-System 7 "Desktop" file is 
used [42, pp. 9-3-9-4]. The Finder's database is more properly referred to as the 
"Desktop Database". 
Several viruses have been created that infected the Finder's desktop database. We 
discuss how these viruses worked in Section 2.4.2.7. 
The Windows "registry" is used to perform a similar function to the Finder's Desk-
top Database. A document file's creating application is identified only on the basis of 
the document's filename suffix, however. This means that only one application pro-
gram can be associated with each file suffix. The strategy used by the Macintosh allows 
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many applications to create the same types of files, if appropriate^, but for each file 
to be associated with the appropriate application. The Desktop Database may also be 
rebuilt if damaged simply by causing the Finder to scan a volume for application files 
when mounting the volume. 
2.4.2.5 Macs and Microprocessors 
The Macintosh was first introduced in 1984. It was based on the 68000 microprocessor 
from Motorola. Many later Macintosh models were based upon the 68020, 68030, 
68040 and 68LC040 microprocessors. Macintoshes based upon the 680x0 series of 
microprocessors are often collectively referred to as "68K Macintoshes", and code 
intended to run on these microprocessors as "68K code". 
In 1994, the first Macintosh computers based on the PowerPC series of micropro-
cessors were introduced. Ultimately, PowerPC microprocessors replaced 680x0 mi-
croprocessors in new Macintosh models. Macintoshes based upon a PowerPC micro-
processor are often collectively referred to as "PPC Macintoshes", and code intended 
to run on these microprocessors as "PPC code". 
The machine code of the 680x0 microprocessors was completely incompatible 
with the newer PowerPC microprocessors. This would present something of a problem 
in the transition from 68K to PPC, as old applications would be useless on a PPC Mac-
intosh and would need to be replaced immediately. To avoid this, and allow computer 
users to change to PPC-native applications at their leisure, Apple provided a 68LC040 
emulator as part of the system software of the PPC Macintosh machines [47, Ch. 1] 
that would allow 68K code to execute on a PPC-based machine. The emulator also 
meant that the implementation of operating system components where performance 
was not critical could be deferred to a later time. 
The performance of a program executing under emulation on a PPC Macintosh 
is obviously inferior to the performance of native PPC code running on the machine. 
It was often advantageous to build an application that contained 68K code and PPC 
code, and was therefore able to be executed on Macintoshes based on 68K or PPC mi-
croprocessors. The two code components are stored separately within the executable 
file. 
^TEXT files, containing ASCII text, are common. 
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The manner in which the executable code of an appHcation program is stored 
within the appUcation file is extensively documented in [48]. There are three basic 
code models: 
• application consisting of 68K code split into a number of code segments; the 
"classic" 68K runtime architecture. This variety of application can run under 
emulation on a PPC Macintosh. 
• application consisting of PPC code, based on code fragments. 
• application consisting of 68K code, based on code fragments, but typically also 
containing a small code segment based component, responsible for starting up 
the code fragment component on versions of the operating system that are unable 
to automatically perform this task. This variety of application cannot run under 
emulation on a PPC Macintosh. 
Either of the two 68K code models may be combined in the one application with the 
PPC code model. This results in an application which is able to run on a 68K or PPC 
based Macintosh. On a PPC Macintosh the 68K code is ignored in favour of the PPC 
code. A 68K based Macintosh of course ignores any PPC code that may be present. 
Viruses seen so far on the Macintosh that infect by modifying an application's code 
only infect the 68K code segments. Why then do users of PPC Macintoshes need to 
be concerned with viruses? 
• Many PPC applications contain at least a small 68K code segment based com-
ponent which indicates to the user that the application cannot be run on a 68K 
Macintosh; some will contain 68K code for the entire application. This 68K 
code segment based component can be infected with a virus and poses a danger 
to a user of a 68K Macintosh who should happen to run the application. This 
68K component may also be executed on a PPC Macintosh if the PPC code is 
intentionally removed. 
• Not all viruses work by modifying the application's code directly. Some add 
executable resources like the MDEF resource to an application to infect it with 
the virus. 68K definition procedures added to a PPC application by a virus will 
still work in a PPC environment. 
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• While there are currently no viruses that infect an application by modifying PPC 
code fragments, there is every reason to suppose that such viruses will be written 
in the future. 
As there are currently no viruses that modify code fragments, this code model will 
only be examined briefly. Code fragments are typically stored in the data fork of an 
application file, but may also be stored in resources in the resource fork. A resource 
known as the code fragment resource, or c f r g resource, with ID 0 is used to index 
the fragments stored in the data fork or resource fork. 
Applications based on code fragments can also import shared libraries. These 
might be more familiarly known to IBM PC users as dynamically linked libraries, or 
DLLs. The code fragments within a shared library could potentially be infected by a 
virus; no such viruses for the Macintosh are currently known. 
A code fragment based runtime environment is a more flexible and programmer-
friendly environment than the 68K code segment based runtime environment. With 
these advantages, however, comes greater complexity, which may have deterred Mac-




Figure 2.6: Simple illustration of a code segment based 68K application. The jump 
table (CODE 0) contains references to the entry points of routines that can be the 
subject of an intersegment reference. 
The structure of a code segment based 68K application is much simpler, how-
ever. Figure 2.6 is a simple illustration of a code segment based 68K application. The 
executable code of a 68K application based on this model is usually divided into a 
number of segments, each segment stored in a CODE resource. This has the advantage 
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that programs can be constructed so that only a subset of these resources is required in 
memory at a particular time; CODE resources not currently required can be removed 
from memory. Large, complex programs could then be executed in limited memory. 
A mechanism is needed to enable a routine located in one code segment to call 
a routine in another code segment. The code segment containing the routine being 
called may need to be loaded into memory. Intersegment references are handled by 
means of a structure called the jump table. To call a routine in another segment, a 
jump is executed to the jump table entry corresponding to the routine to be called. 
If the routine's code segment is not already present in memory, this entry contains a 
small snippet of code to load the segment into memory and then jump to it. Otherwise, 
the jump table entry contains a jump to the location in memory of the routine. If a 
segment is unloaded from memory, the jump table entries of routines in that segment 
are restored to their unloaded format. 
The jump table is stored in the CODE resource of ID 0. The first entry in the 
jump table indicates the routine that receives control when an application first begins 
executing. Not all compilers store the entire jump table in the CODE 0 resource; 
instead, an appropriate jump table is constructed in memory on execution, using data 
stored by the compiler. There are also different formats possible for the jump table, to 
support extra application capabilities. However, the first entry, specifying the routine 
that receives control when the application begins executing must always be present in 
the jump table. 
2.4.2.6 Organisation of Macintosh System Software 
Programs written for the PC invoke system software routines by executing a software 
interrupt. A table of addresses is maintained that stores the routine to be executed when 
a particular interrupt occurs. This means that the internals of the operating system can 
freely be modified by the operating system developers without affecting the function of 
application programs, which invoke system software routines via a software interrupt. 
A similar scheme is used by the Macintosh. For full details on how this is imple-
mented on a 68K Macintosh, consult [44, Ch. 8]. To invoke a system software routine, 
a program executes an instruction not implemented by a 680x0 microprocessor. This 
causes an exception handler provided by system software to be executed, which in turn 
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invokes the appropriate system software routine. 
The system software routine that handles the microprocessor's exception is referred 
to as the trap dispatcher. An exception resulting from executing one of the unimple-
mented instructions reserved for the purposes of invoking a system software routine 
is referred to as a trap; this term may also be applied to the unimplemented instruc-
tion itself. The trap dispatcher consults trap dispatch tables to determine the address 
of the routine to call to perform the operation required by the executing application 
program. 
Many system software routines have their own trap. Some, however, share a single 
trap. The specific routine that is required in this case is determined using a value from 
the stack or a register. 
The contents of the trap dispatch tables can be modified so that routines other than 
the normal system software routines are executed in response to a trap. This allows 
system software routines to be enhanced or replaced, and is referred to patching a 
trap. The "patch" is the routine replacing the system software routine in the trap 
dispatch tables. It is not uncommon for a trap patch to call the routine whose address 
it replaces in the trap dispatch tables. 
When using MultiFinder with System 6 or Finder with System 7 and later, each 
application is provided with its own copy of the trap dispatch tables. This ensures that 
patches installed by one application don't interfere with other applications running at 
the same time, and are disposed of when the application exits. A patch that applies to 
all applications must be installed during system startup. I N I T resources, described in 
Section 2.4.2.3, commonly contain code to install trap patches at system startup. 
Trap patching was a little different under System 6 and earlier when using Finder, 
rather than MultiFinder. System 6 using Finder was able to run only a single applica-
tion at a time, either Finder itself or one of the user's applications. Most significantly, 
trap patches installed by an application would still be present following the termina-
tion of the installing application, unless removed by the application before exiting^. 
These trap patches would then affect any applications that were subsequently run. 
^The author was unable to find any explicit written documentation for the behaviour of trap patches 
in system software before System 7. That trap patches are still present if not removed by an applica-
tion before exiting was verified experimentally using a Macintosh LC, System 6.0.8 with Finder, and 
MacsBug 6.5.3, a low-level debugger from Apple Computer. It was also verified that System 6.0.8 with 
MultiFinder behaves as per documentation describing trap patching under System 7 and later. 
2.4. Computer Virus Types and Strategies 32 
2.4.2.7 How Macintosh Viruses Work 
Now that the necessary background information on the Macintosh has been covered, 
we can look in detail at the workings of Macintosh viruses. 
Most Macintosh viruses modify the executable code of an application program in 
some way so that when the program is run, at some point during execution of the 
program the viral code is executed. This usually occurs as the first step in program 
execution. There are two common methods of achieving this goal: 
• A virus can alter the code segments of the application by adding a new code 
segment or modifying an existing one^; 
• A virus can add resources containing definition procedures that will be invoked 
implicitly during application execution. 
A less successful strategy for a virus is to infect only documents of type I N I T . 
These contain code which is intended to be loaded at system startup time. An example 
of a virus that employs this strategy is the INIT 1984 virus [39, 49]. 
Some viruses install patches so that viral code can receive control when particular 
operating system functions are invoked; the intention is to identify applications which 
are candidates for infection, and to infect suitable applications. These patches must be 
installed at system startup when using MultiFinder with System 6 or when using Sys-
tem 7 and later. This task is commonly performed using an I N I T resource. Although 
it is possible to modify an existing INIT resource, the common strategy is to create 
a new I N I T resource containing viral code. This resource may be added directly to 
the System file, or to documents of type I N I T located within the Extensions folder. 
A new document of type I N I T located in the Extensions folder may also be created 
to hold the resource. There are other places the resource may be located so that it is 
loaded at system startup, however. 
Many Macintosh viruses use I N I T resources to install patches at system startup 
time. 
^In some places, such as [38] and [39], Macintosh viruses using this strategy may be referred to as 
link viruses. It is important to distinguish between these viruses and PC link viruses, which are briefly 
described in Section 2.4.1.4 — unfortunately the names are the same, but the strategies are completely 
different. 
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Figure 2.7: Illustration of modifications made by virus that adds an additional CODE 
resource to an application to achieve infection. 
Figure 2.6 is an illustration of a normal 68K application, before it has been in-
fected with a virus. There are a number of ways in which viruses have modified an 
application's code segments to achieve infection: 
Strategy #1 
The virus adds a code segment to the application, in the form of an additional 
CODE resource, and modifies the first entry of the jump table to refer to the added 
viral CODE resource, so that the viral code receives control when the application 
starts executing. The original first jump table entry is saved by the virus so that 
it can return control to the application once it has completed its work. Other 
supplementary resources may also be added. The application's existing code 
segments, aside from the jump table, are not modified. This is the strategy that 
was used by the nVIR [50, 51] series of viruses^®, one of the most successful 
families of Macintosh viruses [52]. This strategy has also been used by the 
INIT 29 [53] viruses, the Scores virus [54] and by the CODE 32767 virus. This 
strategy is illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
Strategy #2 
Rather than adding an additional code segment to the application, or modifying 
the jump table, a virus can add its code to the end of an existing CODE resource, 
^^There are a number of very minor variants of the nVIR virus. The nVIR virus was named after the 
extra resources, of type nVIR, that it adds to an application and that hold other parts of the virus' code 
and data. nVIR variants function almost identically to nVIR itself, but add resources with different 
names. They are therefore named differently. 
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Figure 2.8: Illustration of modifications made by virus that adds its code to an existing 
CODE resource and modifies a routine to jump to the viral code. 
and modify the first few bytes of a routine in that CODE resource so that when 
the routine is called, the added viral code is invoked. The bytes replaced by 
the virus can be saved and restored after running the viral code. This strategy 
is used by the ANTI family of viruses^ ̂  A slight modification of this strategy 
was used by the T4 D virus: this virus replaces a call to InitDialogs, an 
operating system function usually invoked by an application when it first begins 
to execute, with a branch to appended viral code. Other members of the T4 
family are similar [39]. The strategy is illustrated in Figure 2.8. 
Strategy #3 
The third strategy that is seen is for the viral code to be added to the end of an 
existing CODE resource, and the jump table to be modified to pass control to the 
added viral code. The original jump table entry is saved so that control can be 
passed to the application after executing the viral code. This strategy is used by 
the ZUC family of viruses, and is illustrated in Figure 2.9. 
There are several ways in which an application can be infected by the addition 
of a resource containing the code for a definition procedure. Definition procedures 
are discussed in Section 2.4.2.3. Figure 2.10 illustrates the typical relationship of an 
^^Note that the ANTI family of viruses were rendered mostly ineffective by changes in the way trap 
patching was handled when MultiFinder was introduced under System 6. ANTI installs patches con-
taining viral code that seem to be expected to apply to all applications; however, since the introduction 
of MultiFinder, such patches must be installed at system startup time. ANTI's patches are removed 
once the installing application exits, so it has very few opportunities to infect further applications. See 
Section 2.4.2.6 for more details on the subject of trap patching. This is not a comment on the effec-
tiveness of the strategy used by ANTI to infect applications, merely on some technical details of that 
particular family of viruses that can affect its further replication under operating system versions more 
recent than System 6 using Finder. 
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Figure 2.9: Illustration of modifications made by virus that adds its code to an existing 




Figure 2.10: Illustration of typical relationship of application MENU and System MDEF. 
application menu with a default definition procedure^^. The first way in which such 
resources can be used in the implementation of a virus is by the addition of a definition 
procedure with the same type and ID as a standard definition procedure resource from 
the System file. The resource present in the application overrides that in the System 
file, also discussed in Section 2.4.2.3. For example, when an application's menus are 
created, any MDEFs required for these menus are loaded. Most menus use the System 
MDEF 0; the presence in the application of a MDEF 0 containing viral code means 
that it will be loaded and executed in place of the System MDEF 0. This strategy is 
used by the MDEF and MBDF families of viruses, and is illustrated in Figure 2.11. 
The second strategy that can be used is to change the ID of the resource containing 
a definition procedure to be used for drawing something like a menu. In the case of 
^^This relationship can be more complicated. As an example, consider the Appearance Manager, a 
system software component that was introduced with MacOS 8; versions that were compatible with 
some earlier versions of system software were subsequendy introduced. The System file contains old-
style definition procedures, MDEFs and the like, while a separate Appearance component includes up-
dated definition procedures to enhance the Macintosh GUI. Appearance definition procedures typically 
override the old-style versions contained in the System file; this may affect the correct operation of 
definition procedure-based viruses that attempt to infect the System file so that the viral code will be 
executed even when an uninfected application is executed, and may then infect the application. Other 
third-party system extensions to achieve similar results to the Appearance Manager may also affect the 
correct operation of such viruses. 
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Application System File 
Figure 2.11: Illustration of the relationship between an application MENU, a viral MDEF 
and the System MDEF. 
Application System File 
Figure 2.12: Illustration of the relationship between an application MENU, a viral MDEF 
and the System MDEF. 
a menu, this information is stored in the menu's MENU resource. By changing this 
information, when a menu is created, the viral MDEF resource is loaded and executed. 
This strategy also appears in the MDEF family of viruses, and is also used by members 
of the SevenDust family of viruses. Figure 2.12 illustrates the strategy. 
By changing the ID of the overridden resource containing the definition procedure 
in the System file to another value, and adding the resource containing the viral code 
with the original ID of the overridden resource, the viral code will be executed even 
when uninfected applications are executed. These applications can then be infected. 




System File (infected) 
Figure 2.13: Illustration of the relationship between an uninfected application and a 
System infected with a virus using an MDEF resource. 
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A combination of strategies is certainly possible. Members of the SevenDust fam-
ily of viruses infect applications by adding a MDEF resource containing the viral code 
to an application and altering a MENU resource to refer to the new resource. When an 
infected application is executed, an INIT resource containing viral code will be added 
to a new or existing file so that the viral code will be executed at system startup. A 
trap patch is then installed so that applications can be identified for infection. 
Special mention is required of the WDEF virus [55], once a common and success-
ful Macintosh virus [52]^^. As the name suggests, this virus infects using a definition 
resource. However, the definition resource is not added to an executable file! 
The WDEF virus adds a WDEF 0 resource containing the viral code to the re-
source file on each disk in which the System 6 Finder stores its desktop database, the 
"Desktop" file. The Desktop file is discussed in Section 2.4.2.4. This resource file 
is opened by the Finder when a disk is mounted, which occurs when a floppy disk 
is inserted, for example, and is held open while the disk is mounted. When the user 
subsequently opens a window within the Finder, the operating system will search for a 
WDEF 0 resource to perform window drawing operations; as the most recently opened 
resource files are searched first for resources, the viral WDEF 0 resource stored within 
the Desktop file will be found and executed in place of the operating system's WDEF 
0 resource. This is illustrated in Figure 2.14. 
Viral WDEF overrides S>'slem WDEF 
System File 
"MacintoshHD 1" Desktop File 
Other 
Resources 
"Macintosh HD 2" Desktop File 
Figure 2.14: Illustration of the strategy employed by the WDEF virus: a WDEF re-
source located in a floppy disk's Desktop file overrides the System's WDEF resource 
for the Finder. 
13 The CDEF virus uses a similar strategy to the WDEF virus. 
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The exact circumstances under which the WDEF 0 resource in a disk's Desktop file 
is executed is a little more complicated. To perform some simple tests, a custom WDEF 
resource was written that when executed invoked a low-level debugger to display an 
indication that the custom WDEF code had been called. On return from the debugger 
the original system WDEF resource is loaded and called. This custom WDEF resource 
was inserted into a floppy disk's Desktop file as WDEF 0. This mimics the non-viral 
behaviour of the WDEF virus. 
It seems that the custom WDEF resource will be executed when opening the infected 
floppy disk itself or any directory on the infected disk, or Finder/MultiFinder windows 
not directly related to disks and directories, such as the "About the Finder" window. 
Opening directories located on disks mounted before an infected floppy was mounted 
does not appear to result in the execution of the custom WDEF located in the floppy 
disk's Desktop file; this is perhaps because the Finder/MultiFinder has altered the 
resource search order in preparation to displaying the contents of the directory being 
opened, temporarily removing the floppy disk's Desktop file from the search path. As 
windows that are open when a disk is unmounted are re-opened when later the disk 
is mounted, the viral code could be executed as the result of inserting a floppy disk, 
without even executing any applications on the disk. 
Changes to the Finder in System 7 and later versions eliminated the threat from 
viruses such as WDEF that added resources containing viral code to a disk's Desktop 
file [56]. This is in part a result of shifting from storing the Desktop Database in a re-
source fork to storing it in the data fork across two files, for volumes over 2 megabytes 
in size, which meant that hard disks, which tend to have capacities considerably greater 
than 2 megabytes, were no longer vulnerable to infection. System 6 and the Macin-
tosh models capable of running it are, at the time of writing, very old; many models 
of Macintosh have since been produced that are not even capable of running System 
6. And more recent versions of the operating system do not seem to be vulnerable to 
the disk Desktop-infection technique used by this virus. So it is to be hoped that this 
information is of historical interest only. 
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2.4.2.8 HyperCard Viruses 
HyperCard is an application program which allows the creation, modification and "ex-
ecution" of documents referred to as "stacks". Stacks are composed of one or more 
"cards", and may use scripts written in HyperCard's scripting language HyperTalk [57] 
to handle user interaction with a stack or provide other functionality. For example, a 
script can be attached to a button on a card which will perform actions appropriate to 
the button when the button is clicked by the stack user. 
Executing a script or performing actions such as clicking on a button results in a 
"message" being sent. Handlers for messages are implemented using scripts. Handlers 
may be located in places other than the current stack. If a handler for a message is not 
available in a script attached to the object that is the target of the message, the message 
will be sent to the next object in the message-passing path. The message-passing path 
includes the "Home" stack. The "Home" stack is a special stack that is in the message-
passing path of all stacks. Handlers may also be present in the "Home" stack, and will 
be invoked if no more specific handler for a message is available. This fact may be 
exploited by viruses written in HyperTalk. Some similarities to the way many macro 
viruses that are hosted by applications such as Microsoft Word are apparent here [58] 
— a macro virus may copy its code to a location where it is available globally to all 
documents, so that uninfected documents may be infected with a copy of the virus' 
code. 
Viruses written in the scripting language HyperTalk are referred to as "HyperCard 
viruses". For more information on the workings of these viruses, consult [58] or [59]. 
HyperTalk is a flexible, powerful language. However, a script written in HyperTalk 
does not have the same access to facilities provided by the operating system as does a 
program written in a lower-level language such as C or Pascal. HyperTalk is extensible 
by means of resources of type XCMD or XFCN that contain executable code compiled 
from programs written in a language like C or Pascal. XCMD and XFCN resources are 
more examples of resources that contain executable code and which could potentially 
be infected by a Macintosh virus. 
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2.4.2.9 The AutoStart Worm 
In 1998, some malicious Macintosh software was discovered that used a novel tech-
nique for infection and transmission of the software from one computer to another. It 
was classified as a worm, because the software is capable of self-replication, but unlike 
a virus does not directìy attach itself to another executable file in some way. 
There are a number of members of the AutoStart worm family. They all use similar 
techniques. The novel technique used for infection by the worm will be examined here; 
for a more detailed treatment of the functioning of the AutoStart worm, consult [13]. 
The AutoStart worm takes its name from the novel technique it uses for infection. 
The AutoStart [60, pp. 533-534] [61, pp. 625-626] feature is supplied by Apple Com-
puter's QuickTime software. QuickTime is software that can be used by developers to 
create application programs that work with sounds, still images and movies, and sup-
ports a variety of formats for the data. The AutoStart feature, which was introduced 
with QuickTime 2.0, allows the designation of an application program or document to 
be loaded automatically when a storage medium such as a CD-ROM is mounted. 
This feature was intended to allow an application program or document to be 
loaded automatically when a CD-ROM is inserted, which may be useful for CD-ROM 
titles targeted at the educational or entertainment market. However, the AutoStart fea-
ture works for other types of media as well, such as floppy disks. 
It is very easy to set an application program to be executed when a disk is mounted: 
it is necessary only to specify the name of the program in the appropriate location in a 
disk's boot blocks. We refer to the program so designated as the "AutoStart program". 
It must be located in a disk's root directory, and it may be an invisible file. It is 
therefore not obvious that a disk is infected. 
The worm spreads from computer to computer via disks where the AutoStart pro-
gram has been set to be the worm's program file. When the disk is inserted, the Au-
toStart program is executed and the worm infects the system so that the worm program 
will be executed whenever the system is rebooted. 
Fortunately, it is very easy to prevent infections by this worm. This requires only 
that the AutoStart feature be disabled. However, this is possible only in QuickTime 
2.5 and later. 
Although QuickTime has been made available for users of Microsoft Windows, 
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QuickTime's AutoStart feature is not available to Windows users as it is dependent on 
certain features of Apple Computer's disk formats. 
2,4.3 Macro Viruses 
A macro can be thought of as a collection of statements in some language that per-
form a task when interpreted or otherwise executed. Macro facilities are provided by 
many application packages to allow users of the package to automate tasks encoun-
tered when using the package that are common or repetitive, or to otherwise customise 
an application package to some degree. 
Some application packages provide more than a simple scripting language that can 
be used to control the application in some basic ways, instead providing an interpreter 
for a complete programming language. Microsoft Word is perhaps the best-known 
of these applications. Microsoft Word 6 provided as its macro language a version of 
BASIC '̂̂  that was called WordBasic. Microsoft Word 6 was the first implementation of 
Word to provide this macro language in both the Macintosh and PC implementations. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, virus writers learned how to use the macro language pro-
vided by Microsoft Word to create viruses. Writing WordBasic macro viruses is much 
more straightforward than implementing other varieties of virus, such as a file or boot 
sector infecting virus. There are a variety of ways in which a Word macro virus may 
arrange for its execution at some point in time, all of which have been used in a number 
of macro viruses [62]; some of these are: 
• There are a number of macros referred to as "auto macros", that if present in 
a document or the Word environment are executed when certain actions are 
performed within Word. These include AutoOpen, which will be executed 
whenever a document is opened, and AutoClose, which is executed when a 
document is closed. There are several other "auto macros". 
• Macros with names like FileSave or FileSaveAs that are contained within 
a document will override the corresponding "system" macro. So, for example, a 
FileSaveAs macro in the active document will be executed when the "Save 
"̂̂ BASIC is an acronym for "Beginner's All-purpose Symbolic Instruction Code". It is a general-
purpose programming language once commonly used by novice programmers, because it is relatively 
simple and easy to learn. 
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As" option is selected from the "File" menu, rather than the normal "system" 
macro that performs this function. 
• Menu items can be replaced with substitutes that invoke a virus' macro when 
that menu item is selected by the user. 
• Almost any keypress can be associated with a macro. The macro will be exe-
cuted when its corresponding keypress is detected. 
The concept of a macro virus is not new. The possibility of a macro virus was de-
scribed by Highland in 1989 [63, 64], but it was not until 1995 that one of the first of 
these viruses. Concept [65], appeared and spread widely around the world. There are 
many useful references describing macro viruses in general and dealing with aspects 
of the macro virus problem, including [62, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71]. For example, one 
interesting aspect of some macro viruses is that they are able to incorporate macros 
from other macro viruses or non-viral macro packages, to create what may be thought 
of as a "new" virus, or are capable of replicating with a reduced set of macros. Prob-
lems such as these can create difficulties for anti-virus developers when implementing 
strategies to deal with macro viruses. 
By the end of March 1999, almost 600 macro virus strains were known, represent-
ing almost 3700 macro virus variants in total [72]. By the end of September 1999, 
775 macro virus strains were known, which represented almost 4600 total macro vims 
variants [73]. Most of these macro viruses are targeted at versions of Microsoft Word. 
A variety of other classes of malicious macro software are also listed, including some 
macro virus generators, which are small programs intended to be used to automatically 
generate new macro viruses, and some macro trojan horses. 
These viruses are remarkable because they exist as executable code embedded 
within what appears to the computer user as a document file. Since the macros are 
interpreted by the application package rather than compiled into machine-specific exe-
cutable code, they are executed within their host application on any computer hardware 
platform to which the host application package has been ported. Many Microsoft Word 
macro viruses work well within Microsoft Word running on a PC or a Macintosh, for 
example. Differences can arise, however, if a virus attempts to make use of functional-
ity that is provided by its host application on one particular platform and not a similar 
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version on another platform. This can be the case when the functionality in question 
relates to access to the underlying operating system, for example. 
Macro viruses are now more successful than file or boot sector infecting viruses, 
responsible for in excess of 65% of reported virus incidents in the months January 
to December 1999; in nine months of 1999 macro viruses were responsible for in 
excess of 80% of reported virus i n c i d e n t s I t is likely that these viruses are more 
successful than file or boot sector infecting viruses because the exchange of documents 
is arguably much more common than the exchange of executable files, which may be 
infected with a file infecting virus, or disks that might be infected with a boot sector 
virus^^. E-mail enables rapid distribution of infected documents between computers 
locally and at remote sites. 
Later versions of Microsoft Word beginning with the version included with Office 
97 for PCs, and Office 98 for Macintoshes, replaced WordBasic with Visual Basic for 
Applications (VBA). Other applications, such as Microsoft Excel and PowerPoint also 
provide VBA as their macro language; some versions of Excel released prior to Office 
97 supported a version of Visual Basic for Applications. 
It is certainly possible to implement macro viruses using Visual Basic for Appli-
cations. Furthermore, in the interests of maximum compatibility, the ability to convert 
macros from Word 6's WordBasic to Visual Basic for Applications was provided. This 
meant that viruses written in WordBasic could in some cases be converted to viruses 
that would function effectively in the environment provided by Word 97. Some protec-
tion against "upconverting" common WordBasic macro viruses was provided by Mi-
crosoft, but was found to be not wholly effective in stopping the translation of viruses 
from WordBasic to VBA. 
As the applications Microsoft Word, PowerPoint and Excel provided with Office 
97 share a common macro language. Visual Basic for Applications, virus writers have 
been able to create viruses that are capable of cross-infecting between the different 
applications that are part of Office 97. Shiver [76] is capable of infecting both Word 
97 documents and Excel 97 spreadsheets. Triplicate [77] is capable of infecting Word 
97 documents. Excel 97 spreadsheets and PowerPoint 97 presentations. 
^^According to prevalence tables published in Virus Bulletin. 
^^File-based viruses or worms that utilise network distribution methods such as e-mail also made a 
strong showing in 1999. These viruses or worms include ExploreZip [74] and Ska [75]. 
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There even exists at least one virus, Beast [78], that is capable of cross-infecting 
between the Windows environment and Word 97 documents. The virus consists of 
two parts: a VBA macro and an ordinary Windows executable. When an infected 
Word document is opened, the virus' VBA macro installs and executes its Windows 
executable component. The Windows executable component of the virus checks for 
uninfected active Word documents periodically, infecting any that become available. 
Infection of Word documents takes place using facilities provided by Word and Win-
dows. Although the virus does not attempt to infect Windows executables, it does not 
require much imagination to see that this would be a direction in which this style of 
attack could be extended. 
Office 97 applications will warn the user when documents containing customiza-
tions such as macros are being opened, and permit these customizations to be disabled. 
However, the warning may be easily turned off, and in any case does not really assist 
the user in determining if a document is infected. 
Office 2000 supports low, medium and high security modes to determine the ac-
ceptability of macros. Macros are either always acceptable, acceptable subject to user 
authorization, or never acceptable. However, support for digitally signed macros is 
also included; signed macros from a source that has previously been designated by 
the user as being "trusted" are always acceptable and will be enabled without warn-
ing [79, 80]. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that macro viruses exist for a variety of other ap-
plication packages, as can be seen by browsing a list of known macro viruses such 
as [73]. However, macro viruses capable of infecting Word documents, Excel spread-
sheets or PowerPoint presentations are by far the most common varieties of macro 
virus currently known. 
2.4.4 Polymorphism and Stealth 
2.4.4.1 Polymorphism 
An easy way to identify a computer virus infecting an executable object such as a file 
or a boot sector is to search the object for a sequence of bytes found only in the code 
of that particular virus and in no non-viral code. The sequence of bytes is known as 
the virus' signature. 
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How could a virus attempt to hide its signature so it is more difficult to detect? 
Well, one strategy is to encrypt the body of the virus using a variable key for different 
infections. That way, the only constant piece of viral code from which a signature can 
be extracted is the small routine responsible for decrypting the main body of the virus. 
The encryption routine does not need to be particularly sophisticated: its sole aim 
is to alter the appearance of the vims' code. As the key used to encrypt the code must 
be available to enable the subsequent decryption of the code, no secrecy is provided. 
A more complicated strategy is to not only encrypt using a variable key, but to use 
a variety of different decryption routines. Now the virus may only be characterised by 
a small set of signatures, one for each of its decryption routines. 
The most sophisticated strategies that have been developed to alter the appearance 
of a virus' code is to use encryption with a variable key, and also manipulate the de-
cryption routine in such a way that there are a large number of possible decryption 
routines that all differ in appearance but ultimately perform the same task, that of 
decrypting the virus' code. If done well, there will be a very large number of decryp-
tion routines that may be generated, and it will be impossible to pick a scan string 
to identify the virus on the basis of its decryption routine. This strategy has come to 
be known as polymorphism [15, 81]. Viruses that employ a strategy such as this are 
termed polymorphic viruses. 
Some strategies for altering the appearance of code that can be used by a virus 
writer to implement polymorphism include [82] [4, pp. 199-215]: 
Instruction Equivalence: 
Replace machine instructions with another from a set of equivalent instructions 
that achieve the same effect. 
Instruction Reordering: 
Rearrange a sequence of independent or semi-independent instructions into a 
different order which still results in equivalent operation. 
Garbage Insertion: 
Insert instructions into a sequence of instructions that have no effect on the out-
come of the sequence of instructions. An example would be the insertion of NOP 
(No Operation) instructions, or instructions that perform operations on registers 
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that are not otherwise used in the sequence of instructions. 
Build and Execute: 
Include code to construct, somewhere in memory, the code that will perform a 
particular task rather than writing code to perform that task directly. Once built, 
execute the code to perform the required task. 
Intermixing Operations: 
Interleave the individual instructions from two sequences of code that perform 
independent tasks such that the two tasks occur simultaneously rather than in 
sequence. 
Note that these strategies could also be applied to the main body of the virus code 
instead of using some form of encryption to conceal it. 
An interesting article discussing the encryption methods used by various early 
viruses is [83]. Some of these viruses use strategies such as those listed above to 
implement polymorphism. 
A variety of modules have been created that can be used by a virus writer to make 
any virus polymorphic. So a virus writer is in theory able to create difficult-to-detect 
polymorphic viruses without expending much effort on the polymorphic parts at all. 
These polymorphic engines include MtE, the "Mutation Engine" [84] or "Mutating 
Engine" [4, p. 51], or NED, the "Nuke Encryption Device". 
However, anti-vims techniques have been developed that can detect viruses using 
sophisticated polymorphic strategies. Brief descriptions of a number of strategies that 
have been implemented to detect polymorphic viruses can be found in [85]. Poly-
morphic viruses in general do not present the same level of difficulty for anti-virus 
techniques as was once the case. 
Forms of polymorphism can also be implemented by macro viruses. The sorts of 
techniques that can be used include [62, 66]: 
• Changing the names of variables used in the virus' macro code; 
Insertion of WordBasic or VBA operators into the macro code that have no effect 
on the normal operation of the virus; 
Insertion of comments into the macro code; 
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• Swapping around the WordBasic or VBA operators used in the virus' macro 
code in such a way that the vims' normal operation is not affected. 
Many of these strategies are similar to the ones listed above that may be applied di-
rectly to a virus' binary code. 
Encryption within a macro vims can be achieved by treating the majority of the 
vims code as a text string which can be encrypted and inserted into the vims as com-
ment with an associated decryption loop. This strategy is used by the Quoter macro 
vims [86]. 
2.4.4.2 Stealth 
Many vimses, when active in a computer system, will attempt to conceal signs of their 
presence in infected executable objects. A virus that employs such techniques has 
come to be referred to as a stealth virus [4, pp. 51-52] [84]. 
As a simple example, a boot sector infecting vims active in memory might attempt 
to conceal signs of its presence on infected disks. This can be done by intercepting 
requests to read from an area of the disk, such as the boot sector, that has been modified 
by the vims. Instead of retuming a boot sector infected by the vims, retum the original 
contents of the boot sector before the disk was infected. 
This strategy is most straightforward for boot sector vimses, as these vimses mod-
ify a small number of sites on an infected disk. The Brain vims, one of the very 
first vimses for the IBM-PC, was a boot sector vims that employed techniques as de-
scribed above [2, 3], and many other boot sector vimses have since employed similar 
techniques. Stealth is more complicated for file infecting vimses, as the viral code is 
not found in one convenient place on disk. 
If the vims is active in memory, reading an infected object will not reveal signs of 
the vims' presence. The most reliable way to detect the presence of a stealth virus is 
to boot the computer from a disk containing the operating system and that is known to 
be uninfected. This ensures that the virus will not be active in memory when attempts 
are made to search executable objects for signs of infection. 
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2.5 Potential Damage by Computer Viruses 
The damage that can be inflicted by a computer virus is limited only by the vims 
writer's imagination, and the permissions of the user that is unknowingly running the 
virus. This statement is not particularly useful for illustrating the damage that can be 
inflicted by a computer virus, however. To illustrate this, some types of damage that 
can be inflicted by computer viruses will be discussed. We'll also look briefly at some 
of the computer viruses and worms that received considerable media attention in 1999, 
as a result of a number of high-profile incidents. 
A useful discussion of types of damage that can be inflicted by a computer virus 
can be found in [87]. Arguments against benevolent viruses are presented in [88]; 
many of these arguments arise as a result of types of damage that can be performed by 
a computer virus. 
Computer viruses cause damage to a computer system in a variety of ways. This 
may occur as a result of the infection of an executable object — for example, an 
overwriting vims will destroy part of the executable object it infects. Or the "damage" 
may be that the presence of the vims on a computer system causes system instability or 
degradation of performance of a computer system, both possibilities resulting in loss 
of productivity of affected workers, and the need to divert resources into the removal 
of the vims and restoration of normal operations. Damage can also occur as a result 
of bugs, or programmer errors, in the vims. For example, the Jerusalem virus fails to 
mark . EXE files it infects appropriately, and so infects them multiple times. Infected 
files can become so extended in length by repeated infections with this vims that they 
become too large to fit into available memory [3]. 
More intangibly, passing along a computer virus infection could result in a loss of 
goodwill towards the company or person responsible. 
Computer vimses and worms have received some media attention in 1999, as a 
result of a number of high-profile incidents. The viruses or worms responsible were: 
Melissa Word Macro virus [89, 90, 91, 92,93, 94, 95]: 
The most notable feature of this vims is that when first executed on a computer 
system it will use certain versions of the e-mail program Microsoft Outlook to e-
mail infected documents to the first 50 e-mail addresses in each Outlook address 
book. The virus can spread so rapidly that mail servers may be overloaded with 
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huge volumes of Melissa-generated e-mail. 
Chernobyl/CIH virus [27,96,97]: 
The most interesting feature of the CIH virus is that it is capable of rendering 
certain types of PCs unbootable when its damage routine is triggered. It does 
this by erasing some of the code in ROM required to boot the computer. Nor-
mally it is impossible to modify the contents of a ROM chip. However, many 
computers now incorporate ROMs that can be reprogrammed if necessary, mak-
ing it easier to update important routines stored in these reprogrammable ROMs. 
The CIH virus, by erasing code required to boot the computer, renders the com-
puter effectively unusable pending repair. It is easy to see that this could result 
in considerable expense and inconvenience. 
ExploreZip worm [74, 98, 99,100]: 
A standalone piece of malicious software, ExploreZip propagates either by send-
ing e-mail containing the worm program in reply to new e-mail received by an 
infected computer, or via file sharing. It inflicts damage on a system by attempt-
ing to truncate certain varieties of file, such as those belonging to Microsoft 
Office programs, to zero length. 
Viruses that inflict massive, immediate damage on a computer system, perhaps by 
wiping disks or in the manner of the CIH virus, outlined above, are, in fact, less of a 
threat than viruses which perform more subtle varieties of damage. This is because the 
damage done makes the presence of the virus obvious and limits future opportunities 
to spread to other computers. However, such viruses can be very inconvenient to those 
to whom damage is done. 
A data-diddling virus [101] performs its damage by altering data files. These 
changes can be difficult to detect, as data files change legitimately on a frequent basis. 
Damaged files may be incorporated into backups; older backups with undamaged ear-
lier versions of files may be discarded or recycled. Therefore, recovering from such 
a virus attack can be difficult. This style of attack has been implemented by some 
viruses, for example: 
• Nomenklatura swaps the order in a disk's file allocation table of clusters making 
up large files. If this has been happening for some time, reconstructing the 
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original ordering of a file's clusters can be difficult [87]. 
• Variants of the Wazzu macro virus will move up to 3 words in a document being 
opened to some other place in the document, or insert the word 'wazzu' at some 
point in the document [102]. 
A virus could also be designed to mount an extortion-based attack, by using cryp-
tographic techniques. Such a virus could encrypt some of a user's important files, such 
as those used to store electronic cash, in such a way that the user is unable to recover 
the encrypted material without either a recent backup or the assistance of the virus 
writer [103]. 
Viruses could also be employed as an information-gathering mechanism. Pass-
words would be a useful target. Again, cryptographic techniques can be used not only 
to render the information useless to someone besides the virus writer, but also to con-
ceal the quantity of information collected [104]. 
It has been proposed that computer viruses could be used to perform a distributed 
computation covertly [105]. Problems faced by such a virus are the distribution of 
work and the reporting of any results found to the architect of the scheme. Some 
problems, such as performing a search for the key used to encrypt a block of data 
using a cryptosystem such as the Data Encryption Standard (DBS), can be undertaken 
by randomly choosing a work element. However, as for reporting results found, the 
best that can sometimes be done is for future generations of the virus to carry along 
results found so far, in the hope that at some time in the future, these results will find 
their way back to the sender of the virus. The increasing popularity of the Internet 
can offer a solution to both the distribution of work and the return of results: a virus 
could use the network, when available, to achieve both tasks. In Chapter 5 some non-
viral malicious software that performs covert distributed computing and that uses the 
Internet for the distribution of its code and for fetching work and reporting results will 
be discussed. In Chapters 7 and 8, some problems are discussed that can benefit from 
an approach using distributed computing and that are not well-suited to processing by 
picking a random work element. 
Clearly, because of the almost unlimited potential for damage possessed by com-
puter viruses, and the speed with which viruses are able to spread in the modem net-
worked environment using mechanisms such as e-mail, it is important that viruses be 
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identified and removed as rapidly as possible. There are a variety of strategies that can 
be pursued to help prevent virus infection, or to detect the presence of viruses. 
2.6 Anti-virus l^pes and Strategies 
It would seem to be desirable to either prevent viruses from becoming established in a 
computer system, or to detect and remove them as soon as possible should the system 
become infected. How can this be achieved? 
There are a variety of non-technical solutions, for example: 
• Boot sector viruses are a significant problem for users of IBM PCs. Systems 
are commonly infected by leaving an infected floppy disk in the floppy drive 
at system startup time; frequently the default startup sequence is to attempt to 
startup from the floppy drive, if a disk is present, which results in viral code 
being executed. On many systems, this can be prevented by changing the order 
in which drives are searched for a bootable device to check the hard drive first, 
rather than the floppy drive. 
• One way that macro viruses spread is by the exchange of infected documents in 
e-mail. Some e-mail readers may be configured to automatically open received 
documents with an appropriate application; if this is configured to be Microsoft 
Word, any viral macros present in the document may be executed when the doc-
ument is automatically opened. Instead, configure such programs to use some-
thing like the Microsoft Word Viewer to open documents received in e-mail. A 
variety of other useful techniques for dealing with macro viruses can be found 
in [106], or alternatively [107, 108, 109, 110]. 
• Exercise caution in deciding to execute executable programs that have been re-
ceived from untrusted sources. For example, it is not unknown to receive small 
executable programs from friends or colleagues that perform some amusing or 
interesting function. Such programs can also function well as a carrier of a virus 
from one computer system to another, or may be a trojan horse program that 
could, for example, install a backdoor into the computer system which can later 
be used to gain unauthorized access. 
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• It is important to keep up with patches, security related and otherwise, released 
for any operating systems and application packages in use. Flaws in operat-
ing system or application software can facilitate access of malicious code to a 
computer system. Due to the complexity of modem software, it would seem 
that problems such as this are inevitable. For example, BubbleBoy [111] is 
a virus/worm written in Visual Basic Script which is spread via e-mail and is 
executed as a result merely of reading an e-mail message, without explicitly ex-
ecuting any attachments. This is possible because of an operating system flaw 
which has been patched. Following application of this patch, a system is no 
longer vulnerable to an attack utilising that particular flaw. 
• Good backups are important in recovering from a computer virus infection. This 
includes keeping a backup of the Master Boot Record (MBR) and boot sector, 
both of which may be modified by a boot sector virus or multipartite virus. By 
themselves, however, backups are not the answer: 
- In Section 2.5, we have seen that there are existing viruses that are designed 
to corrupt files in such a way that corrupt versions of the files will be backed 
up, possibly replacing uncorrupted versions; 
- Backups may not be particularly useful in dealing with a macro vims. 
This is because documents, such as Microsoft Word documents, commonly 
change frequently. So the vims cannot be eradicated by replacing infected 
documents from a backup; 
- There are also no guarantees that backed-up executable objects are not in-
fected by a vims [112]; if a virus has been present in a computer system 
for a sufficiently long time before being detected, backed-up executables 
may also be infected. How should a backed-up executable be determined 
to be virus-free? 
More useful techniques to reduce the threat posed by computer viruses can be found 
in [113]. 
There has, however, been considerable effort expended in developing anti-vims 
software to detect the presence of viruses either before or after the computer system has 
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become infected. In many cases, these viruses may even be removed — the infected 
program is "disinfected" — to restore the infected program to its original state. 
Recall from Section 2.2, however, that it is not possible to detect 100% of viruses. 
So these anti-virus techniques will not be perfect — they will suffer from false posi-
tives, which occur when a file is identified as being infected by a virus when in fact 
it is clean, or false negatives, which occur when a file is declared to be clean when 
in fact it is infected with a virus. However, with sufficient work on the part of the 
developers of anti-virus software, the rate of false positives and false negatives can be 
made very low. Users of these products must also invest time, energy and money on an 
ongoing basis in ensuring that any updates made available by the product's developers 
are installed in a timely fashion; use of outdated security products can contribute to a 
false sense of security and leave the user vulnerable to new attacks. 
The common types of anti-vims techniques are as follows: 
• Scanner; 
• Integrity Checker; and 
• Behaviour Blocker/Activity Monitor. 
A good defense can be achieved by a combination of these anti-virus techniques, the 
goal being to make the creation of a vims that is able to avoid all the implemented 
defenses as difficult as possible [114]. 
We also consider briefly possible future developments in anti-vims technologies. 
2.6.1 Scanner 
A vims scanner attempts to detect the presence of a vims in a file by searching for the 
signature of that vims in the file. The signature of a vims is a sequence of bytes, not 
necessarily contiguous, that are thought to characterise that virus — the signature is 
unlikely to occur in a normal, uninfected executable file, so finding it is then a reason-
able indication that the file is infected with the vims corresponding to the signature. 
If possible, it is useful to use several different vims scanners to confirm a virus 
infection, should one be detected. This can help to reduce the significance of false 
positive alerts from a scanner. 
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. Scanners are able to exactly identify a vims, by computing a checksum or hash 
value of the invariant portions of the virus' body, for example. It may then be possible 
for the scanner to disinfect the infected files. However, as we have seen, it is possible 
to write viruses in such a way that the original state of the file cannot be restored. 
The most reliable way to remove a vims from an executable object is to replace the 
executable object from a backup if possible. 
There are, however, a number of problems with this approach to virus detection [4]: 
1. A scanner can only detect viruses for which it has a signature; it cannot detect 
vimses that were unknown when the scanner, or its virus signature collection, 
was released. 
2. New viruses are constantly being written. To be able to detect new viruses, 
scanners must be frequently updated. Occasionally, updating a scanner will re-
quire the acquisition of a new version of the scanner program rather than just the 
scanner's data files. 
3. Scanners are not good at detecting polymorphic viruses. Polymorphism is dis-
cussed in Section 2.4.4.1. Such viruses attempt to minimise the number of bytes 
that can be used to form a signature for that virus. 
4. Scanners require a certain level of discipline from the users. Users must mn the 
scanner to check disks, such as floppy disks from other users, for infection at 
regular intervals. Executable programs or documents that might potentially con-
tain a macro virus and that have been downloaded from the Intemet or received 
in e-mail are potential sources of infection and should be checked for viruses 
before use. 
Solutions to some of these problems have been devised. 
Problem #1 prompted the development of heuristic analysis [115,116]. Heuristics 
in this case are a set of rules that can be applied to executable code to determine the 
possibility that the executable code contains a vims. Heuristics can be both positive — 
the presence of code to perform a particular function contributes to the belief that the 
executable code contains a virus — and negative — the presence of code to perform 
certain functions, like interacting with the user or displaying windows on the screen. 
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detracts from the belief that the executable code contains a virus. Good results can be 
obtained using heuristic analysis; however, it is likely that a number of false positives 
and false negatives will also occur. There are no guarantees that a particular unknown 
virus will be detected by heuristic analysis. 
Once information on the behaviours exhibited by a program has been collected, this 
information must still be interpreted to conclude if there is enough evidence to declare 
that code is likely to be a virus. Artificial intelligence techniques may be of use: for 
example, neural networks have been applied with some success to the detection of boot 
sector infecting viruses [117]. 
There are several ways in which problem #3 might be addressed. The first possible 
solution is to produce a custom detection algorithm for each polymorphic virus or 
polymorphic engine with which a scanner has problems [84]. This is time-consuming 
and would otherwise seem to be a poor general approach in the long term. A number 
of other solutions that have been implemented to help detect polymorphic viruses are 
summarised in [85]. A more general solution is to implement some form of generic 
decryption [15, 118, 85]. 
A polymorphic virus must decrypt the main body of its code before execution. 
The main body of its code is usually static. Ordinary signature scanning or heuristic 
analysis can be applied to the virus once its main body has been decrypted. Generic 
decryption attempts to emulate the program under investigation past the point at which 
the virus code has been decrypted. The decrypted virus code can then be scanned 
for signatures in the usual way. There are some difficulties in performing generic 
decryption: the first is deciding when to stop emulating a program under investigation. 
This is a problem not only because polymorphic viruses will execute different numbers 
of instructions in the process of decrypting the virus body, but also because some 
viruses are written so that the virus receives control at some point during the execution 
of the infected file, rather than immediately on execution. The second problem faced 
in the implementation of generic decryption is deciding which of the many possible 
CPU architectures should be used to emulate the program. 
Emulating a program's execution can also be used in the performance of heuristic 
analysis: rather than examining the code directly, which may be written to obscure the 
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function that the code performs by using techniques similar to those used by polymor-
phic viruses but applied to a different end, a heuristic analyser can gather information 
based on the actions performed by emulated code [116]. 
A solution to problem #4 is to provide a memory-resident scanner component that 
is able to scan files or disks for viruses v^hen accessed. So an executable program might 
be scanned for viruses before being run, or a Word document before being interpreted 
by Microsoft Word. Users are no longer required to be particularly disciplined in 
scanning files — instead, files will be scanned when used. 
Some possible solutions to problem #2 will be discussed in Section 2.6.5. 
The detection and disinfection of macro viruses poses some special problems for 
anti-vims developers. For example, it is not usually possible to replace the infected ob-
ject from a backup copy, because the document to which the viral macros are attached 
may have changed substantially since the last uninfected backup copy was made; it 
must be disinfected in some way, even if this requires that all macros be removed from 
an infected document. These problems are discussed in greater detail in [62, 66]. 
Finally, scanners have the advantage over other forms of anti-virus software that 
they can be used to identify files infected by a virus before that virus has been executed 
and has had a chance to spread. Other anti-virus techniques can detect evidence of a 
virus' spread or the actions performed by a virus. 
2.6.2 Integrity Checker 
The idea behind an integrity checker is that a virus must change something when it 
infects a file or disk. So viruses can be detected by monitoring files for changes. This 
is done by computing some form of checksum or hash value, which is a short string 
of bytes derived in some manner from the contents of the file in question. The method 
for computing the checksum or hash value should ensure that any change in the file 
produces a different checksum or hash value, and that it is hard to forge this value — 
that it is infeasible to find a modified program such that the hash values of the two 
programs are identical. 
The checksum can then be recomputed at a later date. If the value has changed 
from its original computation, then the file in question has been changed. 
It is important that it be infeasible to find a modified program such that the hash 
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values or checksums of the original, unmodified program and the modified version are 
identical. Otherwise, a virus can compute the extra changes required to make the hash 
value for a modified program match that of the unmodified program [114]. However, 
as different integrity checking products may use different methods for computing the 
checksum, such attacks are unlikely to be successful against all products. 
However, an integrity checker does not detect viruses —just changes in files. If a 
file has changed, then this may be the result of it being infected by a virus. The file in 
question may have been updated by the user; installing updates to software is not an 
uncommon activity. A file may even have altered as part of the normal functioning of 
the application package to which it belongs. Only the user is able to determine why a 
file might have been altered. 
Furthermore, an integrity checker is not able to detect viruses in files that were 
infected before the integrity checker computed checksums for files in its database. It 
is also not able to determine if a file downloaded from the Internet or received in e-
mail is infected with a virus, because in most cases no checksum is available to verify 
that what was received by the user is really what was originally distributed by the 
file's sender. Viruses may only be detected once they have had a chance to spread. 
Unfortunately, this means that these viruses may also have had a chance to do some 
damage. 
Viruses are detected by detecting modification in files containing executable code. 
So integrity checkers are vulnerable to an attack by a virus that is able to infect ex-
ecutable files without altering any code, unless such attacks have been considered 
during the implementation of the integrity checker. Companion viruses, discussed in 
Section 2.4.1.3 use such a strategy. A variety of such attacks against integrity checkers 
and countermeasures for these are discussed in [35]. 
Advantages that integrity checkers have over virus scanners include: 
• An integrity checker is able to detect unknown viruses. Unknown viruses are 
detected as a result of the changes made in files as the virus spreads. 
• Polymorphic viruses pose no problems to an integrity checker; polymorphism is 
useful only for altering the appearance of the virus. The virus must still make 
changes, which can be detected by the integrity checker. 
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Considerable research has been performed into the nature of the algorithm required 
to compute the checksum or hash value and other aspects of the integrity checking 
process. For a sample of material, see [119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 4]. 
Bontchev [35] is a very detailed discussion of issues, such as virus attacks directed 
against integrity checkers, relating to integrity checkers and their implementation. 
Algorithms to produce hash values are also heavily studied in the cryptographic lit-
erature. These algorithms, known as hash functions, may be used in conjunction with 
a public-key cryptosystem to produce a signature for a message to allow authentica-
tion of the sender of a message, or verification that the message has not been tampered 
with. A key property of a useful hash function is that it is difficult to find two messages 
with the same hash value. It is also useful if a hash function is fast: able to process 
data very rapidly to produce a hash value. These properties may also be useful for 
anti-virus purposes. An example of a well-known hash function is MD5 [127]. More 
hash functions, and references to further reading, can be found in [128] by a reader 
interested in pursuing this topic. 
Finally, the application of an integrity checking strategy to the detection of macro 
viruses poses some special problems. As the non-macro part of the document may 
change frequently, computing the checksum or hash value for an entire document is 
not useful. The macro areas alone must be examined. There is also a variety of "com-
panion" attack that can be implemented by a macro virus, so that viral macros are not 
added directly to a document to infect it [62]. 
2.6.3 Behaviour Blocker/Activity IMonitor 
This sort of anti-virus program attempts to detect the presence of an active virus by 
monitoring the computer's operation for activity that is considered to be indicative of 
the presence of a virus. For example, it might be considered suspicious to attempt 
to alter in some way another executable object or some component of the operating 
system. 
Problems with this sort of anti-virus measure include: 
• Viruses may make use of operating system implementation weaknesses to ac-
complish their goals, but it is not required that a virus do so; most of the opera-
tions that a virus performs have entirely legitimate applications. 
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• Some viruses will attempt to bypass operating system patches installed by a 
behaviour blocker to monitor system activity. Some Macintosh viruses, for ex-
ample, contain code to attempt to redirect traps called by the vims to ROM code 
on certain machines. If successful, the behaviour blocker will fail to alert even 
though the virus is active. 
• Blocking a suspicious action can have unexpected consequences. If the action 
is not being performed by a virus, or if the action is being performed by a virus 
but is part of an already partly-completed sequence of actions, then blocking the 
action may leave files in an inconsistent, damaged state. 
• If an action is considered to be suspicious, it is not uncommon to leave the de-
cision over whether or not to permit the action to take place to the user of the 
software. This can be irritating if it happens frequently not as a result of the 
actions of a virus, generating many false positives, but also may require a rea-
sonably detailed knowledge of the current operating environment to determine 
whether or not an action is permissible. 
2.6.4 Other Anti-Virus Techniques 
There are a variety of other anti-virus techniques that have been suggested but that see 
little use in practice, for a variety of reasons. These techniques include use of snapshots 
during the computer bootstrap process [114, 1291 [4, pp. 77-78] and vaccines [4, pp. 
71-72]. 
A snapshot works by making a copy of a computer's memory at some stage during 
the bootstrap process at a time when the system is presumed to be known to not be 
infected with a vims that modifies the bootstrap process — some sort of boot sector 
infecting vims. On subsequent booting of the computer, the state of memory at the 
same point in the bootstrap process at which the snapshot was originally taken is re-
placed with the state recorded in the snapshot. Any boot sector infecting vimses that 
have already become memory resident are removed when the snapshot is used to re-
place the contents of memory, and the bootstrap process can continue from a known 
clean state. 
Unfortunately, the use of a snapshot complicates modifying the configuration of 
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the operating system: for example, installing software which loads during the boot 
process at a point before the snapshot was taken requires that the snapshot be replaced 
with a new snapshot incorporating the newly-installed software. 
The idea of a vaccine is to make modifications to executable programs in such a 
way that those programs will be recognised by a virus as already being infected by that 
virus. This technique has many problems, however: 
• There are a very large number of viruses against which a program must be vac-
cinated. Attempting to vaccinate against more than a small subset may make a 
program inoperable; 
• Not all viruses attempt to determine if a program is already infected before at-
tempting to infect it; these viruses cannot be vaccinated against; 
• Mutually exclusive conditions employed by some viruses may make vaccination 
impossible. As a simple example, if virus A decides that it has infected a file if 
byte L < 75 and virus B decides that it has infected a file if byte L > 100, it is 
impossible to vaccinate against both these viruses. 
2.6.5 Future Developments 
As has been seen recently with the Melissa virus, the Internet enables the rapid trans-
mission of viruses from one site to another. A virus can become widespread so rapidly 
that traditional anti-vims techniques have difficulty coping. For example, the viruses 
detected most reliably by virus scanner, discussed in Section 2.6.1, are those whose 
signature is present in the scanner's database of virus signatures. 
Such problems can be partially addressed by creating anti-virus tools able to update 
themselves across the Internet, either automatically or at the request of the user. This 
can significantly reduce the burden on the user of manually frequently updating anti-
virus tools. Improved tools for distributing anti-virus updates to users on a local area 
network in such a way that these updates are largely transparent to the user can also 
help. 
However, this still requires that new viruses be analysed, signatures produced and 
anti-virus tools such as scanners appropriately updated. These procedures may take 
too long to effectively respond to fast-spreading viruses. 
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What more can be done? Considerable research has been undertaken into produc-
ing an anti-virus tool, a "computer immune system" [130, 131], that is capable of: 
• Detecting the presence of viruses previously unknown to that particular version 
of the anti-virus tool; 
• Identifying a signature for previously detected unknown viruses, possibly with 
the assistance of a remote site where virus samples identified by a client com-
puter are automatically analysed and a signature produced; 
• Distribution of signature for newly-identified virus to other clients requiring de-
tection for this vims. 
Ideally, human involvement in this process would be minimised so that response times 
will be short. For example, potential virus samples might be dispatched automatically 
for automated analysis at a remote site, or perhaps with the permission of a human 
operator, who might ensure that proprietary materials involved in a virus incident do 
not leave a company's site. 
Chapter 3 
Companion Viruses and the Macintosh: 
Threats and Countermeasures 
The material in this chapter is based upon a published paper: 
Jeffrey Horton and Jennifer Seberry. Companion viruses and the Macin-
tosh: threats and countermeasures. In Information Security and Privacy, 
ACISP '99, volume 1587 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 
202-212. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1999. 
Much of the introductory material present in the paper on which this chapter is based 
has been edited out to avoid unnecessary repetition of material already covered in 
Chapter 2. 
3.1 Introduction 
The Macintosh vims world is not as active as that of PC and PC-compatible comput-
ers. Macro viruses are as much a problem for users of affected application packages 
on the Macintosh as on the PC, but there are only a few dozen known native Mac-
intosh viruses. This number has seen little change in some years. To the best of our 
knowledge, the techniques described here are not employed by any existing Macintosh 
virus. 
A "companion virus" is a variety of computer virus which avoids modifying the 
files that it "infects". Companion virus attacks that can be implemented when running 
under DOS are discussed in Section 2.4.1.3. The first method of attack is based on 
the order of execution of files when a file extension is not specified to differentiate 
between two files of the same name and different extension, and the second on placing 
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an executable of the same name and same extension earlier in the search path followed 
by the operating system when identifying which executable to run. As a virus of this 
type does not modify the application program which it infects, it is an attack that is 
targeted specifically at anti-virus defenses based on integrity checking, a type of anti-
virus method that endeavours to detect changes in executable files that take place as a 
result of infection by a virus. Integrity checking is discussed in Section 2.6.2. Integrity 
checkers must be modified to be able to detect the presence of a companion virus in 
the environment, by looking for changes not only in an application program, but also 
in that program's environment. 
However, the Macintosh operating system does not have the concept of a "path" 
which is followed when searching for executable files, or the notion of filename exten-
sions. However, several features of the Macintosh operating system enable an attack 
that appears very similar in conception if not in execution. 
We consider this results in a minor weakness in the Macintosh operating system, 
which could potentially be exploited to construct a companion-type vims. This type 
of virus has been previously unknown on the Macintosh platform. For detailed in-
formation on strategies that have been employed previously to implement viruses on 
the Macintosh, consult Section 2.4.2. We decided to explore the consequences of this 
attack in more detail, and to attempt to devise some countermeasures that could be im-
plemented by anti-vims software to enhance its effectiveness against a vims employing 
these techniques. The strategies involved in implementing a companion-type vims on 
the Macintosh have been tested using versions of the Macintosh operating system from 
7.1 to 8.1, and may also be effective on later versions of the operating system. Macin-
tosh users and anti-vims vendors should be aware of the possibilities we outline. We 
discuss details of the attack and some thoughts on detecting and countering the attack 
in Section 3.3. 
In the interests of not supplying sufficient information to allow the easy implemen-
tation of a functioning vims, only the basic ideas behind the attack will be discussed. 
Source code will not be supplied. We feel that the security community is better able to 
respond to a potential security problem of this nature with some degree of foreknowl-
edge of the problem. 
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3.2 More Macintosh Basics 
3.2.1 The Desktop Database 
Recall from Section 2.4.2 that every file maintained on disk by the Macintosh operating 
system is associated with both a file type and a file creator. 
The file creator is used to associate the file with the application program that cre-
ated it. This allows the correct application to be started when a file is double-clicked by 
the computer user. The type information may be used by the application to determine 
how the contents of the file should be interpreted. 
The Macintosh operating system identifies the application to be executed in re-
sponse to a user double-clicking a file by searching a database in which the location 
of each application with a valid creator code is maintained. This is not the only infor-
mation stored in this database — icon information for the different file types created 
by an application is also stored in the database, if this information is provided by the 
application. The database is known as the "Desktop Database". 
Not every type of disk has a Desktop Database. Volumes storing less than 2 
megabytes, such as floppy disks, do not have a Desktop Database, but instead have 
a simpler structure which performs similar functions. Our attention here is confined 
to disks which do have Desktop Databases, such as hard disks, or for which one is 
created, such as AppleShare volumes [42, pp. 9-3-9-4]. 
Usually there will be a single application with a certain creator code on a disk. 
However, it is possible to have several applications with the same creator code on 
the one disk. Although according to a technical note [132] the application which is 
the "first choice" is the one with whose information the Desktop Database was last 
updated, correcting earlier documentation stating that the "first choice" application 
was the one with the most recent creation date [42, p. 9-5], it appears that in most 
cases the application selected will be the one with the most recent creation date. Even 
after rebuilding the Desktop Database, a process that may be initiated by the user and 
which is sometimes useful in troubleshooting, the application selected is the one with 
the most recent creation date. It is critical to the attack described in Section 3.3 that 
the application selected for execution be the viral application. 
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3.2.2 Starting an Application 
When the user starts an application by opening a file or files in some manner, the 
application is notified by the operating system of the files that were selected by the 
user. 
This is accomplished using an Apple Event, which is a type of high-level event 
commonly used for interapplication communication. There are many different types 
of Apple Event, and applications may define their own. In the case being considered 
here, the operating system sends an "Open Document" (odoc) Apple Event to the 
application when it has started executing to inform the application of the location of 
the files that the user wishes to open using that application. 
Not all application programs support receiving Apple Events; a program that does 
not support these events is not a candidate for infection by the method we will describe. 
Applications may provide Apple Event support but don't themselves "own" any files; 
as will be seen, such applications are not good candidates for infection. However, 
many common application programs that create files that are "owned" by that appli-
cation support these events, and would be more difficult for users to work with if they 
did not. 
3.3 A Macintosh "Companion Virus" 
How might these facilities provided by the operating system be used to implement a 
viral attack? If the application required is not already running and is not specified, 
only the documents that are to be processed, then the operating system must identify 
and execute the appropriate application(s) itself, passing an event to the application to 
inform it of the documents it is to process. When there exists more than one application 
on a given disk with the particular creator code, the operating system selects the one 
with the most recent creation date. 
So it suffices to infect an application by creating an application program with the 
same creator code as the other application that is the target of infection, but with a more 
recent creation date, such that the operating system executes the viral application in 
preference to the application which is the target of infection. 
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Then, when an infected application is launched, to make it seem as though every-
thing is normal, the viral application performs the following tasks: 
1. Intercepts the event intended for the infected application which is sent by the 
operating system; and 
2. Runs the infected application and forwards it the intercepted event; soon after 
completing this step, the viral application would exit, to avoid easy detection. 
There are a number of other details which must be handled to create an effective 
virus. As an example of these details, it is useful to preserve the original application 
icon information, which is usually overridden by the icons applicable to the more 
recently created application, so that visual displays look unchanged. We are reluctant 
to discuss solutions to such problems here, in the interests of not revealing enough 
information to easily create an effective virus. 
It is possible to extend the implementation to handle Apple Events sent to a newly-
launched application under other circumstances and that require different handling. 
However, the presence of the viral application can result in behaviour that differs 
slightly from that of the pre-infection state. 
Cooperating applications might use other types of high-level events that are not 
Apple Events. We consider this to be sufficiently uncommon that the possibility is not 
addressed here. 
Clearly this attack bears some resemblance to a companion virus style of attack as 
described in Section 2.4.1.3. 
It should be noted that it is certainly possible to specify exactly which application 
program is to be used to manipulate a particular file or files; such a virus would rely 
on the fact that it is more convenient to permit the operating system to identify and run 
an application than to perform this task manually. 
Some consideration has been given to how such a virus might become resident in 
memory; that is, how it might place viral code somewhere in memory and arrange for 
it to be executed at some time in the future, long after the viral application itself has 
ceased to run. Installing a device driver is one possible option. Device drivers are not 
required to deal with devices at all; other uses have been found for them. A device 
driver may receive calls from the operating system to perform periodic tasks — in the 
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case of a companion virus, such a periodic task could be searching the list of currently 
running application programs, infecting any that appear to be uninfected. 
3.3.1 Detection 
The mere presence of several applications with the same creator code on a Macintosh 
computer system is not something which should cause any alarm, and is not suffi-
cient to conclude that an application program has been infected by a companion-type 
virus. This situation commonly arises when, for example, a new version of an applica-
tion package is installed without removing the previous version. An integrity checker 
would need to monitor other information to help it decide how alarming the presence 
of multiple applications with the same creator code is. For example, as a compan-
ion virus would most likely be a much smaller file and of a simpler structure than an 
application that has some more useful functionality, the presence of two application 
programs with the same creator code but very different sizes or structures might be 
considered suspicious. 
It would be useful for an integrity checker to keep track of the locations of le-
gitimate applications, and require authorisation from the user to recognise a new or 
moved application. An integrity checker that is aware of legitimately installed appli-
cations can consult the Desktop Database for a specific creator code to determine if 
any new applications have been added. 
There are a number of system calls which may be of use in implementing such a 
virus and which may be considered suspicious by a behaviour monitoring program. A 
behaviour that is a characteristic of such a virus is a need to launch the infected appli-
cation. As the viral application and infected application have the same creator codes, 
if a patch were installed on the operating system routine responsible for launching an 
application, it could check the creator code of the application originating the request 
against the creator code of the application being launched, and refuse to launch an 
application having the same creator code as the one making the request; an indication 
to the user that suspicious activity has been detected would certainly be appropriate. 
There are various ways that might be used by a virus to circumvent such a check, 
but employing this check cuts off the simplest and most straightforward way for one 
application to launch another application. An occasion where one application might 
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legitimately need to launch another with the same creator code seems most unlikely. 
As the virus exists as an application separate to the infected application, checks on 
the creation of applications may also be effective. Some anti-virus applications will 
likely include such checks, at least as an option, as it may be effective against other 
varieties of virus. However, this is not as specifically targeted against a companion 
virus attack as the previous countermeasure, and would not seem to be appropriate 
to as wide an environment — for example, people working with compilers may find 
checks on creation of application programs produce many false alarms. 
Under OS 8.0 and 8.1, application files may be marked as "invisible" or be located 
within invisible directories, and still be executed successfully when a document is 
double clicked. Under most earlier versions of the operating system, this is not the 
case^. Although under some OS versions applications may be hidden, as there would 
seem to be no good reasons for this, the presence of such concealed applications could 
even be seen by an anti-virus program as being suspicious. Substituting a non-hidden 
application if available for a hidden one at time of execution is a potentially useful 
strategy. Fixing the operating system to ignore hidden applications would also be a 
useful strategy. 
The possible utility that a device driver might have for a companion virus is dis-
cussed in Section 3.3. There are many legitimate reasons that a program might wish 
to install a device driver^. As a device driver is potentially of use in a virus attack, 
it would be useful to check drivers for suspicious code that might perform virus-like 
actions when installed. 
Other calls by the virus may also be able to be monitored. For example, the com-
panion virus might use the P B D T A d d A P P L call to update the Desktop Database with 
information about the newly created viral application when performing an infection, 
rather than waiting for the operating system to update the Desktop Database with in-
formation about the new application at some time in the future. Apple documentation 
discourages the practice of making modifications to the Desktop Database [42, p. 9-3], 
^Sometimes invisible applications will be launched under earlier versions of the operating system 
where this is not normally the case, but apparently only just after the application has been made invisible. 
This appears to be due to stale catalog information being read from the disk; this behaviour passes 
quickly. 
^For example, they are commonly used to implement virtual disk schemes, where the raw disk data resides in a large container file. 
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so it might also be viewed as a suspicious event. 
3.3.2 Demonstration Program 
A non-viral application program demonstrating this attack has been created. The 
demonstration program has been found to work appropriately in a variety of environ-
ments — single and multiple partition Macintosh hard drives, removable media such 
as Zip disks, and a simple network consisting of two Macintosh computers. The code 
can be made available to serious researchers upon request. 
3.3.3 Dangers Posed? 
Having discussed a method by which a companion virus for the Macintosh might be 
written, some consideration ought to be given to the dangers posed by an attack of this 
nature. 
It is more difficult for a vims constructed in this manner to remain undetected and 
to spread between systems. Under most OS versions prior to 8.0, this variety of virus 
must exist as a distinct non-invisible file on the disk if it is to be executed, and is notice-
able by an observant user. Furthermore, in the interests of surviving to multiply, such 
a virus if visible would place itself somewhere not associated with the infected appli-
cation, and so would be unlikely to spread through distribution of software archives. 
Under OS versions after and including 8.0, this variety of virus has more options. 
It could even conceal itself in the same directory as the application which is the target 
of infection, which enhances its chances of distribution via software archive. 
Such a virus may be able to spread via a local area network to another Macintosh. 
Its ability to spread across a network could of course be slowed by proper configuration 
of user permissions. In particular, users should not have permission to make changes 
on network volumes unless absolutely necessary. 
The attack is rendered considerably more potent if the virus is able to become 
resident in memory. One way that this might be accomplished is outlined. 
The attack is perhaps most dangerous if the virus so constructed is capable of two 
modes of infection. For example, one time in ten the virus might infect by modifying 
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the target program in the manner of a file-infecting virus; although it would be read-
ily detected by an integrity checker, and perhaps by a behaviour monitor, this would 
improve its chances of spreading to another computer. The undetected copies of the 
virus which infect using the "companion" strategy would form a reservoir for future 
infections. 
3.4 Conclusion 
We have considered a possible virus attack that could be implemented under the Mac-
intosh operating system. The attack has a good resemblance to a companion virus style 
of attack. 
We know of no Macintosh viruses implementing an attack such as is described 
here. The attack is not believed to pose as great a danger as other varieties of com-
puter virus, due to limitations of the implementation described. It could, however, 
avoid detection by an integrity checking program or other generic anti-virus measures 
that were not aware of the possibility of this implementation of the companion virus 
strategy. 
A similar attack could be implemented by replacing the application to be infected 
with a viral application and renaming the original application^; we do not consider 
this attack to be as interesting as the one described in this chapter, because the original 
application is modified by being renamed. 
We discuss various countermeasures that might be employed against such a vims as 
has been described in this chapter. We believe that the most effective of these measures 
is to check the creator code of the application attempting to launch another against that 
of the application being launched, and to abort the request if the creator codes match. 
Infection is not prevented, but is readily detected. 
This appears to be how the CODE 9811 virus operates [133]. 
Chapter 4 
Extensions to the Macintosh Companion Virus 
Attack and Some Thoughts on the Future of 
Viruses on the Macintosh 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, we discussed how a companion virus attack might be implemented on 
a computer running the Macintosh operating system. The attack used the observation 
that an application program with the same creator code as another application but a 
more recent creation date will in some cases be executed by the Macintosh operating 
system in place of the other application. The viral application was then able to launch 
the infected application so that the user would have difficulty detecting the presence 
of the viral application. The process of infection did not require the alteration of the 
application to be infected in any way. 
A simple countermeasure was discussed that worked by patching the operating 
system's L a u n c h A p p l i c a t i o n routine; the patch would be able to detect an appli-
cation launching another with the same creator code, and flag this as possible suspect 
activity. 
In Section 4.2, we consider some extensions to the basic attack that can allow the 
a Macintosh companion virus to avoid detection via a patch on L a u n c h A p p l i c a -
t i o n . These extensions require only the presence of what are now standard operating 
system services to accomplish their objective. 
The Macintosh viruses that have been seen so far and that achieve infection of 
an application by altering that application's code have only attacked the 680x0 (68K) 
portions of the application; any code intended for execution on Macintosh computers 
based on PowerPC microprocessors has not been touched. As 68K executable code 
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will not ordinarily be executed if PowerPC executable code is present, this very much 
limits the virus' ability to spread successfully. Why have no viruses been seen which 
attack an application's PowerPC executable code? In Section 4.3, we consider the 
level of difficulty faced in the design and implementation of such a virus. 
Finally, in Section 4.4, we consider the effects that changes in the Macintosh oper-
ating system may have on future viruses for the Macintosh. 
4.2 Extensions to the Macintosh Companion Virus At-
tack 
There are a number of ways in which a Macintosh companion virus may avoid de-
tection by a patch placed on the L a u n c h A p p l i c a t i o n trap. The key to avoiding 
detection is for the infected application to be launched when another application ap-
pears to be the foremost application. 
How might this be achieved? One way would be for a viral application to employ 
a device driver whose sole purpose would be to call L a u n c h A p p l i c a t i o n when 
some application other than the viral application is foremost. However, we will be 
considering a much simpler method that relies only on standard operating system com-
ponents. In particular, we build and execute small scripts written in the AppleScript 
scripting language. These scripts direct the Finder, the component of the Macintosh 
operating system that is responsible for tasks such as providing a user interface to the 
file system, to launch the infected application. 
AppleScript is a simple scripting language supplied as a standard operating system 
component since the release of System 7.5, but which was also available as an exten-
sion to System 7.1. It allows users to write simple programs to control applications 
that have been designed by their developers to be scriptable. To be scriptable, a devel-
oper must provide a dictionary that can be used to translate the high-level English-like 
language in which AppleScripts are written into a series of Apple Events that will be 
sent to the application as a result of executing an AppleScript.' Of course, the appli-
cation must also process the events received and perform the appropriate actions. A 
single AppleScript might interact with several applications in the process of executing 
the script. An application does not need to be scriptable to be able to use AppleScript, 
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however; any application may use AppleScripts to perform tasks. The use of scripting 
facihties from within a program is documented in [134]. 
So the process followed by a viral application might look something like: 
1. Viral application receives a list of documents via an Apple Event that the com-
puter user intended to be opened by the infected application; 
2. Viral application constructs a simple AppleScript which instructs the Finder to 
use the infected application to open the documents received by the viral appli-
cation in Step 1. 
3. Viral application executes AppleScript constructed in Step 2; the Finder receives 
an Apple Event which results in the infected application being executed, receiv-
ing the list of documents originally received by the viral application. 
4. Viral application may now exit. 
This process allows the viral application to execute the infected application without 
itself calling L a u n c h A p p l i c a t i o n . However, the process does have a number of 
disadvantages: 
1. The process of compiling and executing the AppleScript is very much slower 
than the alternative of calling L a u n c h A p p l i c a t i o n directly. As a result, the 
computer user is more likely to notice that something is amiss. It is possible that 
this problem may be circumvented by constructing the Apple Event to be sent 
to the Finder manually rather than using an AppleScript to perform this task. 
2. The AppleScript approach does not work well if documents are to be printed 
rather than just opened. 
3. The AppleScript approach also does not work if some other type of event other 
than an "open documents" event is directed at the viral application initially. 
However, this is also something for which only limited functionality can be 
achieved using L a u n c h A p p l i c a t i o n directly. 
This enhancement to the basic Macintosh companion virus attack is considered 
unlikely to be implemented. In view of changes that can be expected to the Macintosh 
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operating system in the near future, some of which we outline in Section 4.4, no coun-
termeasure, such as the patch to L a u n c h A p p l i c a t i o n previously developed, has 
so far been devised for this attack. 
4.3 Viruses and the PowerPC-based Macintosh 
In this section, we will be considering how a virus might attempt to infect an exe-
cutable program built for a PowerPC-based Macintosh computer. Programs built for a 
PowerPC Macintosh have a different internal structure from that of a program built for 
a 680x0-based Macintosh computer; in fact, in many cases PowerPC and 68K code 
can be combined into a single program file, which is capable of being executed on 
either a PowerPC or 68K-based Macintosh, the appropriate code component being ex-
ecuted on computers of each architecture. The basic structure of a PowerPC executable 
program has some similarities to the executable program structure employed by many 
modem UNIX operating systems, or with modem versions of Microsoft Windows. 
The structure of PowerPC programs will perhaps be more familiar to those with some 
knowledge of UNIX and Windows file formats than was that of a 68K program. 
A PowerPC Macintosh computer uses a fragment as its basic unit of executable 
code and data associated with the code. Fragments are managed by an operating sys-
tem component referred to as the Code Fragment Manager. The PowerPC Macin-
tosh's runtime architecture may also be referred to as a CFM-based mntime architec-
ture. Complete documentation of fragments and the Code Fragment Manager may be 
found in [48] and [47]. 
A fragment may be of almost any size, and may be stored in either a file's data fork 
or in a resource located in the file's resource fork. Before it can be used, a fragment 
must be prepared by the Code Fragment Manager. A fragment is prepared by locat-
ing any shared libraries, also known as dynamically linked libraries (DLLs), that are 
required to resolve references to code and data not a part of the fragment itself, and 
replacing these references with the addresses of the actual code and data. A shared 
library is a fragment which provides code and data for use by another fragment; one 
shared library fragment may depend on other fragments which will also need prepa-
ration. Shared library support means that code used by different application programs 
4.3. Viruses and the PowerPC-based Macintosh 75 
can be present on a computer system only once, and be shared between the different 
applications that use it, rather than a copy of the library code being present in each 
application that uses the library. 
A file may contain multiple fragments; the Code Fragment Manager expects to 
find the index to these fragments in a resource, stored in the file's resource fork, of 
type c f r g and ID 0. This resource should be provided even if only a single fragment 
is contained within the file. 
When an application is executed on a PowerPC Macintosh, the c f r g resource of 
ID 0, if present, will be searched for a fragment containing the application's code. This 
fragment is prepared for execution, and its main routine is executed. 
How might such an application be infected by a virus? One obvious way is to mod-
ify the executable code contained within a fragment. Fragments may have a complex 
internal structure, however; a simpler way is to add an extra fragment to the applica-
tion that contains the viral code. This fragment may be placed within a resource or in 
the application's data fork, and an entry added to the c f r g 0 resource to identify the 
fragment as the fragment to be executed when an application is run. This approach 
has been tested using a simple non-viral fragment containing code which beeps when 
executed, then prepares the application's original fragment for execution and jumps to 
its main routine. The approach appears to be effective; the very basic test described 
here was not exceptionally difficult to implement. 
There are a number of potential difficulties with this approach, however: 
• If an application cannot be executed because the preparation of the fragment 
containing the application's code would require a shared library that cannot be 
located, an error message is displayed by the operating system. Using the simple 
approach outlined above, the application's fragment is prepared by the viral code 
rather than the operating system, so the virus would need to display any errors 
ordinarily displayed by the operating system in order to remain unnoticed. 
• Applications may cease to work properly after infection if any shared libraries 
required by the viral code are not available at runtime. 
• There may be version conflicts between shared libraries required by the viral 
code and the application code. 
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It is believed that most of these difficulties can be overcome by keeping the viral code 
very simple. 
A fragment-based PowerPC virus would perhaps face a more difficult task in be-
coming memory resident and subsequently infecting further applications. Attempting 
to support both the 68K and PowerPC architecture in a single virus would also add 
significantly to the complexity of the virus. These problems do not appear insurmount-
able, however. 
A number of recommendations can be made for detecting the activity of such a 
virus as it attempts to infect an application, or detecting that an infection may have 
taken place: 
• Adding a new fragment to the application will require modification of the c f r g 
0 resource. Any such modifications could be treated as being suspicious. 
• Modification of the code present in an existing fragment will most likely require 
making a modification to the application's data fork. Such modifications to a file 
which also contains a c f r g 0 resource should be treated as suspicious. 
• While fragments may be stored in a resource located in an application's resource 
fork, locating fragments in the data fork has some advantages for the application 
developer and computer user not shared by locating fragments in a resource, 
so in practice it would seem unlikely that resource-based fragments would be 
common in a PowerPC program. Any such occurrences could be treated as 
suspicious. 
So it can be seen that writing a PowerPC-based virus poses a more challenging 
undertaking to the virus writer than that faced in writing a 68K-based virus. However, 
the greater challenge would not appear to pose an insurmountable problem. No 68K-
based Macintosh computers have been produced since 1995, and although 68K viruses 
are still able to spread to some degree on a PowerPC-based Macintosh, it would seem 
likely that PowerPC-native viruses will eventually be produced. Strategies should be 
considered for dealing with such viruses before their appearance. 
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4.4 Affect of Operating System Changes on Macintosh 
Viruses 
The Macintosh operating system has changed substantially over the last few years. The 
next major upgrade to the operating system will be MacOS X, due for release in late 
2000 or early 2001. MacOS X will feature some changes that may affect Macintosh-
based viruses: 
• MacOS X will feature a number of different execution environments, including 
a "Classic" compatibility environment which will allow applications compiled 
to 68K or PowerPC code but written for earlier versions of the operating system 
to be executed by MacOS X, and a "Carbon" environment; programs written 
to run in the "Carbon" environment will take more advantage of the new fea-
tures introduced with MacOS X, which will include protected address spaces 
and improved support for multitasking. Programs written to run in the "Carbon" 
environment will be referred to as "Carbonised" programs. 
• MacOS X will not execute 68K code, which will run only in the "Classic" com-
patibility environment. This may affect the long-term viability of viruses written 
using 68K code, as ideally the use of applications requiring the "Classic" com-
patibility environment will be reduced in favour of "Carbonised" versions of the 
application. 
• Patching traps is not supported for programs written to run in MacOS X's "Car-
bon" environment. It remains to be seen if an alternative will be provided which 
allows similar results to be achieved. Patching traps is one of the mainstays of 
many currently known viruses. Patching traps can also be used to detect viral 
activity, as was illustrated by the patch to L a u n c h A p p l i c a t i o n that we used 
to detect the activity of a program implementing the companion virus attack de-
scribed in Chapter 3. Patching traps has also been used by developers in the past 
to extend operating system functionality. 
• Some viruses make extensive use of overriding or replacing definition proce-
dures, which are commonly stored in resources, that are used by the operating 
system and applications to present a graphical user interface. There will be some 
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changes to the way these definition procedures are handled by MacOS X that 
may affect how and if these definition procedures are utilised in writing viruses. 
• We have made some reference to uses to which a virus might put a device driver, 
which can presently be installed at any time by any application. This variety of 
device driver and mode of operation is unlikely to be supported in MacOS X. 
It is likely that viruses infecting applications that execute within the "Classic" compat-
ibility environment will also execute successfully within that environment, and be able 
to infect other applications. It is not likely, however, that old, non-MacOS X-aware 
viruses will be able to infect "Carbonised" applications. 
However, despite the changes that are to occur, experience with UNIX-like op-
erating systems and PC operating systems such as Microsoft Windows suggests that 
methods of implementing viruses will eventually be found by those interested in doing 
so. 
Chapter 5 
Covert Distributed Computing Using Java Through Web Spoofing 
The material in this chapter has been published as: 
Jeffrey Horton and Jennifer Seberry. Covert distributed computing using 
Java through Web Spoofing. In Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 
'98, volume 1438 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 48-57. 
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1998. 
5.1 Introduction 
There are many problems in computer science which may be solved most easily by 
the application of brute force. An example of such a problem is the determination of 
the key used to encrypt a block of data with an algorithm such as DBS (Data Encryp-
tion Standard). The computer time required could be obtained with the full knowledge 
and cooperation of the individuals controlling the resources, or covertly without their 
knowledge by some means. A past suggestion for the covert accomplishment of tasks 
such as this involved the use of computer viruses to perform distributed computa-
tions [105]. 
An approach involving computer viruses may not be the best solution to the per-
formance of distributed computing. Distributing new problems on which work is to 
be done is a potential difficulty, as is the collection of results of the computation in a 
timely manner. It will also be difficult to determine that a complete search has been 
performed; this may be important for some classes of problems. Other solutions can 
be considered in the modem highly networked environment. 
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Java is a general purpose object-oriented programming language introduced in 
1995 by Sun Microsystems. It is similar in many ways to C and C++. Programs written 
in Java may be compiled to a platform-independent bytecode which can be executed 
on any platform to which the Java runtime system has been ported; the Java bytecodes 
are commonly simply interpreted, however speed of execution of Java programs can 
be improved by using a runtime system which translates the bytecodes into native ma-
chine instructions at execution time. Such systems, incorporating these Just-In-Time 
(JIT) compilers, are becoming more common. The Java system includes support for 
easy use of multiple threads of execution, and network communication at a low level 
using sockets, or a high level using URL objects [135]. 
One of the major uses seen so far for Java is the creation of applets to provide 
executable content for HTML pages on the World Wide Web. Common Web browsers 
such as Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer include support for down-
loading and executing Java applets. There are various security restrictions imposed 
upon applets that are intended to make it safer for users to execute applets from un-
known sources on their computers. One such restriction is that applets are usually only 
allowed to open a network connection to the host from which the applet was down-
loaded. A number of problems with Java security have been discovered by various 
researchers [136, 137]. 
Java could also be applied to performing a distributed computation. Java's straight-
forward support for networking and multiple threads of execution make construction 
of an applet to perform the computing tasks simple. The possibility of using Java ap-
plets to covertly or otherwise perform a distributed computation is discussed by several 
researchers [138] [136] [137, pp. 112-114] [139]. 
There have been no suggestions, however, as to how this might be accomplished 
without requiring browser users to knowingly visit a particular page or Web server at 
the beginning or sometime during the course of each session with their Web browser, 
so that the applet responsible for performing the computation can be loaded. This 
paper describes how the Web spoofing idea described by the Secure Internet Program-
ming Group at Princeton University can be used to pass a Java applet to perform a dis-
tributed computation to a client. The advantage is that clients do not have to knowingly 
(re)visit a particular site each time, but may rejoin the computation through bookmarks 
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made during a previous session. 
There will be some indications visible in the browser when rejoining a computa-
tion through a bookmark that the user has not reached the site they may have been 
expecting; however, these signs are small, and are believed to be mostly correctable 
using the same techniques as employed in a vanilla Web Spoofing attack. 
We also propose a simple countermeasure against such a spoofing attack, which 
would be useful to help users detect the presence of Web Spoofing. The countermea-
sure takes advantage of the requirement that many clients should be able to be handled 
simultaneously so that the distributed computation proceeds efficiently. 
Finally, we introduce the idea of browser users, as clients of Web-based services 
provided by third parties, "paying" for these services by running a distributed compu-
tation applet for a short period of time. This may be an acceptable alternative to the 
inclusion of advertising material in certain circumstances. 
5.2 About Web Spoofing 
Web Spoofing was first described briefly by Cohen [140]. The Web Spoofing at-
tack was later discussed in greater detail and elaborated upon by the Secure Internet 
Programming Group at Princeton University [141]. Among other contributions, the 
Princeton group introduced the use of JavaScript for the purposes of concealing the 
operation of the Web Spoofing attack and preventing the browser user from escaping 
from the spoofed context. JavaScript is a scripting language that is supported by some 
common Web browsers. JavaScript programs may be embedded in an HTML page, 
and may be executed when the HTML page is loaded by the browser, or when certain 
events occur, such as the browser user holding the mouse pointer over a hyperlink on 
the page. 
The main application of Web Spoofing is seen as being surveillance, or perhaps 
tampering: the attacking server will be able to observe and/or modify the Web traffic 
between a user being spoofed and some Web server, including any form data entered 
by the user and the responses of the server. It is pointed out that "secure" connections 
will not help — the user's browser has a secure connection with the attacking server, 
which in turn has a secure connection with the server being spoofed [141]. 
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Web spoofing works as follows: when an attacking server www.attacker.org re-
ceives a request for an HTML document, before supplying the document every URL 
in the document is rewritten to refer to the attacking server instead, but including the 
original URL in some way — so that the attacking server is able to fetch the document 
that is actually desired by the browser user. For example, 
http://www.altavista.digital.com/ 
might become something like: 
http://www.attacker.org/f.acgi?f=http://www.altavista.digital.com/ 
There are other ways in which the spoofed URL may be constructed. The Princeton 
group gives an example [141]. 
The first part of the URL (before the '?') specifies a program that will be executed 
by the server. This is a CGI (Common Gateway Interface) program. For those not 
familiar with CGI programs, the part of the URL following the '?' represents an 
argument or set of arguments that is passed to the CGI program specified by the first 
part of the URL. More than one argument can be passed in this way — arguments are 
separated by ampersand ('&') characters. 
So, when the user of the browser clicks on a spoofed URL, the attacking server 
is contacted. It fetches the HTML document the user wishes to view, using the URL 
encoded in the spoofed URL, rewrites the URLs in the document, and supplies the 
modified document to the user. Not all URLs need be rewritten to point at the attacking 
server, only those which are likely to specify a document containing HTML, which is 
likely to contain URLs that need to be rewritten. In particular, images do not generally 
need to be spoofed. However, as many images would be specified using only a partial 
URL (relative to the URL of the HTML page containing the image's URL), the URLs 
would need to be rewritten in full, to point at the appropriate image on the server being 
spoofed. 
There will be some evidence that spoofing is taking place, however. For example, 
the browser's status line and location line will display rewritten URLs, which an alert 
user would notice. The Princeton group claim to have succeeded at concealing such 
evidence from the user through the use of JavaScript. Using JavaScript to display the 
proper (non-spoofed) URLs on the status line when the user holds the mouse pointer 
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above a hyperlink on the Web page is straightforward in most cases; using JavaScript 
to conceal the other evidence of spoofing is less obvious. 
In the course of implementing a program to perform spoofing, we have observed 
that some pages using JavaScript do not seem amenable to spoofing, especially if the 
JavaScript itself directs the browser to load particular Web pages. It seems that the 
JavaScript has difficulty constructing appropriate URLs if the current document is be-
ing spoofed, due to the unusual form of the spoofed URLs. 
We have implemented only the spoofing component of the attack, as well as the 
simplest use of JavaScript for concealment purposes, that of displaying non-spoofed 
URLs on the browser status line where necessary, for the purposes of demonstration; 
the aspects of the attack that provide more sophisticated forms of concealment were not 
implemented. We believe that the work on concealment of the Web Spoofing attack 
done by the Princeton group can profitably be applied to concealing the additional 
evidence when using Web spoofing to perform a distributed computation. 
5.2.1 Some HTML Tags to Modify 
Any HTML tag which can include an attribute specifying a URL may potentially re-
quire modification for spoofing to take place. A few of the more common tags that 
require modification to undertake a spoofing attack include: 
• Hyperlinks, which are generated by the HREF attribute of the <A> tag. A new 
HTML document is fetched and displayed when one of these is selected by the 
user. 
• Images displayed on an HTML page are specified using the <IMG> tag. Its 
attributes SRC and LOWSRC, which indicate from where the browser is to fetch 
the image data, may require adjustment if present. 
• Forms into which the user may enter data are specified using the <FORM> tag. 
Its ACTION attribute can contain the URL of a CGI program that will process 
the data entered by the user when the user indicates that they wish to submit the 
form. 
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• Java applets are included in an HTML page using the <APPLET> tag. Since ap-
plets are capable of communicating through a socket connected to an arbitrary 
port on the applet's server of origin, the applet should be downloaded directly 
from that server. Otherwise the default is to obtain the applet's code from the 
server that supplied the HTML page containing the applet. An applet's code can 
be obtained from an arbitrary host on the Internet, specified using the CODE-
BASE attribute. For spoofing to function properly in the presence of Java ap-
plets, the CODEBASE attribute must be added if not present. If a CODEBASE 
attribute is already present, it must be ensured that the CODEBASE attribute is 
an absolute URL. 
5.3 Application of Web Spoofing to Distributed Com-
puting 
The Secure Internet Programming Group suggest that Web Spoofing allows tamper-
ing with the pages returned to the user, by inserting "misleading or offensive mate-
rial" [141]. We observe that the opportunity to tamper with the pages allows a Java 
applet to perform part of a distributed computation to be inserted into the page. Tam-
pering with the spoofed pages in this manner and for this purpose has not been previ-
ously suggested. 
As Web pages being spoofed must have their URLs rewritten to point at the attack-
ing server, it is a simple matter to insert the HTML code to include a Java applet into 
each page in the course of performing the other modifications to the page. The Java 
applet can be set to have only a small "window" on the page, which makes it difficult 
for users to detect its presence on the Web pages that they view. 
When the browser encounters a Java applet for the first time during a session, it 
usually starts Java, displaying a message to this effect in the status line of the browser. 
It may be possible to conceal this using JavaScript if necessary (although this has 
not been tested); however, if Java applets become increasingly common and therefore 
unremarkable, concealment may be deemed unnecessary. 
Users may bookmark spoofed pages during the course of their session. If this 
occurs, the user will rejoin the computation when next that bookmark is accessed. 
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Rather than knowingly (re)visiting a particular site to acquire a copy of an applet, the 
user unknowingly contacts an attacking server which incorporates the applet into each 
page supplied to the user. 
A site that employed distributed computing with Java applets and Web spoofing 
could potentially be running applets not only on machines of browser users who visit 
the site directly, but also on the machines of users who visit a bookmark made after 
having directly visited the site on some previous occasion. Thus, the "pool" of users 
who could be contributing to a computation is not limited to those that directly visit the 
site, as it is with other approaches to covert distributed computing with Java. For ex-
ample, consider a Web server that receives on average 10,000 hits/day. If the operators 
of the Web server elect to incorporate an applet to perform distributed computation in 
each page downloaded from the server, they will steal some CPU time from an aver-
age of 10,000 computers each day. However, by using Web spoofing as well, on the 
second day after starting the spoofing attack and supplying the applet, CPU time is 
being stolen from the (on average) 10,000 users who knowingly (re)visit the site, and 
also from users who have visited the site on the previous day and made bookmarks to 
other sites subsequently visited. 
The level of load on the attacking server can be controlled by redirecting if neces-
sary some requests directly to the actual server containing the resource, foregoing the 
opportunity to perform Web Spoofing, and of stealing computation time from some 
unsuspecting browser user, but keeping the load on the server at reasonable levels. 
An attacker might decide to increase the likelihood of bookmarks referring to 
spoofed pages by modifying a Web search engine to return answers to queries that 
incorporate spoofed links, but not require the search engine itself to participate in the 
spoofing. Of course, if the pages of an unmodified search engine are being spoofed 
when a search is performed, rewriting of the URLs in the response will take place 
automatically. 
The user's Web browser will display a URL in its location line which exhibits the 
presence of spoofing when revisiting a bookmark made of a spoofed page; however, 
we believe that this may be concealed after the page has commenced loading using 
JavaScript, although again this has not been implemented. 
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5.3.1 An Implementation 
For reasons of simplicity, the Web spoofing attack for the purposes of demonstration 
was implemented using a CGI program. An off-the-shelf Web server was used to 
handle HTTP requests. 
The applet to demonstrate the performance of a simple key cracking task was of 
course implemented in Java. The program which kept track of which subproblems had 
been completed (without finding a solution) and that distributed new subproblems to 
client applets was also written in Java (the "problem server"). 
Client applets use threads, one for performing a computation, another for commu-
nicating with the server to periodically report the status of their particular computation 
to the problem server. Periodic reporting to the server guards against the loss of an en-
tire computation should the client applet be terminated before completion of the entire 
computation; this might occur as a result of the user exiting the Web browser in which 
the applet is being run, for example. 
The thread performing the computation sleeps periodically, to avoid using exces-
sive resources and so unintentionally revealing its presence. 
The problem server keeps records using the IP numbers of the computers on which 
a client applet is running, and will allow only one instance of an applet to run on each 
computer, to avoid degrading performance too noticeably. A new client applet will 
be permitted to commence operations if some amount of time has elapsed without a 
report from the original client applet. 
5.4 Countermeasures? 
5.4.1 Client-side Precautions 
Obviously, disabling Java is an excellent way for a user to ensure that he or she does not 
participate unwillingly in such an attack, as the Java applet to perform the computation 
will be unable to run. The disadvantage of this approach is that applets performing 
services of potential utility to the user will also not be able to run. 
The merits of disabling JavaScript are briefly discussed by the Princeton 
group [141]. This prevents the Web spoofing from being concealed from the clients. 
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How many clients would take notice of the signs is an interesting question, especially 
given that in the future clients may have become accustomed to the use of strange 
URLs such as those produced by a Web spoofing program, as there are several sites 
providing legitimate services with a Web spoofing-style program^. 
5.4.2 Server-side Precautions 
During the preparation of a demonstration of this approach to covert distributed com-
puting with Java, it was observed that there were some sites whose pages included 
counters of the number of times that a site had been visited, and links to other CGI 
programs, all of which failed to produce the expected results when the page containing 
the counter, or link to CGI program, was being spoofed. Note that a page visit counter 
is commonly implemented by using a CGI program through an <IMG> HTML tag. 
The problem was eventually traced to an improperly set Ref e r e r : field in the 
HTTP request sent by the spoofing program to fetch an HTML page from the server 
being spoofed. The Ref e r e r : field that was originally being sent included a spoofed 
URL. 
The Ref e r e r : field of an HTTP request is used to specify the address of the re-
source, most commonly a Web page, that contained the URL reference to the resource 
which is the subject of the HTTP request, in cases where the URL reference was ob-
tained from a source that may be referred to by a URL; this field would be empty if 
the source of the request was the keyboard, for example [142, 143]. 
The value of the Ref e r e r : field can be checked by a CGI program to determine 
that a request to execute a CGI program comes only from a URL embedded in a spe-
cific page, or a set of pages. This prevents easy misuse or abuse of the CGI program 
by others. 
An implementation of distributed computing with Java in the manner described 
in this chapter would want to keep the amount of data passing through the attacking 
server as small as possible, to minimise response time to client requests, and so that 
the number of clients actively fetching pages and performing computations could be 
maximized. To achieve this, only URLs in pages which are likely to point at an HTML 
^"The Anonymizer": see h t t p : / / w w w . a n o n y m i z e r . c o m / [141]; the "Zippy Filter": see 
h t t p : / / w w w . m e t a h t m l . c o m / a p p s / z i p p y / w e l c o m e .mhtml [141]; the "Fool's Tools" have 
been used to "reshape" HTML: h t t p : / / l a s . a l f r e d . e d u / "pav/ f o o l t o o l s . html . 
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document (whose URLs will need to be rewritten, so that the client continues to view 
spoofed documents) are rewritten to point at the spoofing server — all other URLs, 
specifically URLs in HTML <IMG> tags are modified only so that they fully specify 
the server and resource path; they are NOT spoofed. 
It is easy enough for the attacking server to adjust the Ref erer: field to have the 
value it would normally have, were the page not being spoofed. However, this does 
not help with the fetching of non-spoofed resources such as images — the attacking 
server never sees the HTTP request for these resources. So the Ref erer: field will 
not be set as the spoofed server would expect. 
So we propose that an effective countermeasure against a spoofing attack imple-
mented for the purpose of performing a distributed computation is for Web servers 
to check the Ref erer: field for images and other resources that are expected to be 
always embedded in some page being served by the Web server for consistency; that 
is, the Ref erer: field indicates always that the referrer of the document is a page 
served by the Web server. Usually it should be sufficient to verify that the address of 
the Web server that served the page which contained the URL for the resource cur-
rently being served is the same as the Web server asked to serve the current request. 
The Web server could refuse to serve a resource if its checks of the Ref erer: field 
were not satisfied, or display an alternative resource, perhaps attempting to explain 
possible causes of the problem. 
While checking the Ref erer: field and taking action depending on its contents 
does not prevent an attack from taking place, it does mean that unless all the images 
contained on a page are also spoofed there will be gaps where a Web server has refused 
to serve an image because its checks of the Ref erer: field have failed. Given the 
high graphical content of many Web pages, it is unlikely that a user would wish or be 
able to persist in their Web travels while the pages were being spoofed. Either they 
would find a solution or stop using the Web. Spoofing all the images would increase 
the amount of data processed by the spoofing server, which as a result would greatly 
limit the number of clients who could be effectively spoofed at the one time. 
Unfortunately, at this time there are some inconsistencies in the way in which 
different Web browsers handle the Ref erer: field. Common Web browsers like 
Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer appear to provide Ref erer: 
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fields for HTTP requests for images embedded in Web pages, for example. Other less 
widely used browsers, such as Apple Computer's Cyberdog, do not do so. 
It should be noted that this countermeasure would be most effective in protecting 
users if many of the Web servers in existence were to implement this sort of check. A 
site could, however, implement this countermeasure to help ensure that users of that 
particular site were likely to detect the presence of Web spoofing. 
5.5 Computing for Sale 
It is not unusual to find that a Java applet that performs a distributed computation 
is classed as a "malicious" applet [137, pp. 113-114] [139]. The computation is 
undesirable because the user is not aware that it is being performed. 
On the other hand, it is not difficult to imagine a large group of users donating 
some of their computer time to help perform a long computation. Examples include 
efforts to crack instances of DBS or RC5 encrypted messages^, or finding Mersenne 
Primes^. Using Java for this sort of purpose avoids many troublesome issues of pro-
ducing a client program for a variety of different computer platforms; there is, how-
ever, currently a heavy speed penalty that must be paid, as Java is not as efficient as 
a highly-tuned platform-dependent implementation. Improvements in JIT compilers, 
mentioned earlier, will help to reduce this speed penalty, but will not eliminate it en-
tirely. 
We introduce the idea of "Computing for Sale" — that sites which provide some 
form of service to clients could require that clients allow the running of a Java applet 
for some fixed period of time as the "price" for accessing the service. An excellent 
example of a service to which this idea could be applied is that of a Web search en-
gine, or perhaps an online technical reference library or support service. Clients that 
are unable or unwilling to allow the Java applet to run so that it may perform its com-
putation could be provided with a reduced service. For example, a client of a Web 
search engine who refused to run the applet could be provided with E-mail results of 
their query half an hour or so after query submission rather than immediately. This 
provides an incentive for clients to allow computation applets to perform their tasks. 
^See h t tp : / /www.dis t r ibuted .ne t / 
^See http://www.mersenne.org/ 
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It would be possible for a service to deny access or provide only a reduced ser-
vice to a client whose computation applets consistently fail to report results for some 
reason, such as being terminated by the client. 
In the interests of working in a wide variety of network environments, applets used 
for this purpose should be able to communicate with the server using methods apart 
from ordinary socket connections, such as, by using Java's URL access capabilities, 
HTTP POST or GET messages [144]. For example, a firewall might prohibit arbitrary 
socket connections originating behind the firewall but permit HTTP message traffic. 
The service provider would be able to sell computation time in much the same 
way as many providers sell advertising space on their Web pages. Some clients of 
such services might prefer to choose between an advertising-free service which re-
quires that client assist in performing a computation, and the usual service loaded with 
advertising, but not requiring the client to assist with the computation by running an 
applet. 
5.6 Conclusion 
There are many problems in computer science which can best be solved by the appli-
cation of brute force. An example is the determination of an unknown cryptographic 
key, given some ciphertext and corresponding plaintext. Distributed computing offers 
a way of obtaining the necessary resources, by using a portion of the CPU time of 
many computers. 
Such a project can either be conducted with full knowledge and cooperation of 
all participants, or covertly. There have been some suggestions that applets written 
in Java and running in Web browsers might perform covert distributed computations 
without the knowledge of browser users, but requiring browser users to knowingly 
visit a particular site. 
We observe that Web Spoofing offers a way of not only adding Java applets to 
perform covert distributed computations to Web pages, but also of increasing the like-
lihood of past unwitting contributors contributing again when they revisit bookmarks 
made during a prior spoofed Web browsing session. 
Some simple measures which make a successful attack more difficult and less 
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likely have been examined. These include disabling Java. We also proposed that 
servers examine the Ref e r e r : field of HTTP requests, and refuse to serve the ob-
ject, or serve some other object explaining the problem, should the Ref e r e r : field 
not be consistent with expectations. 
We introduced the idea of browser users "paying" for access to services and re-
sources on the Web through the use of their idle computer time for a short period. 
Service providers could then sell these CPU resources in the same way as advertising 
is now sold, and may feel it appropriate to offer an advertising-free service for users 
who "pay" using their computer's idle time. 
Part II 
Some Applications of Distributed 
Computing to Combinatorial Search 

Chapter 6 
Introduction to Sequences and Hadamard Matrices 
6.1 Sequences 
6.1.1 Introduction 
Sequences have many practical and mathematical applications. For example, Barker 
sequences, short sequences of ±1, may be used in radar systems to improve range res-
olution and accuracy [145]. No Barker sequences longer than 13 elements are known, 
and it is believed that none exist. 
As another example, m-sequences or maximal length binary sequences are se-
quences composed of 0 and 1 elements. Such sequences are output from certain con-
figurations of linear feedback shift register (LFSR). m-sequences may also be used in 
radar systems in place of Barker sequences if a larger sequence than is available with 
a Barker sequence is required [145]. 
Another application of m-sequences is in the area of digital watermarking [146, 
147, 148]. Digital watermarking is a very active field of research. 
A more mathematical application of sequences is to create new weighing matri-
ces or orthogonal designs. In this section, we expand further on the mathematical 
background presented to the sequence search in Chapter 7. The use of sequences in 
constructing weighing matrices and orthogonal designs has been studied extensively. 
The main references for this section are Geramita and Seberry [149] and a review of 
the construction of weighing matrices and orthogonal designs using two sequences 
with zero autocorrelation function by Koukouvinos and Seberry [150]. 
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6.1.2 Mathematical Background 
Given a set of / sequences, the sequences Aj = {aji, ay2, •. •, ajn}^ j J each of 
length n, the periodic autocorrelation function Pa{s) is defined as: 
/ n 
Pa{S) = X ^ a j i a j j + s , s = 0 , l , . . . , n - l (6.1) j=ii=i 
There is also a non-periodic autocorrelation function, NA(S), defined as: 
I n—s 
^a{s)= ^ (6.2) i=\ 
Note that PAÍ-̂ ) — -\-NA{n — s), SO that a set of sequences with zero non-periodic 
autocorrelation function also has zero periodic autocorrelation function. 
Here we are interested in sets of two sequences of length n. These will be said to 
be of type (^1,^2) if the sequences are composed of two variables, say x\ and JC2, and 
zbci occurs a total of s\ times and ±X2 occurs a total of S2 times. Other elements of 
the sequences are zero. Such sequences may be used as the first rows of two circulant 
matrices to obtain an orthogonal design OD{2n\s\,S2). We note that this means that 
the two sequences have zero (non-)periodic autocorrelation function. 
An orthogonal design is defined as follows: 
Definition 1 An orthogonal design of order n and type (^i, 52,..., Su), s i positive inte-
gers, is an nxn matrix X with entries {0, ±xi,..., ±Xu} ( the Xi commuting indetermi-
nates) satisfying: ( " 
v=i / 
In (6.3) 
This is written as OD(n; , 52,..., ̂ m). 
Alternatively, an orthogonal design can be thought of as an « x w matrix X in which 
each row (column) has si entries of the type =bjc/, and the distinct rows (columns) are 
orthogonal under the euclidean inner product. 
Two sequences are said to be of type (0, ±1) and weight w if they have a total of 
w non-zero elements ±1, and may be used as the first rows of two circulant matrices 
to obtain a weighing matrix W{2n,w). We note that this means that the two sequences 
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have zero (non-)periodic autocorrelation function. A weighing matrix is defined as 
follows: 
Definition 2 A weighing matrix W = W{n,k) is a square matrix with entries 0 ,±1 
having k non-zero entries per row and column and inner product of distinct rows zero. 
W satisfies WW^ = kin, and W is equivalent to an orthogonal design OD{n\k). 
Weighing matrices have been studied because of their use in improving the accuracy 
of weighing experiments, as first studied by Hotelling [151]. 
The maximum number of variables in an orthogonal design is given by the Radon 
number, defined by p(n) = 8c + where n = b odd, and a == 4c + 0 < J < 4. 
We are interested in orthogonal designs formed from two circulant matrices of odd 
dimension, and so we are limited to designs of one variable (weighing matrices) and 
two variables. 
To form the orthogonal design from the two circulant matrices, the following the-
orem is used: 
Theorem 1 (Geramita-Seberry [149]) If there exist two circulant matrices Ai, A2 of 
order n satisfying: 
J,AiAf=fI 
and f is the quadratic form ^j^xSjjpj, then there is an orthogonal design 
OD{2n\s\,S2)' If f is an integer there exists a W{2n,f). 
The circulant matrices Ai, A2 are used as follows: 
Al A2 ^ r̂  f MR \ 
or D=\ 
\ -A2R Ai 
where R is the back diagonal (0, 1) matrix. 
6.1.3 Asymptotic Existence 
Theorem 2 (Eades [149]) Suppose there is a 2x2 rational matrix P such that PP^ = 
diag(5i,52), where si and S2 are positive integers. Then there is an integer N = 
N{s\, S2) such that for allt>N there is an 0D{2t\s\, S2) 
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This theorem guarantees the existence of two-variable orthogonal designs of suffi-
ciently large order. 
6.2 Hadamard Matrices 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Hadamard matrices have a long and extensive history of study. In this section, we 
briefly cover some of the basic theory applying to Hadamard matrices. We will look 
at a number of constructions for Hadamard matrices. The construction that we use in 
our distributed search is called Williamson's method; it is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 8. Many similar constructions exist, some of which will also be mentioned. 
We will look briefly at how Hadamard matrices can be used to construct codes to 
be used in communications. Hadamard matrices have many applications; we consider 
this one in particular because of its accessibility to any audience. 
Williamson's construction has been used as the basis of a number of exhaustive 
searches for Hadamard matrices. We describe the results from these prior searches. 
The main reference for this section is Seberry and Yamada [152]. 
6.2.2 Basic Theory 
An Hadamard matrix H of order his a. square matrix with entries ±1, such that: 
HH'^ = hlh (6.4) 
That is, the row vectors of H are pairwise orthogonal. 
These matrices were first studied by J. J. Sylvester [153]. 
The rows and columns of H may be permuted without altering the property spec-
ified by Equation 6.4. Entries in rows and columns may also be multiplied by - 1 
without altering this property. Two Hadamard matrices are said to be equivalent if one 
can be obtained from the other by a sequence of operations of these types. 
Some basic properties of Hadamard matrices are: 
Lemma 1 Let H be an Hadamard matrix of order h. Then the following hold: 
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J. HH^ = hlh 
2. \detH\=h'2^ 
3. HH^ = H^H 
4. Every Hadamard matrix is equivalent to an Hadamard matrix that has every 
element of its first row and column +1. Matrices of this latter form are called 
normalized 
5. h = 1, 2 or 4n, n an integer 
6. If H is a normalized Hadamard matrix of order An, then every row (column) 
except the first has 2n-\'s and 2n-^I's in each row (column); further, n -I*s 
in any row (column) overlap with n —I's in each other row (column). 
6.2.3 Some constructions for Hadamard Matrices using "multipli-
cation" 
Sylvester [153] observed that if H is an Hadamard matrix, then 
H H 
H -H 
is also an Hadamard matrix. Using the Hadamard matrix of order 2: 
1 1 
1 - 1 
we have: 
Lemma 2 (Sylvester [153]) There is an Hadamard matrix of order 2^ for all integers 
t. 
Definition 3 IfM = (m/y) is a mx p matrix and N = {nij) is annxq matrix, then the 
Kronecker product MxN is the mn x pq matrix given by: 
m\\N mnN ••• m\pN 
miiN m22N • • • m2pN 
MxN = 
mmiN mmiN ••• mmpN 
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Lemma 3 (Hadamard [154]) Let Hi and H2 be Hadamard matrices of orders hi and 
h2. Then H = Hi XH2 is an Hadamard matrix of order hih2. 
Lemma 4 (The Multiplication Theorem of Agayan-Sarukhanyan [155]) Let Hi 
and H2 be Hadamard matrices of orders Ah and Ak. Then there is an Hadamard matrix 
of order Shk. 
Theorem 3 (Craigen-Seberry-Zhang [156]) Suppose that there are Hadamard ma-
trices of orders Aa^Ab^Ac^Ad. Then there is an Hadamard matrix of order \6abcd. 
Definition 4 An Hadamard matrix H is said to he regular if the sum of all the elements 
in each row or column is a constant k. Hence HJ = JH = kJ, where J is the matrix of 
all ones. 
Theorem 4 (Goethals-Seidel [157]) Suppose that there is an Hadamard matrix of or-
der h. Then there is a regular symmetric Hadamard matrix with constant diagonal of 
order h^. 
Definition 5 A matrix C of order In with elements ±l,±i that satisfies CC* = 2nl will 
be called a complex Hadamard matrix. 
Theorem 5 (T\iryn [158]) Suppose that there is a complex Hadamard matrix of order 
In and an Hadamard matrix of order Ah. Then there is an Hadamard matrix of order 
Shn. 
6.2.4 Direct construction theorems for Hadamard Matrices 
Many constructions for Hadamard matrices require that matrices be "plugged in" to 
some other matrix. These constructions are the main subject of this section. 
Theorem 6 (Paley [159]) Let p = 3 mod A be a prime power Then there is an 
Hadamard matrix of order p-\-\. 
Theorem 7 (Paley [159]) Let p = \ mod A be a prime power Then there is an 
Hadamard matrix of order 2{p + 1). 
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A B C D 
-B A -D C 
-C D A -B 
-D -C B A 
A B C D 
-B A D -C 
-C -D A B 
-D C -B A 
the right representation of the quaternions; 
the left representation of the quaternions. 
Figure 6.1: The Williamson Array 
Definition 6 X and Y are said to be amicable matrices if 
XY^ YX^ 
Definition 7 Four circulant, symmetric ±1 matrices A, B^C^D of order w that satisfy 
AA^ + BB^ + CC^ + DD^ = Awl,, 
will be called Williamson matrices. Four ± 1 matrices A,B,C,D of order w that satisfy 
both 
XY^ YX^ for X, Y G 
(that is, A,B,C,D are pairwise amicable), and 
AA^ + BB^ + CC^ + DD^ = 
will be called Williamson-type matrices. 
(6.5) 
The most common structure matrices are "plugged into" is the orthogonal design. 
Orthogonal designs are defined in Definition 1. 
An orthogonal design with no zeros and in which each entry is replaced with a +1 
or — 1 is an Hadamard matrix. 
Some orthogonal designs that are of interest are: 
1. the Williamson array: the 0D(4,1,1,1,1). The Williamson array is shown in 
Figure 6.1; 
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A BR CR DR A BR CR DR 
-BR A -D^R C^R or -BR A D^R -C^R -CR D^R A -B^R -CR -D^R A B^R 
-DR -C^R B^R A -DR C^R -B^R A 
Figure 6.2: The Goethals-Seidel Array 
2. an OD(8; 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) is known; 
3. the Baumert-Hall array: the OD(12;3,3,3,3); 
4. the Plotkin array: the OD(24;3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3); 
5. the Welch array: the OD(20;5,5,5,5); 
6. the Ono-Sawade-Yamamoto array: the OD(36; 9,9,9,9); 
7. the Goethals-Seidel array [160]. The array is shown in Figure 6.2, where 
A,B,C,D are circulant matrices satisfying Equation 6.5 and R is the back di-
agonal (0,1) matrix. 
It remains only to define conditions on matrices that are "plugged into" these or-
thogonal designs to form an Hadamard matrices: 
Definition 8 Suitable matrices of order w for an ODf/z; 51,52, •••^Su) are u pairwise 
amicable matrices (that is, that pairwise satisfy Definition 6), Ai, i = I,..., u, that 
have entries +1 or — I and that satisfy: 
(6.6) 
1=1 
Suitable matrices are used in the following theorem: 
Theorem 8 (Geramita-Seberry) Suppose that here exists an 0D(Y,Si\s\,S2,... ,Su) 
and u suitable matrices of order m. Then there is an Hadamard matrix of order ÇZsi)m. 
6.2.5 Hadamard Matrices and Block Codes 
Hadamard matrices have many applications [161]. One use is the construction of block 
codes. 
6.2. Hadamard Matrices 
Consider, for example, the problem of transmitting a text message from one place 
to another. Each letter will be encoded for transmission by representing it using its 
8-bit ASCII binary value. For example, A is represented by 01000001. 
It is not uncommon for errors to occur during transmission; most real-world chan-
nels are noisy. Consider what happens if a 1-bit error occurs in the transmission of 
'A : 01000001 is sent but 01001001 is received, for example. The received codeword 
corresponds to the character T . 
So the choice of 8-bit ASCII binary values to encode a text message is not a par-
ticularly good one: all codewords are being used, and a single-bit error is sufficient to 
change one character being transmitted into another. It is not even possible to detect 
that this has occurred. 
However, we can create codes which give some degree of error-detecting and error-
correcting capability. The Hamming distance between two codewords is the number 
of places in which the codewords disagree. A code is a "distance d code" when the 
minimum Hamming distance between any pair of codewords is at least d. A distance 
d code can detect (d—l) errors in the transmission of a codeword, and can correct 
^{d—1) errors in the transmission of a codeword. 
Definition 9 An {n,k) linear code over the field GF{q) consists of q^ vectors (called 
codewords) of length n with components from GF{q) such that: 
1. the vector sum of two codewords is a codeword; 
2. the multiplication of any codeword by a scalar which is any element of GF{q) 
yields a codeword. 
Hadamard matrices may be easily used to form non-linear binary codes. 
Definition 10 An {n,M,d) code is a set of M codewords, all of length n, composed 
with symbols from GF{q) symbols and minimum Hamming distance d. An {n,M,d) 
code is called optimal ifM is as large as possible for the given n and d. 
We consider binary codes here. In this case, q = 2, and the symbols used in con-
structing codewords are 0 and 1. 
Theorem 9 The existence of an Hadamard matrix of order At implies the existence of 
the following optimal codes: 
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• ( 4 i - l , 4 i , 2 0 ; 
• {4t-l,St,2t-l); and 
• (4 i -2 ,2 i ,2 i ) . 
Codes constructed using Hadamard matrices have seen practical applications: a 
(32,64,16) code was used in the Mariner telemetry system in 1969. 
For more details on constructing binary codes using Hadamard matrices, consult 
[161]. 
6.2.6 Computer Searches for Hadamard Matrices of Williamson 
T y p e 
In many cases complete searches have been conducted for Hadamard matrices of 
Williamson type. Searches have also been conducted for special classes of Williamson 
type Hadamard matrices. Furthermore, an infinite class of such matrices is known and 
will also be discussed briefly. 
• Baumert and Hall [162] report results of a complete search for orders 4t, t odd 
and 3 < i < 23. Some incomplete results for higher orders are also given. 
• Sawade [163] reports results of a complete search for orders 4i, t = 25,21. The 
results for t = 25 were later demonstrated to be incomplete by Dokovic [164]. 
• Dokovic [165] reports results of a complete search for orders 4i, i = 29,31. 
Only a single non-equivalent solution was found for t = 29 and is equivalent to 
an earlier result due to Baumert [166]. 
• Koukouvinos and Kounias [167] report results of a complete search for or-
der 4i, t = 33. These results were later demonstrated to be incomplete by 
Dokovic [168]. 
• Dokovic [168] reports results of a complete search for orders 4/, t = 33,35,39. 
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Dokovic [164] reports results of a complete search for orders 4i, t = 25,37. 
This extends results obtained by Sawade [163] for t = 25 and, for t = 37, by 
Williamson [169] and later Yamada [170] for a special class of matrices. 
An infinite family of Hadamard matrices of Williamson type has been proved to 
exist under certain conditions [171,172]: 
Theorem 10 is a prime power, q = 1 (mod 4), q+l=2t, then there exists a 
Williamson matrix of order At; we have C = D, and A and B differ only on the main 
diagonal. 
This theorem gives examples of Hadamard matrices of Williamson type for orders At, 
i = 31,37,45,49,51,55,..., for example. 
Yamada [170] has searched for Hadamard matrices of Williamson type, with cer-
tain restrictions. These matrices are referred to as Williamson type j matrices. The 
WilUamson equation for such matrices, of order An is: 
An = 
seA / \ seA / 
(6.7) 
seB / \ SEB / 
where Cs,ds = ±1, 0)5 = 00̂  + co" ,̂ (if = 1, f = 1 (mod«), A,BJA,jB is a parti-
tion of {1,2,..., Such a j exists if and only if all prime divisors of /i are = 1 
(mod 4). This led to some new results for « = 29,37,41. 
Chapter 7 
When the necessary conditions are not 
sufficient: sequences with zero autocorrelation 
function 
The material appearing in this chapter has been published as: 
Jeffrey Horton and Jennifer Seberry. When the necessary conditions are 
not sufficient: sequences with zero autocorrelation function. Bulletin of 
the Institute of Combinatorics and its Applications, 27:51-61, 1999. 
7.1 Introduction 
Recently K. T. Arasu (personal communication) and Yoseph Strassler, in his PhD the-
sis, The Classification of Circulant Weighing Matrices of Weight 9, Bar-Ilan University, 
Ramat-Gan, 1997, have intensively studied circulant weighing matrices, or single se-
quences, with weight 9. They show many cases are non-existent. Here we give details 
of a search for two sequences with zero periodic autocorrelation and types (1,9), (1,16) 
and (4,9). We find some new cases but also many cases where the known necessary 
conditions are not sufficient. 
We instance a number of occasions when the known necessary conditions are not 
sufficient for the existence of weighing matrices and orthogonal designs constructed 
using sequences with zero autocorrelation function leading to intriguing new ques-
tions. 
A weighing matrix W = W{n,k) is a square matrix with entries 0, dbl having k 
non-zero entries per row and column and inner product of distinct rows zero. Hence 
W satisfies WW'^ = kin, and W is equivalent to an orthogonal design OD{n\k) (see 
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Geramita and Seberry [149] for more details). The number k is called the weight of 
W. 
Weighing matrices were first studied by HoteUing [151] because of their use in 
weighing experiments. 
Given a set of £ sequences, the sequences Aj = {aji,aj2,...,ajn}, j = of 
length n the periodic autocorrelation junction, PAF, PA{S), is defined, reducing i + s 
modulo n, as i n 
PA{S) = s = 0,\,...,n-l. (7.1) j=ii=i 
Two sequences, of length n, will be said to be of type {s,t) if the sequences are 
composed of two variables, say a and b, and a and -a occur a total of 5 times and b 
and -b occur a total of t times. Such sequences may be used as the first rows of two 
circulant matrices to obtain an orthogonal design, 0D{2n;s,t). The sequences are said 
to be of type (0, ±1) and weight w if they have a total of w non-zero elements and may 
be used as the first rows of two circulant matrices to obtain a W{2n, w). 
We note, using the languages of sequences, the following conditions from [149]. 
In addition we note there is no square orthogonal matrix of size 18 which will have 
one element once in each row and column and the other 16 times. 
Theorem 11 (Necessary Conditions) The necessary conditions for the existence of a 
single sequence of length n, n odd, type (0, ±1) and weight k are that k is a perfect 
square and (n — k)^ — (n — k) >n — 1. 
The following conditions are necessary for the existence of two sequences type 
(s,t) and length n with n odd: 
i) s, t and s-\-t must each be the sum of two squares, 
ii) s -\-t <2n — 1, 
Hi) there exists a 2x2 integer matrix P (called the sum-fill matrix), with all entries 
of modulus < n which satisfies PP^ = diag{s,t). 
The necessary conditions for the existence of four sequences of types (51,52), 
{si,S2,S3) or (51,52,53,54) are given in [149,173]. 
In this note we concentrate on sequences of types (1,9), (1,16) and (4,9) which 
satisfy all known necessary conditions. We undertook a computer search which was 
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unable to find sequences of type (4,9) with a zero periodic autocorrelation function 
except for lengths 19m and 21m, m > 1. For types (1,9) and (1,16) we were able 
to find several new sequences. This leads to the intriguing question of what other 
necessary conditions must hold for these sequences to exist. 
The large number of possibilities to be examined in the course of an exhaustive 
search for sequences with zero autocorrelation function suggests that a solution based 
around distributed computing may be useful. Fortunately, in this case, an efficient 
algorithm, described in Section 7.4.1, was identified which enabled the original goals 
of the search to be met and surpassed, without explicitly constructing an algorithm 
based around distributed computing, a process which can be both difficult and time-
consuming. The algorithm employed was distributable to a very limited degree: the 
space to be searched could be broken up easily into a number of parts of varying size, 
each of which could be processed by different computer. However, this feature was 
often of limited use due to the very uneven size of the subspaces of the search and the 
amount of work involved in processing each one. 
The implementation of the program used to perform the search can be found in 
Appendix B. It is written in the language C and is targeted at compilers running on 
UNIX and Macintosh systems. If desired, it should be easily possible to port to another 
system. Some brief instructions for use may be found as a comment placed at the head 
of the program. 
7.2 Preliminary Results 
We make extensive use of the book of Geramita and Seberry [149]. For convenience, 
and since [149] is out of print, we restate some of the results in the language of se-
quences for reference. The next useful lemma is well known. 
Lemma 5 If there exists a sequence of length n, type (0, ±1) and weight k then there 
exists a sequence of length pn, type (0, ±1) and weight kfor all p>\. 
Theorem 12 (Circulant Kronecker Product) If there exists a sequence of length n, 
type (0, ±1) and weight k, and another sequence of length m, type (0, d=l) and weight 
i where gcd(n,m) = 1 then there exists a sequence of length mn, type (0,=bl) and 
7.3. Weighing matrices of weight 9 ^^^ 
weight kL 
Theorem 13 If there exist two sequences of length n and type {s,t) then there exist 
two sequences of length pn and type {s,t)for all integers p>l. 
Theorem 14 Suppose q is a prime power and q^+q+I is a prime. Then there exists 
asingle sequence of length q^+ 1, type (0,±1) andweightq^. And there exist two 
sequences of length q^ + q+l, type (0, ±1) and weight {q + 1)^. 
If in addition, q^ + q+I = 3{mod 4) is prime, then there exist two sequences of 
length q^ + q-\-l and type (1,(^+1)^). 
Remark 1 We note that iox q = 2 this means there are two sequences of length 7 
and type (1,9); and for ^ = 3 there are two sequences of length 13 and type (1,16). 
There also exists a sequence of length 21 and type (1,16), using the W(21,16) from 
Theorem 14 plus W(21,1). 
The first part of Theorem 14 allows us to construct a sequence of length 7, type 
(0,±1) and weight 4; a sequence of length 13, type (0,±1) and weight 9; and a se-
quence of length 21, type (0, ±1) and weight 16. We use Lemma 5 to make a sequence 
of length 91m, type (0, ±1) and weight 4 and a sequence of length 91m, type (0, d=l) 
and weight 9. This ensures there are two sequences of length 91m and type (4,9) for 
all m > 1. 
Two sequences of length 11 and type (1,16) are known from [149]. 
7.3 Weighing matrices of weight 9 
Strassler [174] has completed the classification of single sequences of length n, type 
(0,±1) and weight 9. 
When we consider two sequences of length n, type (0, d=l) and weight 9 we find 
they are known forn = 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, and multiples of these numbers by 
In a number of cases the only weighing matrix known of weight 9 is described by 
writing out its elements as in the W(15,9), W{\1,9) and W(18,9) (see Koukouvinos 
and Seberry [150] for details). 
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7.4 Sequences with Zero Autocorrelation 
The sequences of lengths n and types (1,9) and (4,9) have proved even more elusive. 
The only known sequences for (4,9) are of length 91m (see Remark 1). We have found 
sequences for (4,9) that are of length 19m and 21m. 
For order 14 the following matrix, quoted from [149, p331], has orthogonal rows 
and is of type (4,9) however no such other matrix is known for orders m = 2 (mod 4), 
m < 2 8 . 
0 X y y y X X X y y y y y y 
X 0 X X X -y -y -y y y y -y -y -y 
y X 0 -y -y X - X - X y y -y y y -y 
y X -y 0 -y - X X - X -y y y -y y y 
y X -y -y 0 - X - X X y -y y y -y y 
X -y X - X - X 0 y y -y y y y -y -y 
X -y - X X - X y 0 y y -y y -y y -y 
X -y - X - X X y y 0 y y -y y y -y 
y y y -y y -y y y 0 - X - X -y X - X 
y y y y -y y -y y - X 0 - X - X -y X 
y y -y y y y y -y - X - X 0 X - X -y 
y -y y -y y y -y -y -y - X X 0 X X 
y -y y y -y -y y -y X -y - X X 0 X 
y -y -y y y -y -y y - X X -y X X 0 
This note details our search for sequences of these types. 
7.4.1 Search Method 
It is known that sequences A = {a i , . . . , and B = {b\,...,bn} of length n and type 
(5,i), a variable a and —a occurring 5 times, and variable b and —b occurring t times, 
must satisfy the condition: 
f n \ 2 ( n \ 2 
X«/ + {12) 
\i=i J \i=i / 
7.4. Sequences with Zero Autocorrelation IJ^ 
We use Equation 12 to determine in what quantities each of variables a, -a and b, 
-b can occur in each sequence: this helps limit the size of the space which must be 
searched for sequences with zero autocorrelation function. 
Equation 7.2 is equivalent to: 
sâ  + tb^ = {NA,aa + NA,bbf + {NB,aa + NB,bbf 
= {^la + + {^Ib + + 2{NA,aNÂb + NB,aNB,b)ab 
from which we obtain the following: 
NA,aNA,b+NB,aNB,b = 0 (7.3) 
N l a + N l , = ^ (7-4) 
N i t + Nib = t (7-5) 
Note that Nx,v = (count of variable v) - (count of variable - v ) in sequence X. 
Consider the case for sequences of type (4,9); the case for (1,9) is similar. Then 
Equations 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 have solutions: 
NA,a = ±2 NA,b = 0 NB,a = 0 NB,t = ±3 
NA,a = 0 NA,b = ±3 NB,a = ±2 NB̂B = 0 
We need consider only one of these two possible solutions; the other corresponds to 
exchanging sequences A and B. 
Each solution has four cases, of which we need to consider only one. The other 
three cases correspond to changing the sign of each variable in one or both sequences, 
which does not affect the result of evaluating Equation 7.1. 
This yields a table (Table 7.1) of counts of variables present in sequences A and B 
of type (4,9). A similar table (Table 7.2) can be generated for sequences of type (1,9). 
We also observe that the result of evaluating Equation 7.1 is not affected by rotating 
a sequence; we are able to eliminate some rotations of a sequence from the search 
space by fixing the first element of each sequence. We choose the variable that is 
to occur in a sequence the fewest number of times as the first (fixed) variable in the 
sequence; this gives the greatest reduction in the search space. 
Note also that the result of evaluating Equation 7.1 is the same for the reflection of 
a sequence; however, we have only been successful in eliminating a small proportion 
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A B 
a —a b -b a —a b -b 
3 1 0 0 0 0 6 3 
3 1 1 1 0 0 5 2 
3 1 2 2 0 0 4 1 
3 1 3 3 0 0 3 0 
2 0 0 0 1 1 6 3 
2 0 1 1 1 1 5 2 
2 0 2 2 1 1 4 1 
2 0 3 3 1 1 3 0 
Table 7.1: Variable counts for sequences A and B of type (4,9). 
A B 
a —a b —b 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 
1 0 2 2 
1 0 3 3 
a —a b —b 
0 0 6 3 
0 0 5 2 
0 0 4 1 
0 0 3 0 
Table 7.2: Variable counts for sequences A and B of type (1,9). 
of these from the search space. No reflections have been eliminated from the search 
space sizes tabulated in Table 7.3. 
We can speed up the process of evaluating Equation 7.1 for each pair of possible 
sequences if we count the number of possible sequences for A and for B given the 
variable counts for the particular s and i, evaluate Equation 7.1 for whichever has fewer 
possible sequences, and store these results in memory ̂  Equation 7.1 can then be fully 
evaluated for both sequences by evaluating it for each possibility of the sequence with 
the largest number of possibilities together with the results stored in memory. 
Table 7.3 records the total size of the search space, amount of the space that was 
searched before finding a pair of sequences with zero autocorrelation function, and 
the time taken, for different (s, t) and various n. Results were obtained using three 
different computers. 
'Although in practice so much memory may be required for large n for some (i, t) that this step must 
be performed in parts. It should also be noted that considerable improvements in runtimes could be 
obtained by limiting the amount of memory used by a single part to a size that could be accommodated 
by cache memory. 
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Tot. Sequences Searched Time 
Type n (billions) (billions) (minutes) Machine 
(1.9) 27 3.78 All 14.5 Ultra-5 
(1,9) 27 3.78 All 21.5 Ultra-2 
(1,9) 29 7.16 All 27 Ultra-5 
(1.9) 29 7.16 All 42.5 Ultra-2 
(1.9) 31 12.94 All 55 Ultra-5 
(1.9) 31 12.94 All 80 Ultra-2 
(1.9) 31 12.94 All 50 PM 7300/200 
(1,9) 33 22.44 All 99 Ultra-5 
(1,9) 33 22.44 All 158 Ultra-2 
(1,9) 33 22.44 All 116 PM 7300/200 
(1.9) 37 60.93 All 275 Ultra-5 
(1.9) 37 60.93 All 416 Ultra-2 
(1,9) 41 148.07 All 767 Ultra-5 
(1,9) 41 148.07 All 1102 Ultra-2 
(1,9) 43 223.01 All 745 RIOOOO 
(1.9) 47 477.31 All 1684 RIOOOO 
(1,9) 47 477.31 All 2550 Ultra-5 
(1,9) 51 956.18 All 3613 RIOOOO 
(1,9) 53 1324.68 All 5132 RIOOOO 
(1,16) 15 10.28 0.68 <1 PM 7300/200 
(1,16) 17 155.83 0.12 <1 PM 7300/200 
(1,16) 19 1538.97 2.39 5 PM 7300/200 
(1,16) 23 63929.02 
(4,9) 15 9.68 All 17 Ultra-5 
(4,9) 15 9.68 All 23.5 Ultra-2 
(4,9) 17 57.96 All 106 Ultra-5 
(4,9) 17 57.96 All 151 Ultra-2 
(4,9) 17 57.96 All 97 PM 7300/200 
(4,9) 19 269.38 71.71 157 Ultra-5 
(4,9) 19 269.38 71.73 245 Ultra-2 
(4,9) 19 269.38 75.02 194 PM 7300/200 
(4,9) 21 1035.27 834.60 1645 Ultra-5 
(4,9) 21 1035.27 833.36 2222 Ultra-2 
(4,9) 23 3431.72 All 9552 Ultra-5 
(4,9) 25 10104.85 All 14230 RIOOOO 
Table 7.3: Time taken to search for sequences of types (1,9), (4,9) and (1,16) for 
various n, multiple computers. 
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Type Length Zero 
PAF 
New? Type Length Zero 
PAF 
New? 
(1,9) 7 Yes (1,16) 21 Yes 
(4,9) 7 No (4,9) 21 Yes 
(1,9) 9 No (1,9) 23 Yes V (1,16) 9 No (4,9) 23 No V (4,9) 9 No (1,9) 25 Yes V (1,9) 10 Yes (4,9) 25 No V (4,9) 10 No (1,9) 27 No V (1,9) 11 No (1,9) 29 No V (1,16) 11 Yes (1,9) 31 No V (4,9) 11 No y (1,9) 33 No V (1,9) 13 Yes (1,9) 35 Yes 
(4,9) 13 No v/ (1,9) 37 No V (1,16) 13 Yes (1,9) 39 Yes 
(1,9) 15 Yes y (1,9) 41 No V (1,16) 15 Yes y (1,9) 43 No V (4,9) 15 No y (1,9) 45 Yes 
(1,9) 17 No x/ (1,9) 47 No V (1,16) 17 Yes V (1,9) 49 Yes (4,9) 17 No x/ (1,9) 51 No V 
(1,9) 19 Yes x/ (1,9) 53 No V 
(1,16) 19 Yes y (1,9) 55 No V (4,9) 19 Yes v/ (1,9) 57 Yes V 
(1,9) 21 Yes (1,9) 59 No V 
Table 7.4: The results of an exhaustive search for the existence of two sequences of 
types (1,9), (1,16) and (4,9). 
7.4.2 Results 
A summary of our results is given in Tables 7.4 and 7.5. Table 7.6 is derived from 
[150]. 
The results we now give in Table 7.4 marked ^ are previously unpublished. 
7.5 When necessary conditions are not sufficient 
As we have seen in this paper, and from [173, 175, 176], the known necessary condi-
tions are not sufficient for the existence of 
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Len. Type Sequences with zero autocorrelation function Zero 
7 (1,9) b 
b 
- b a 
- b - b - ] 
b - b 

















10 (1,9) a 0 - b 0 0 0 0 0 b 0; PAF 
b - b - b b b 0 b 0 b i 0 






































15 (1,9) 0 0 0 0 b 0 0 a 0 0 - b 0 0 0 0; PAF 
b b b - b 0 0 - b b 0 0 0 b 0 0 0 
15 (1,16) a b b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0-b--b, r PAF 
b b b b--b b - b b 0--b 0 b 0 - b b 0 0 
17 (1,16) a b b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0-b--b; r PAF 
b b b b--b b - b b 0--b 0 b 0 - b b 0 0 
19 (1,9) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b a - b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0; PAF 
b b b - b b 0 0 0--b 0 0 0 0 b 0 0 0 0 0 
19 (1,16) a b 0 0 b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - b 0 0--b; PAF 
b b b 0 0--b b b 0 b - b b--b-b 0 b 0 0 0 
19 (4,9) a a 0 0 b-- b - b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b 0 0 0 0; PAF 
a--a b 0 b 0 0 0 0 0 b 0 0 0 0 - b 0 0 b 
21 (1,9) b 0 0 b 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 - b 0 0--b 0 0; PAF 
0 b 0 0 0 0 0 b 0 0 0 0 0 b 0 0--b 0 0 b 0 
21 (4,9) a b b - b 0--b 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 - b 0 0 0 0 b 0 0; PAF 
a 0 0 0 0 0 0--a 0 0 0 - b 0 0--b 0 0 0 0 0--b 
21 (4,9) a b 0 0 b 0 0 a 0 0 - b 0 0 - b 0 0 b 0 0-•b 0; PAF 
a 0 b 0 0 0 0-•a b 0 0 b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 (1,9) b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0--b; PAF 
b--b 0 b 0 0 b b b 0 0 - b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 (1,9) 0 b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - b 0; PAF 
b 0 b 0 0 b b-•b 0 0 0 0 0 b 0 0 0-•b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





12, 14,16,(18), 20, (22), 24... 
20... 
14,16,(18), 20, (22), 24, (26), 28... 
Table 7.6: The asymptotic existence of 1,9), 0D{2n;l, 16) and OD(2n;4,9). 
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• four sequences of lengths 5 and type (3,7,8); 
• four sequences of lengths 5 and types (1,3,6,8), (1,4,4,9), or 
(2,2,5,5); 
• two sequences of lengths 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 23 or 25 and type (4,9); 
• four sequences of lengths 7 and type ( 1,5,20) ; 
• four sequences of lengths 7 and types (1,4,9,9), (1,8,8,9), (2,8,9,9), 
(3,6,8,9), (4,4,4,9) or (4,4,9,9); 
• two sequences of lengths 9, 11, 17, 27, 29, 31, 33, 37, 41, 43, 47, 51, 53, 55 or 
59 and type (1,9); 
• two sequences of length 9, type (0, ±1) and weight 9; 
• four sequences of lengths 9 and types (1,2,8,25), (1,4,4,25) or 
(2,3,4,24); 
• four sequences of lengths 11 and types (5,38), (6,37), (8,35), (10,33), (12,31), 
(13,30), (14,29), (15,28), (16,27), (19,24), (20,23), or 
(21,22). 
• four sequences of lengths 11 and types (1,5,38), (1,6,37), (1,8,35), (1,10,33), 
(1,12,31), (1,13,30), (1,14,29), (1,15,28), (1,16,27), 
(1,19,24), (1,20,23) or (1,21,22). 
• single sequence of length 15 or 17, type (0, ±1) and weight 9; 
We note there is an (4,4,9,9) constructed of four circulant sequences of lengths 
19 and 21. 
Chapter 8 
A Search for Hadamard Matrices constructed from Williamson Matrices 
The material in this chapter has formed the basis of a paper: 
Jeffrey Horton, Christos Koukouvinos and Jennifer Seberry. A Search for 
Hadamard Matrices constructed from Williamson Matrices, (submitted) 
8.1 Introduction 
An Hadamard matrix H of order n has elements ±1 and satisfies HH^ = nin. These 
matrices are used extensively in coding and communications [see Seberry and Ya-
mada [152]]. The order of an Hadamard matrix is n = 0 mod 4. The first unsolved 
case is order 428. That is, neither the existence nor non-existence of Hadamard matri-
ces for this order has so far been established. 
We use Williamson's construction as the basis of an algorithm to construct a dis-
tributed computer search for new Hadamard matrices. The theory of Williamson's 
construction is briefly described in Section 8.2. Before presenting a description of the 
search algorithm, Section 8.3 discusses two equivalent representations of Hadamard 
matrices derived from Williamson's construction; the results of our search is presented 
using both representations. The implementation of the search algorithm is presented 
in Section 8.4, some remarks on the time required to perform various searches may be 
found in Section 8.5, and the results of the search are described in Section 8.6. 
A printed version of the source code for the search program is not included: at 
slightly fewer than 15,000 lines of code and comments, it is too large for inclusion in 
printed form. It is, however, present on an attached disk of supplementary material. 
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8.2 Hadamard Matrices from Williamson Matrices 
Theorem 15 (Williamson [169]) Suppose there exist four (1 , -1) matrices A, B, C, 
D of order n which satisfy 
Further, suppose 
Then 
AA^ + BB^ + CC^ + DD^ = Anh (8.1) 
H = 
A B C D 
-B A -D C 
- C D A -B 
-D -C B A 
is an Hadamard matrix of order An constructed from a Williamson array. 













r ( r y = 
If « is odd, T is the matrix representation of the wth root of unity co, co" = 1. 
Let 
(8.4) 
ai = ±l,an-i = ai 
B = JUZo bi = ±l,bn-i = bi 
C = Ci — il; I — Q 
D = HlZodiT^ di = ±l,dn-i = di 
(8.5) 
Then matrices A,B,C,D may be represented as polynomials. The requirement that 
Xn-i = Xi,x e {a, b, c, d} forces the matrices A, B,C,D to be symmetric. 
8.2. Hadamard Matrices from Williamson Matrices ^^^ 
Since A,5,C,D are symmetric, (8.1) becomes: 
=4nln 
and the relation XY^ = YX^ becomes XY = YX which is true for polynomials. 
Definition 11 Williamson matrices are (1 , -1) symmetric circulant matrices. As a 
consequence of being symmetric and circulant they commute in pairs. 
We use the following theorem of Williamson's as the motivator for our search 
algorithm: 
Theorem 16 (Williamson [169]) If there exist solutions to the equations 
A// = 1 + 2 X + co^- '̂), ¿=1 ,2 ,3 ,4 (8.6) 
where s =\{n-l),(iiis anth root of unity, exactly one oft\ j ,t2j, is j, j is nonzero and 
equals ±1 for each I < j < s, and 
then there exist solutions to the equations: 
^ = X/S) aQ = \,ai = an-i = ±l 
B = biT\ = bn-i = ±1 ^̂  
c = mz^ CiT\ C0 = \,Ci = Cn-i = ±l 
D = lIZo diT\ do = l,di = dn-i = ±1 
That is, there exists an Hadamard matrix of order An. 
In matrix form, cô  + is represented as T^ + Since these are symmetric, 
we write 
coy = oy + 
We assume 
' 2A = -/il + + A/3 + /i4 = 2 ( 1 + IJ.^l {-tij + t2j + t3j + t4j)(O)^' + CO«-̂ '}) 
2B = /il - + + = 2 ( 1 + S •=! {hj - t2j + t3j + t4j)((ûj + Cû«-̂ ')) 
) \ (8.8) 
2C = /il +/i2 -/i3 +iU4 = 2 + { t i j + t2j - t3j + t4j)i(àJ + 0)"-̂ } 
2D = /il + /i2 + /i3 - /M = 2 ( 1 + ( t i j + t2j + t3j - t4j) ((ûJ + 0)"-^) 
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If tij ^ 0 then the coefficient of oy + (if~j in jc/ is different from the coefficient of 
oy + co''" '̂ in the other equations. Thus with (8.6), 
bj = t\j-t2j-\-t3j + t4j 
— hj + t2j-t2,j+t4j 
From here we should assume that n is odd. Let 
A = Pi-Ni (8.9) 
where Pi is the sum of positive terms in A and Ni is the sum of the negative terms in 
A. So 
Pi = ^ a j T j , a j = 1; - M = J ^ a j V . a j = - 1 ; (8.10) 
j j 
In the same way we write 
B = P2-N2;C = P3-N3;D = P4-N4 (8.11) 
Since ao = and an-i = a i , i= 1 1, the positive terms except for ao occur 
in pairs, hence the number of terms in Pi, is an odd number. Similarly, P2,P3,P4 
are odd numbers. 
Let us write 
+ + + (8.12) 
Then 
Pi-hNi = J, 1,2,3,4 (8.13) 
Using (8.9) and (8.11) and substituting Ni = J- Pi in (8.1) we have 
(2Pi - + (2P2 - J)^ + (2P3 - Jf + (2P4 -Jf = 4n (8.14) 
Since TjJ = J for all j, we have P// = piJ and fi = nJ. So (8.14) takes the form 
4(Pf + pI + P3 +PI)- 4(/7i + /72 + P3 + Pa)J + 4 « / = Anin (8.15) 
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Divided by 4 becomes 
P¡+P¡+P¡+P¡ = {pi +P2+P3+P4- n)j + nln (8.16) 
Since each pt is odd and n is odd, p i p i P 3 + P4 - n on the right of (8.16) must 
be an odd number. In Pf = {^T^f^k in a subset of 0,1, • • • - 1. We have Pf = 
{mod 2). Hence, every T^ = (r^)^, to appear v îth an odd coefficient on the 
right of (8.16), must occur in exactly one or three of Pi A-
Remark 2 The solutions for (8.6) are independent of the particular root co, so if n as 
defined by (8.1) is prime, we can choose co so that the first ¡i having any coy assigned 
has 0)1. Since the equations are true for all roots of unity co, they are also true for 
co= 1. 
Theorem 17 (Williamson [169]) Let n be odd, and matrices A,B,C,D satisfy (8.1) 
and (8.5), suppose ao = bo = co = do, then exactly three ofaj,bj,Cj,dj, I < j <n-l, 
have the same sign. 
Examplel L^i w = 9;4 x 9 == 36 = 1̂  + + + So 
PI = 1 
P2 = 1 
P 3 = L - 2 ( C 0 ^ + 0 ) ' ^ ) 
= 1 - 2 C 0 2 
P4 = l+2(co + co^)4-2(co^ + co^)-2(co^ + co )̂ 
1 + 2 C O I + 2 C O 3 - 2 C O 4 
Now the complex conjugate ofpi is fii = pi and 
Âl 
= + + (1 - 2co2 - 2(0^ f + (1 + 2co + 2cô  + 2cô  + 2cô  - 2co'̂  - 2co )̂2 
= + + (9 + 40)4 + 4cô  - 4cô  - 4co )̂ + (25 + 4o)̂  + 4o)̂  - - 4o)^) 
= 1̂  + 1̂  + 3^ + 5^ 
If (0=1 
Pi =P2 = U P3 = - 3 ; P4 = 5 
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Weformxiof(8.8) 
2A = 2( 1 + CDi - CO2 + 0)3 - (04) 
2B = 2( 1 + coi - CO2 + CO3 - CO4) 
2C = 2 (1 + CO 1 + CO2 + CO3 - CO4) 
2Z) 2(1 - (Oi - CO2 - CO3 + CO4) 
Then writing Si = T + 
A = I + Si-S2+S3-SA 
D = I-Si -52-53+^4 
and using them as (8.2) gives Hadamard matrix of order 36. 
Theorem 18 (Whiteman [172]) Let q be a prime power = 1 {mod 4) and put n = 
{q+\)/2. Let y be a primitive root of GF{q^). Put = ax-\-b, where a,b e GF{q) 
and define 
au = x{a)M = X{b) (8.17) 
Then the sums 
m = I g(^) = I (8.18) 1=0 /-o 
satisfy the identity 
(8-19) 
for each nth root of unity ^ including ^ = 1. 
Note that when ^ === 1 the identity (8.19) reduces to the classical result that every 
prime = 1 {mod 4) is representable as the sum of two squares of integers. 
Corollary 1 Letq = 2n-1 bea prime power = 1 {mod 4). Put 
V l ® = 1 + / © ' = 1 - m ) . = ¥4(^) -
where f{^) and g{^) are the polynomials defined by (8.18). Then the identity 
+ ¥ 2 © + ¥ 3 © + ¥ 4 ( ^ ) ^ 4 / 1 
is satisfied for each nth root of unity ^ including 
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Theorem 19 (l\iryn's theorem [171], proof by Whiteman [172]) Let q be a prime 
power, q = 2n-\ = \ mod 4. Then there exists a Williamson matrix of order An in 
which A and B agree only on the main diagonal and moreover, C = D. 
We have ao = I,bo = 1. The successive elements in the first row of 
A are 1,(24,^8,••• The successive elements in the first row of B are 
1, -«4, -as, • • •, -a4(„_i). The successive elements in the first rows of C and D are 
1, ¿74, • ' • 5 ̂ 4(n-i) • The matrices A, C, D are circulants. 
8.3 The representation of Hadamard Matrices 
The relationship between two current methods for classifying Williamson matrices, 
the Williamson decomposition of An into four squares, + + 53 + ^ = An, and the 
row sums mi,m2,m3,m4 of the four Williamson matrices A, C,I>, is now discussed. 
Lemma 6 Let the Williamson decomposition into four squares be 












s\ + S2+sl+sl = An<=^m\+m2-\-m\+ml= An 
Ms = Mm = s 
Proof. From (8.6) we have, using the root CO = 1, a decomposition with 
= 1,2,3,4. 
By Williamson's assumption condition, 
s'i+sl+sl-hsl=An. 
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n-l n-1 n-\ n-\ 
7=1 7=1 7=1 
Similarly, 
m = ^{si-\-S2-\-S3-S4) 
and M5 = m. Inverting we have, as = M, Mm = 5. It is easy to check that 
8.4 Search Method 
8.4.1 Introduction 
The basic search method is to examine all possible combinations of (Oy, 1 < 7 < ^(n — 
1) for each mJ = 1,2,3,4, testing each set of n so generated to see if it satisfies 
Williamson's condition and can be used to form an Hadamard matrix of order 4n. 
This search method is documented in more detail in the following sections. 
First experiences with a search program based on this technique indicated that the 
size of the search space rapidly grew so large that it was beyond the capabilities of 
any single available computer to perform a search for Hadamard matrices of order 148 
within a reasonable time, which was defined as weeks or months rather than years; this 
was not unexpected. The most powerful computer available at the time for performing 
the search was a Silicon Graphics machine with 4 180MHz RIOOOO microprocessors. 
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A subsequent version of the program used a more distributed approach — a client 
program running on a remote computer requests a server program to supply subprob-
lems for processing by the client. Any solutions found by the client are reported to 
the server. Very little work is done by the server; most work performed will be shared 
amongst the clients. 
This has the advantage that if the clients can work largely independently and do 
not require to communicate often or extensively with the server to perform work, then 
large amounts of work can be accomplished in a fraction of the time required for 
the same amount of work to be performed by a single computer. A doubling of the 
number of clients results in halving the time taken to perform a search, for example, if 
the problem being considered is suitable. 
There are a number of software tools and packages available to make the construc-
tion of systems to perform a distributed computation more straightforward. These 
include PVM or "Parallel Virtual Machine" [177], and MPI or "Message Passing In-
terface" [178]. Both PVM and MPI have been ported to a variety of different computer 
environments; PVM implementations are interoperable, which is not necessarily the 
case for different implementations of MPI at the present time. PVM and MPI both 
provide facilities allowing the exchange of messages between tasks participating in a 
particular computation. 
However, it was decided not to use one of these packages, but instead to use lower-
level networking APIs directly to perform any required communications, for several 
reasons: 
1. Many of the computers potentially available locally to perform the computation 
were Macintosh computers or computers running some form of UNIX. We are 
not aware of any publicly available package like PVM or MPI that was avail-
able for both UNIX-like systems and the Macintosh and able to interoperate 
between different implementations ̂  It was not particularly difficult, however, 
to produce a client program which could be compiled and run on a wide vari-
ety of UNIX-like systems and which used sockets to perform communication 
^Project Appleseed [179] has been working with a partial implementation of MPI running on a clus-
ter of Macintosh computers. However, their implementation currently uses the AppleTalk networking 
protocol and so would be unlikely to interoperate easily, if at all, with any UNIX-based implementation 
of MPI. 
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via TCP/IP [180], and another which operated on the Macintosh using Open 
Transport to implement TCP/IP communications [181]. Differences in byte or-
dering between computer architectures is another problem which can cause a 
difficulty for client-server systems, and which is typically handled by a package 
such as PVM. In this case all data was converted to and from a simple platform-
independent form for exchange between machines. 
2. It was desired to produce a system which could potentially involve computers 
not located on the local area network, and there was some concern that available 
systems such as PVM and MPI might not be able to incorporate these remote 
computers reliably and robustly, if at all. 
3. Computers located behind a firewall may have difficulty in participating in a dis-
tributed search such as this if the firewall has been configured so that only con-
nections from or to particular ports are permitted. For example, a firewall might 
be configured so that outgoing connections are permitted only via port 80, which 
is the network port on which WWW servers usually listen for connections from 
WWW browsers. Communication between WWW servers and browsers takes 
place using a protocol known as Hypertext Transfer Protocol, or HTTP. Using 
a low-level networking API for communication between a client and server per-
forming a distributed computation enables such environmental restrictions to be 
overcome — for a suitably simple protocol, all transactions between client and 
server can take place encapsulated as HTTP. It was unnecessary to implement 
such sophisticated features to successfully perform the searches described here, 
however. 
4. It was not desirable that participation in the search require any software to be 
installed in addition to the client program for performing the search. The need 
for a remote site to install extra software in addition to the search client itself 
may affect the willingness of that site to participate in the search. 
Searches for Hadamard matrices of all orders up to and including order 148 have 
been performed using Williamson's method implemented by a client/server system. 
Towards the end of an initial search of order 148, 37 computers were involved, 20 
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270MHz Ultra 5 computers from Sun Microsystems, and 17 333MHz iMacs from Ap-
ple Computer. No computers not available on the local area network were employed in 
the initial search. However, a subsequent search performed to verify results utilised 35 
350MHz Pentium-II computers at the University of Newcastle in addition to 30 local 
Ultra 5 computers. 
The details of the implementation of Williamson's method within the framework 
of a client/server system are discussed in the following sections. 
8.4.2 Decompose 4n into sum-of-squares representation 
The first step in performing a search is to decompose 4n into all possible sums-of-
squares representations. Observing the form of (8.6), we see that when O) = 1 each /// 
satisfies: 
/i/l = 1 mod 4 , ^ / > 0 ; or ^^^^^ 
jui\ = 3 mod 4 , ^ / < 0 . 
For example, the possible decompositions for 148 are: 
1, 1, 5, 11 
1, 7, 7, 7 
3, 3, 3, 11 
3, 3, 7, 9 
5, 5, 7, 7 
In the sections to follow, we write cOsub to indicate some cô  = cô  + co" ^ for 1 < 
k< ^{n — I ) when it is necessary to distinguish from an nth root of unity, O). 
8.4.3 Decide on the number of cOsub assigned to each ¡u 
The next step is to assign a number of cOsub to each /u. Using (8.20), we see that 
if = 1 mod 4, then of the cOsub contributing to /i/, the number being added to jui 
will always be greater than the number of cOsub that are subtracted. A similar 
condition can be derived for = 3 mod 4. These cOsub are termed "fixed"; others 
are "floating" and always occur in pairs, one added and the other subtracted. These 
conditions are enforced to help limit the size of the space to be searched. 
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All possible permutations of the number of floating cOsub are assigned to each ju 
over the course of the search of a particular sum-of-squares representation, subject to 
certain restrictions that are useful for reducing the size of the space to be searched: 
1. The number of cOsub assigned to m must be greater than or equal to the number 
of (Osub assigned to ¡ij where j < i and m and juj correspond to the same value 
in the sum-of-squares decomposition. We may apply this condition because for 
the purposes of testing the set of ju to see if Williamson's condition is satisfied, 
jui and fij are interchangeable, and it is desirable to perform the test only once 
rather than twice. This may be extended further if more than two ¡i have the 
same value in the sum-of-squares decomposition. 
2. If n is prime, then we may always place coi in the first to which any cOsub 
are assigned. This corresponds to solving the set of jU for some nih root of 
unity, oy , such that coi is present in the first ^ to which any cOsub are assigned. 
Furthermore, if there are cOsub both added and subtracted from this we may 
either subtract or add coi ; we do not need to check both. If this condition is 
in force, then condition 1 is not applied in the case of the ¡i to which (Oi is 
assigned, but remains applicable for other ¡i corresponding to the same value 
from the sum-of-squares decomposition. Enforcing this condition can greatly 
reduce the size of the space to be searched: for example, applying this condition 
for searching for Hadamard matrices of size 148 reduces the size of the space to 
be searched to 37% of its size were this condition not to be enforced (reducing 
from about 32,387,862,644,280 to 12,062,406,963,464)^. 
For each permutation of floating cOsub that is generated, we must assign specific 
identities to each cOsub and evaluate Williamson's condition. 
8.4.4 Assign specific identities to each cOsub 
We must now assign specific identities to each cOsub so that Williamson's condition 
may be tested. 
^We would have achieved an even greater reduction in the size of the search space had we not been 
checking for solutions by both adding and subtracting coi where this option was available. In this case, 
the size of space to be searched is less than half of the above figure. 
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Let the number of COsub added to m be represented by cn - i and the number of cOsub 
subtracted from m by C2/. S2i-i is the set of cOsub added to ¡li and 821 is the set of 0)sub 
subtracted from ^I. That is, there are eight sets S, two for each ¡D. Some of these sets S 
may be empty. 
Dividing COsub into two groups, one added to a and the other subtracted, helps to 
simplify the procedure for iterating over all possible combinations of cOsub-
The sets Si are formed by choosing c/ elements from the set of cOsub not already 
allocated to an SjJ < i. Recalling that s = \{n- 1), ST,O is defined as: 
5'T,/ is defined as: 
ST,i = S T , i - l - S i - u i = l , . . . , S . (8.21) 
For convenience, we say that: 
Williamson's condition may be tested once . . . h a v e been generated. All 
possible combinations of c/ elements from ^t,/ are examined; once the combinations 
are exhausted, the next combination for is generated. The process is illustrated by 
the small segment of pseudocode shown in Figure 8.1. 
So it should be easy to see that the number of tests of Williamson's condition for a 
particular set of c i , . . . , cg can be calculated as follows: 
/ ST • \ Evaulations = n '' (8.22) 
Usually, however, the total number of evaluations performed will be less than this, for 
two reasons: 
1. If condition 2 from Section 8.4.3 is applied, we choose one fewer oosub for the 
set S in which coi is to appear. 
2. If ¡Hi and /uj, i < j correspond to the same value in the sum-of-squares decompo-
sition of 4n and have the same number of cOsub assigned, then we may require 
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j'=U do 
for k from j to 8 
populate Sĵ k from ̂ t,^-! and Sk-i using (8.21); 
generate combination Sk by choosing q elements from Sĵ ki 
Test Williamson Condition using , . . . , ̂ g to generate /^i,... ,^4; 
; := 8; 
g := false; 
while (0 > 0) and (g == false)) 
generate new combination Sj using cj elements from ^t,; 
if successful 
g := true; 
else 
while ( j > 0); 
Figure 8.1: Segment of pseudocode illustrating generation of combinations for testing 
Williamson's condition. 
that if cOjc is the cOsub of smallest subscript assigned to jui and cOy has the smallest 
subscript assigned to that jc < j . Otherwise, work will be repeated when 
replicates a sequence that had previously occurred in juj. Enforcing this con-
dition ensures that no repetition takes place and reduces the size of the search 
space slightly. The reduction is considerable but unfortunately not as substantial 
as that for applying condition 2 from Section 8.4.3. 
8.4.5 Dividing up the work for distribution 
The easiest way in which to divide up the work for distribution by the server to the 
clients would be for the clients to perform all the work described in Section 8.4.4, with 
the server being responsible for deciding only the number of 0)sub being assigned to 
each jii for a particular sum-of-squares decomposition, as described in Sections 8.4.2 
and 8.4.3. 
However, this not only burdens the clients with far too much work but also limits 
the number of clients which may be involved in the search. It is best to assign the 
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clients an amount of work that would take a small fraction of the total time required 
to perform the whole search, but not so small a fraction that network communication 
overheads become excessive. That is, it is desirable that the clients seldom require to 
communicate with the server. A few hours' work is usually a good target to aim for. 
Catering for the varying abilities of computers is also useful. For example, if one 
computer is very much older and slower than some others participating in the search, 
then it may be useful to assign it a smaller amount of work than that assigned to 
faster computers so that the slower machines may still make a contribution to the 
search. However, such refinements, while desirable, were not implemented for the 
performance of this search. 
The obvious manner in which to reduce the amount of work performed by the 
clients to a reasonable level was to make the server perform part of the work described 
in Section 8.4.4. The server performs no evaluations itself, but would choose sets 
Si,..., Si, for some / < 8. The client would evaluate all the possibilities for the choice 
of the remaining sets Si+i,...,Ss. 
Unfortunately, this does not yield subproblems with an even division of work. 
Some subproblems will require clients to perform many more evaluations than oth-
ers. The server decides what value i should take by estimating the amount of work 
involved in a subproblem using a modification of (8.22): 
8 / .| \ 
Evaulations performed by client = n I ^ 1 • (8.23) 
y=/+iV / 
Two constants and 5max must be specified to the server: a subproblem is of 
acceptable size if its size lies between the two limits. 
This can result in subproblems which are very small if ^max is not set sufficiently 
high. Many small subproblems also mean that the server is performing very much 
more work in terms of allocating and transmitting a work unit than is desirable. It can 
be difficult to determine that .Smax is not sufficiently high when starting the search. 
There are a number of possible solutions to the problem; fortunately none of these 
were required for the searches described in this paper: 
1. The server can allocate multiple small subproblems to a client looking for work; 
2. Instead of just one server, a master server and a number of sub-servers or proxies 
could be designed. Clients could obtain work directly from the master server 
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or from a proxy; similarly, results could be reported to the master or a proxy. 
Proxies would synchronize with the master server on a daily or weekly basis, 
depending on the size of the problem; 
3. Implement a different scheme of partitioning the work that gives more control 
over the size of the subproblems. One way of changing the partitioning of the 
work would be no make the server responsible for choosing say half of the cOsub 
for one of the sets S, and the client responsible for choosing the other half and 
performing all necessary evaluations. In addition to being rather more compli-
cated, this scheme as well would have had some problems regarding the even 
division of work, perhaps not to the same extent as the scheme we employed, 
however. 
The server must also keep a record of each subproblem it allocates, so that should 
any client fail to complete a subproblem, perhaps because the client software was 
deleted from the computer on which it was running along with any records of subprob-
lems allocated to that client, it will still be possible to complete the computation. The 
implementation described here assigns old, as yet unsolved subproblems in response 
to client requests for work once there were no new subproblems to be assigned. This 
ensures that all the work required to solve the complete problem is actually performed. 
8.4.6 An update on methods of dividing the work for distribution 
When searches were performed, it was noticed that there were a large number of sub-
problems that involved individually very little work. These could be completed very 
quickly, and resulted in a large number of reports of completed problems and requests 
for new problems being handled by the server over a short space of time. 
Several modifications were made to the server and client to change this behaviour, 
with the aim of being able to support a much larger number of client machines whose 
contacts with the server are much better distributed over time. 
These modifications are as follows: 
• To even out the amount of work assigned to each client, the server assigns mul-
tiple subproblems to a client so that each client has a certain minimum amount 
of work to perform. 
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• The server was initially a multithreaded design. Most of the threads handle 
communications with the clients. Network communication, especially to remote 
sites, can be quite slow, so multiple threads enable more than one client to be 
handled simultaneously if required. We considered a multithreaded design to 
be superior to a multiprocess design in the case of the server, because there is 
a considerable amount of shared state between the threads. It would be more 
difficult to share this state between multiple processes. An additional thread 
was added that maintained a queue of pre-calculated problems ready for quick 
assignment to clients. This same thread also maintained a queue of completed 
problems waiting to be written to the problem store. This improves the ability 
of the server to handle bursts of requests from clients with a minimal amount 
of computation, synchronization or disk access. This is a useful feature if many 
clients are to participate in the search. 
8.4.7 A note on process control 
Process control on remote machines is a challenging problem. Processes must be ini-
tially started, re-started if stopped, and on occasion it is useful to check that processes 
are still running or send a process a signal to trigger some behaviour. 
Control of processes running on machines running some variant of UNIX was ini-
tially handled using very simple bash shell scripts using r sh for communication with 
remote machines. These simple scripts were later replaced with more sophisticated, 
flexible scripts written using the Tool Command Language [182, 183], Tel, and also 
using r sh for communication with remote machines. This represented a considerable 
improvement over the earlier simple shell scripts. A script has also been prepared to 
automate interaction with the t e l n e t command. This script can be used to access 
multiple remote machines quickly and easily in the absence of rsh. The script was 
written in Expect [184], a Tel extension. 
Tel also includes simple facilities for working with TCP/IP sockets, which was of 
use in stress-testing the server. 
It is unfortunate that process control for Macintosh computers is practically non-
existent. The simplest and most effective method was to check each machine manually. 
However, we believe better and more effective methods may exist. The small number 
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of Macintoshes available and their relatively poor performance compared to computers 
running UNIX discouraged excessive experimentation. 
8.5 Time required for the performance of the searches 
Searching for Hadamard matrices using Williamson's method as previously described 
for matrices of order 100 is very quick — a complete search can be performed by a 
single 270MHz Sun Microsystems UltraS in less than 15 minutes; the exact time taken 
will depend on the options employed to limit the size of the search space. 
Searches for Hadamard matrices of orders higher than 100 utilised multiple ma-
chines. This makes more than a rough estimate of the amount of time required to 
perform the search impossible: over the course of a long-running search, computers 
will crash or be rebooted, or perhaps might not have facilities for reporting the amount 
of CPU time consumed by a process^. 
Performing a complete search for matrices of order 132 required between two and 
three days' running time on 20 UltraS computers. Performing the search for matri-
ces of order 148 required over a month utilising initially only 20 UltraS computers; 
17 Macintosh iMac computers became available towards the end of the search that 
enabled it to be completed in slightly over a month. A total of 10,698,065,244,724 
possible sequences were tested with Williamson's condition. The search was subse-
quently repeated, requiring slightly over two weeks' time on 20 Ultra5 computers and 
17 Macintosh iMac computers, and testing 12,062,406,963,464 possibilities^. A more 
recent repetition of the search used 30 Ultra5 computers and 35 350MHz Pentium-II 
computers, checking 5,772,437,757,944 possibilities in less than a week^. 
The performance of the search code was rather poor on the Macintoshes involved 
in the search. Given the specifications of the machines, it was expected that the code 
would perform substantially better than it did in practice, when compared with the 
performance of the Ultra5 machines. However, the performance of the search code 
^Macintoshes running the Macintosh operating system, rather than some form of UNIX or Linux, 
do not have the capability to report the amount of CPU time consumed by a process. 
^This differs from the previous count because the second search was not excluding duplicate se-
quences as per Condition 2 of Section 8.4.4. 
^This count differs from previous searches as a result of our implementation of our earlier remarks 
regarding choosing co. 
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when run on a Macintosh running Linux was substantially better than when run on the 
same computer using the standard Macintosh operating system. 
It is estimated that performing a complete search using the techniques described 
here for matrices of order 164 would require the participation of about 300 computers 
for between one and two months. This is not viewed as being infeasible, now that 
modifications have been made to the search program to better cope with the many small 
subproblems that were generated during the performance of the search for matrices of 
order 148. Modifications made to date are described in Section 8.4.6. 
8.6 Search Results 
Unfortunately, no new matrices were found as a result of the searches run so far. How-
ever, we are able to provide independent verification of results from previous searches. 
This is considered of utility since some previous searches, such as that conducted by 
Sawade [163], for example, failed to reveal all solutions that are now known for the 
order searched, in that case, order 100. In particular, we provide verification of results 
reported by Dokovic [168, 164] for orders 100,140 and 148. Results for order 100 are 
also verified by Christos Koukouvinos. 
Previous searches are summarised in Section 6.2.6. For reference purposes, com-
plete tables of Hadamard matrices derived from Williamson matrices using circulant 
symmetric (1 , -1) matrices in the Williamson array for orders 12 through 148 are pre-
sented in Appendix C, using the notation of the Williamson decomposition and the row 
sums representation. Example 1 illustrates the process of converting from the notation 
of the Williamson decomposition to the row sums representation. Recall that each row 
of a solution found in row sums representation represents the first row of one of the 
circulant symmetric (1 , -1) matrices A, C, D. 
Appendix A 
Reproduction of ^^Computer Viruses: An Introduction'' 
The material here is a reproduction of "Computer Viruses: An Introduction", an in-
troductory paper on computer viruses presented at the Australasian Computer Science 
Conference held at Macquarie University in 1997. This material has been superseded 
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Abstract 
Computer viruses pose a considerable problem for 
users of personal computers. The recent emergence 
of macro viruses as a problem of some importance 
may heighten vims awareness in general. Yet most 
people have little or no understanding of common 
anti-virus measures, the varieties of viruses that 
exist today, and the strategies which they use to ac-
complish infection and to defeat anti-viruses. It is 
well-known that the virus problem is most severe for 
users of IBM PCs and compatibles; however, users 
of other platforms, such as the Macintosh, should 
not become complacent — viruses exist for many 
platforms in varying numbers. The ease with which 
macro viruses may be written is discussed, and a 
new virus attack for the Macintosh is presented 
which closely resembles an attack under DOS for 
the PC. 
Keywords Computer science, computer virus, 
computer viruses, macro viruses, companion 
viruses. 
1 What is a Computer Virus? 
There is some difficulty in producing a definition 
for the term "computer virus". Dr. Cohen has 
presented a mathematical definition of a computer 
virus, which may be roughly expressed as: 
A virus is a program that can 'infect' 
other programs by modifying them to 
include a possibly evolved version of 
itself. [4, p. 2] 
However, this definition classifies as viruses some 
things which would not be considered viruses by 
those working in the anti-virus field. At the same 
time this definition would not consider as viruses 
programs that infect another without modifying 
the target program itself [2], such as companion 
viruses, discussed in Section 3. 
Proceedings of the 20th Australasian Computer 
Science Conference, Sydney, Australia, Febru-
ary 5-7 1997. 
Additionally, the above definition does not con-
vey any need for the "virus" to be able to replicate 
further once it has infected some other program 
[2] — and replication is viewed as an important 
characteristic of a true "computer virus". 
A definition which is felt to be more useful 
when dealing with "real" computer viruses than 
the above definition or Dr. Cohen's mathematical 
model is: 
We define a computer 'virus' as a self-
replicating program that can 'infect' 
other programs by modifying them or 
their environment such that a call to 
an 'infected' program implies a call 
to a possibly evolved, and in most 
cases, functionally similar copy of the 
'virus'. [19, 2] 
The term 'infect' is used with respect to com-
puter viruses in the sense of the definition above 
throughout the remainder of this document. 
It is important to note that a virus is not neces-
sarily malicious — although its presence may have 
side effects (as a result of the presence of the virus 
and its activities causing problems with the oper-
ating system, user programs and extensions to the 
standard operating system installed by the user) 
which are deemed to be undesirable. 
Some researchers have been considering the 
question of viruses that perform useful actions 
— so-called benevolent viruses. Cohen [4, pp. 
15-21] considers briefiy the topic of benevolent 
viruses. He considers as examples: 
Compression viruses — little-used files are 
compressed by the virus and uncompressed 
when required. 
Maintenance viruses — any virus which would 
perform maintenance tasks in a computer sys-
tem, such as updating installed programs. 
Distributed Databases with viruses — 
viruses would reproduce on networked 
computers, performing searches for the virus' 
originator. Results would be reported back 
by mail, and the vims would clean itself up 
after a certain time. 
The use of viruses in covert distributed data 
processing (specifically, key cracking on encrypted 
messages) has been proposed by White [13]. It 
may be argued, however, that this would not be 
particularly beneficial to the user whose resources 
are used by the virus. 
Many arguments against the idea of benevolent 
vinises are presented by Bontchev [2]. 
2 Worms and Trojan Horses 
A worm is an independent program that is able to 
spread copies of itself or of parts of itself to other 
computers, commonly across network connections, 
and these copies are themselves fully functional in-
dependent programs, which are capable either of 
spreading further and/or of communicating with 
the paxent worm (to report back results of some 
computation, for example). 
There is often confusion over the distinction be-
tween a worm and a virus. For example, the 
program that negatively affected the Internet in 
November 1988 is referred to as a virus ("the In-
ternet Virus") by some [5] and as a worm ("the In-
ternet Worm") by others [11, 12, 10]. Spaiford [12] 
argues that referring to the infection as a "worm" 
rather than a 'Sdrus" is most appropriate. 
A notable difference between worm programs 
(such as the Internet Worm) and viruses is that 
while a virus may take advantage of network con-
nections to infect other programs (some local area 
networks are particularly susceptible, as the user is 
able to interact with programs and data stored on 
a remote machine as if they were available locally), 
it is not capable of causing its code to execute on 
a remote machine. Clearly the well-known worms 
have been able to cause their programs to be exe-
cuted on the remote machine which was the worm's 
target. 
The Internet Worm affected Sun 3 and VAX 
systems running variants of BSD UNIX [11]. Other 
worms have been created with other networks in 
mind, such as DECnet [7]. 
A trojan horse is a program which possesses 
various intentional undocumented features^ whose 
effects few users of the software would appreciate 
were these undocumented features to manifest 
themselves. Unlike a computer virus, which 
attaches itself to some other program using any 
of a number of methods, a trojan horse is a 
self-contained program. A trojan horse may have 
functions of use to the user. 
^As opposed to bugs in the program, otherwise known as 
"unintentional undocumented features". 
Some definitions of "trojan horse" define a com-
puter virus as a replicating trojan horse which in-
serts a copy of itself into some other program [1]. 
A trojan horse might install a virus as its in-
tentional undocumented action. Some feel that a 
program which installs a virus as a result of having 
been previously infected with the virus is also a 
trojan horse (having been converted into a tro-
jan horse by the virus) [17]. However, this seems 
incompatible with the notion of a "trojan horse" 
being a program which was initially produced with 
an intentional undocumented feature in place. 
3 Varieties of Viruses 
There are a number of different ways that viruses 
use to infect a computer system. The two main 
types of viruses are: 
File Infectors: These are viruses that attach 
themselves to some form of executable code. 
There is a variety of ways in which a virus 
when running might attempt to infect a 
file. On a DOS-based system, file infectors 
will commonly attach to .COM or .EXE files, 
although there are many other kinds of 
infectable objects. 
Boot Sector Infectors: Only discussed in the 
context of a PC-compatible system. These 
kinds of viruses infect executable code which is 
loaded from disk and called when a computer 
is starting up. There are a number of different 
pieces of code which may be modified by a 
virus to infect a system, such as: 
• DOS boot sector [floppy disks and hard 
disks]. 
• Master Boot Record (MBR) [hard disks 
only]. 
• Partition table [hard disks only]. 
A virus that is capable of spreading by infecting 
files and by infecting via any code executed at boot 
time is known as a multipartite virus. 
Boot sector viruses are extremely widespread; 
as a group they are easily the most commonly found 
variety of virus on PC-compatible systems. 
A virus may be direct-action or resident [17]. 
A direct-action virus is one that when initially exe-
cuted in the course of normal use of a computer 
system identifies executable objects for infection 
and exits once infection has been accomplished. 
Direct-action viruses may also be referred to as 
non-resident viruses. 
A resident virus is one which installs itself some-
where in memory, and makes arrangements for the 
virus body in memory to be executed at some fu-
ture time; the virus may infect files or take other 
action (to conceal its presence, for example) at the 
time it is next executed. For example, some Mac-
intosh viruses if resident in memory will infect an 
application when that application commences run-
ning and performs certain system calls required to 
initialise the Macintosh Toolbox, which consists of 
a set of utility functions available to all applica-
tions. 
Some programs useful to the user are also resi-
dent programs — this includes some antivirus pro-
grams that monitor computer system operations 
for actions which may indicate the presence of a 
virus. 
There are some other types of viruses which 
should be mentioned: 
Macro Viruses: These are explained in detail in 
Section 4. The ease with which such a virus 
may be written is discussed in Section 9.2. 
File System or Cluster Viruses: Rather than 
infecting files directly, such a virus modifies 
directory table information so that the virus 
is executed first. It would then pass control 
to the program that the caller really wants 
so as to avoid rapid detection. "Dir-II" is an 
example of this variety of virus. [17] 
Kernel Viruses: These are viruses that target a 
specific feature of an operating system's kernel 
(the program(s) that represent the heart of an 
operating system). [17] 
Companion Viruses: Companion viruses occur 
in several varieties [3, 8], the most notable 
being: 
Regular Companion: Creates a file in the 
same directory as the target of infection 
but with a filename extension which the 
operating system chooses to execute be-
fore the original file (for example, under 
DOS a . COM file is executed before a . EXE 
file with the same name). The attack 
as described would appear to be highly 
specific to PCs running DOS. 
PATH Companion: Create a file with any 
executable extension in a directory that 
is searched for executable files before the 
directory containing the target of infec-
tion (named after the PATH environment 
variables found in operating systems such 
as DOS and UNIX). 
Obviously, not all of these infection strategies 
are available on some platforms and operating sys-
tems. For example, Macintosh computers do not 
suffer from companion viruses as described above 
(although there is a possible way of creating a virus 
with similar behaviour — see Section 9.1), and also 
do not appear to be afflicted with viruses of the 
boot sector variety. 
All viruses, with the exception of macro viruses, 
are platform dependent. 
4 Macro Viruses 
The anti-virus community has been aware for some 
time now of the potential for virus-writing provided 
by the scripting (or macro) languages of large soft-
ware packages such as Microsoft Word and Excel 
The idea of macro viruses was first introduced by 
Highland [6]. 
However, it is only recently that such viruses 
have become a problem. These viruses are 
remarkable for the fact that they infect what 
are usually thought of as documents. A macro 
vims may also be platform independent, being 
capable of spreading on any computer platform 
supported by the host application. The most 
well-known and widespread are Microsoft Word 
viruses written in WordBasic (two examples are 
Concept and Nuclear. Concept is the most 
common and widespread of all current macro 
viruses). WordBasic is a version of the BASIC 
programming language extended with many 
commands and functions for use in the word 
processing environment. 
Microsoft Word recognises the existence of two 
different forms of user file — an ordinary document, 
and a template. A template is very much like an 
ordinary document, with the addition that tem-
plates may also contain macros written in WordBa-
sic. Ordinary documents may be converted easily 
into templates, but templates may not be trans-
formed into ordinary documents with the same de-
gree of ease (which makes manual removal of macro 
viruses rather tedious). Word has a "global tem-
plate", the so-called "Normal template", which is 
used by every document created, and is impor-
tant for the spread of macro viruses — the macros 
that make up the virus are copied into the Normal 
template where they are subsequently available to 
other documents. 
There are several ways that a macro virus may 
be created using WordBasic. Macro viruses in Mi-
crosoft Word may exploit the existence of several 
varieties of specially-named macros within Word-
Basic [15|: 
• The AutoExec macro, stored within some 
global template such as the Normal template, 
which is executed automatically whenever 
Word is started. 
• "Auto" macros, which run whenever certain 
user actions take place within Word: 
- AutoNew runs when a new document is 
created. 
— AutoOpen runs when an existing docu-
ment is opened. 
— AutoClose runs when an open 
document is closed. 
— AutoExit runs before Word exits when 
the user quits. 
• Macros named for built-in Word commands 
(menu options are a popular choice), which are 
run when the command is selected by the user. 
An example, commonly used by macro viruses, 
is FileSaveAs. This macro, if present, would 
be executed if the user should select the Save 
As . . . option from the File menu. The 
macro may be said to have redefined the built-
in Word command. 
A recent Word macro virus, the Outlaw 
virus, is an example of another way in which 
macros may be executed. Word permits "shortcut 
keys" to be assigned (by the user or by a macro) 
to macros, menu commands and the like. The 
assigned function is performed when the shortcut 
key(s) are pressed. The Outlaw virus, instead 
of using automatic macros or macros named for 
a built-in Word command, assigns shortcut keys 
to particular viral macros [20]. In the case of 
the Outlaw virus, viral macros will be executed 
whenever the user types a space or presses the 'e' 
key. 
There may be other methods that will assist the 
execution of viral macros within Word. 
Word macros may be marked as ExecuteOnly, 
which means that the macros cannot be easily 
edited or inspected by a Word user but can only be 
executed. Some viruses, for example the Nuclear 
virus, use this method to hinder casual analysis of 
the viral macros. 
A basic Word virus is not difficult to create, 
requiring just one macro. The macro virus D M V 
(the so-called "Demonstration Macro Virus", 
created as a demonstration of macro viruses) 
features a single macro AutoClose. The Normal 
template will be infected when a document 
containing the DMV AutoClose macro is closed. 
Subsequently, documents are infected as they 
are closed [15]. Concept, a more complicated 
macro virus, signals its initial infection of the 
Normal template, and subsequently will infect 
any document (to be saved as a Word document 
or template) with the viral macros when the 
document is saved using the Save as . . . option 
of the File menu (an example of a virus using a 
macro named for a Word menu option). 
Some macro viruses, such as D M V and Con-
cept do nothing but spread. Some would argue 
that even this is damaging, in terms of the time 
required to remove the virus macros from whatever 
documents have been infected. More damaging 
actions are certainly possible, however. For exam-
ple, a virus might delete paragraphs from a docu-
ment, or rearrange or insert words (the Nuclear 
virus will append some lines of text to documents 
when printed at the right time). More sophisti-
cated macro viruses attempt to infect the user's 
computer with an ordinary variety of virus which 
infects executable files (the Nuclear virus unsuc-
cessfully attempts to do this), however behaviour 
such as this is platform dependent. 
A virus can also give itself some (limited) 
protection against being removed by implementing 
a ToolsMacro macro, which is then executed in 
place of the corresponding menu option should 
it be selected by the user. This menu command 
offers one possible way for macros to be removed 
from a document, if the environment has not 
already been infected by a virus. However, if the 
environment is infected, then the possibility exists 
that the virus will take some damaging action 
should this option be selected. 
Disabling of the features of Microsoft Word 
which allow automatic execution of certain macros 
when documents are opened and closed offers 
some limited protection, but as macro viruses can 
be written with macros that mask menu options 
(macros which cannot be disabled in the same way 
that automatic macros may) and macros which are 
executed when certain keys or key combinations 
are pressed, this is hardly a complete solution. 
Furthermore, as the execution of "auto" macros is 
controllable from WordBasic (at least under Word 
6), "auto" macros may be re-enabled by viral 
macros that are executed by some other means. 
5 Virus Occurrences 
There have been a great many viruses created for 
many different computer platforms. The PC has 
by far the largest share of all the viruses in exis-
tence (the producers of Dr. Solomon's Anti-Virus 
Toolkit., a leading anti-virus package, claimed to 
detect 9417 PC viruses in July 1996 [18]). 
Many of these PC viruses are closely related 
(once a virus becomes available, it is not uncommon 
to find a number of copycat viruses that differ only 
slightly from the original appearing, perhaps writ-
ten by less-skilled virus writers using virus source 
code; alternatively, the virus author might release 
a number of viruses with different payloads but 
sharing common code for infection and anti-anti-
virus measures). 
Some information has been gathered by Virus 
Bulletin about PC viruses that have been reported 
as found over the course of a month for some 
months. The percentage of the reports made up 
by the various virus classes for several months of 
1996 are shown in Table 1 [21]. 
Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. 
Macro 21.8 18.4 20.2 34.3 
Boot 62.5 64.5 59.2 53.7 
Multipartite 7.3 10.6 13.9 6.6 
File 8.4 4.8 6.4 4.8 
Other 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Unclassified 0.0 1.3 0.4 0.6 
Table 1: % of reports to/collected by Virus Bulletin 
made up by various classes of virus. 
Only a very few of the total number of known 
viruses are responsible for the majority of virus 
incidents. Some on-access anti-virus products may 
use this fact to help restrict the number of viruses 
that a file must be checked for when accessed by a 
user. 
Viruses exist for a number of other personal 
computer platforms, such as the Amiga and the 
Macintosh, but the numbers of these viruses are 
a small fraction of the numbers of viruses available 
for the PC. The Macintosh, for example, is afflicted 
with only a few dozen viruses. Viruses written to 
target UNIX are especially uncommon. 
6 Virus Anti-Detection/Anti-
Analysis Strategies 
There are a variety of strategies which a virus might 
employ to hinder detection of the virus, and anal-
ysis once it has been discovered: 
Stealth: When initially run, the virus can ar-
range to intercept disk reads while present in 
memory. If it detects an attempt to read a 
section of the disk (such as the boot sector, 
partition table or master boot record) or a 
file that has been infected by the virus, it can 
conceal its presence by returning as a result of 
the call data with no signs of infection. Some 
examples of stealth viruses are [16]: 
• Members of the "Brain" strain of viruses 
are stealth floppy boot sector viruses. 
• The "512" virus (also known as "Number 
of the Beast") is a stealth file infecting 
virus. 
Polymorphic Viruses: A polymorphic virus is 
one that is capable of varying many aspects 
of its appearance in the hope of avoiding de-
tection. Cohen refers to viruses of this type 
as "evolutionary" viruses [4, p. 73]. Some of 
the strategies which might be employed by a 
polymorphic virus are (many of these strate-
gies for code 'evolution', as well as others not 
mentioned here, are explained in greater detail 
by Cohen [4, pp. 199-215]): 
Encryption: Encrypt the body of the 
virus not only with a variety of different 
keys but also with a variety of different 
encryption strategies (each requiring 
a different decryptor, of course). The 
encryption approach is a particularly 
common polymorphic trick — its wide 
use was facilitated by the distribution of 
a variety of object code modules (such as 
MtE and TPE) which could make any 
virus polymorphic. Additionally, this is 
the most straightforward polymorphic 
strategy which a virus might employ. 
One of the many viruses which employs 
a strategy of this sort is the "Tequila" 
virus [16]. 
Instruction Equivalence: Substitute for 
single instructions achieving equivalent 
effects in the virus code. 
Equivalent Instruction Sequences: 
Replace one sequence of machine 
instructions with another which achieves 
the same final result. 
Instruction Reordering: Sometimes it 
is possible to reorder a sequence of 
instructions in a variety of different ways 
and still achieve the same result. The 
"1260 virus" is one which alters the 
order of instructions in its decryption 
routine from infection to infection, 
and additionally inserts irrelevant 
instructions [16]. 
Add or Remove Jumps/Calls: Jumps or 
calls to blocks of code may be repla<;ed 
by an instance of the block of code. 
Garbage Insertion: For example, might 
add NOP instructions, or other 
instructions which do not otherwise 
achieve any useful purpose apart from 
obscuring the code's functions. The 
"Tequila" virus employs a strategy of 
this sort [16]. 
Build and Execute: 'Build' instructions 
somewhere in memory (one byte or 
a sequence of bytes at a time) and 
then execute them. This obscures the 
instructions being constructed from 
observation until their execution. 
Tunnelling: A technique sometimes used by 
viruses that attempts to bypass activity-
monitoring virus detectors (for example, 
by bypassing operating system disk access 
functions and interpreting the contents of the 
disk itself, or calling the operating system's 
functions directly to avoid any trap the 
activity monitor may have set in place) or 
otherwise subvert anti-virus techniques and 
strategies. 
Cavity Virus: A variety of file infecting virus 
which overwrites a portion of the file which 
is filled with the same value, such as a region 
filled with zero bytes. Such a virus will not 
alter the total length of the file. 
Antidebugger Mutations: Various tricks can 
be employed to make disassembling and 
tracing the program code difiicult. For 
example, the program code might be arranged 
in such a way that an instruction or set of 
instructions is hidden from casual inspection, 
so that the function of the code is no longer 
readily apparent from its disassembly. The 
debugger itself could be manipulated in the 
course of tracing a program by tampering 
with the debugger's address space. 
The speed with which a virus reproduces and 
infects other files is also important. Some viruses 
spread particularly quickly. For example, a virus 
might be programmed to infect any executable file 
when the file is opened, for whatever reason. These 
are the so-called fast infectors. 
A slow infector is a virus which only infects 
files as they are created, immediately prior to or 
following a legitimate change (that is, some change 
that the user wants to have happen), or as files are 
copied, perhaps onto a floppy disk [3, 9, 17] [4. p. 
91], 
7 Defenses Against and Detection 
For Viruses 
There are a variety of defenses against viruses and 
ways of detecting their presence. A natural first 
question is: "Is it possible to detect all viruses?". 
Unfortunately not — it is mentioned in Cohen [4, 
pp. 64-68] that it is not possible to construct some 
program which correctly determines whether or not 
some other program is a virus. In fact, given a 
known virus, it isn't even possible to systematically 
determine using a computer program if another 
program is infected with a virus derived from the 
original known virus in some way. 
However, there are a variety of imperfect ways 
to detect the (possible) presence of computer 
viruses. Most forms of vims detection involve false 
positives, which occur when an object is identified 
as being infected by a virus when in fact it is 
clean, and false negatives, which occur when an 
object is passed as clean when in fact it has been 
infected with a virus. Ideally, false positives and 
false negatives will occur very infrequently. 
Some techniques, such as scanning for viruses, 
often lead to a positive identification of a virus. 
In many cases, the infection (and some damage) 
caused by the virus is reversible. 
Stealth techniques mean that attempts at virus 
detection that involve manipulating file objects on 
disk will not necessarily be effective if the virus 
is present and active in memory. For this reason, 
it is recommended that before attempting to de-
tect a virus, the computer in question be rebooted 
from an uninfected, locked, floppy disk containing 
a clean version of whatever anti-virus software is 
needed to search for viruses. 
Known-Virus Scanning: Attempts to identify 
viruses by scanning files for certain strings 
of bytes known to occur in particular 
viruses. Simple scanners which perform only 
such searches will fail to detect numerous 
polymorphic viruses, so many also employ 
some more advanced techniques (such as 
heuristic analysis, to detect suspicious code 
fragments, or algorithmic analysis, to detect 
complex polymorphic viruses). Scanners often 
have difficulty detecting new viruses, and they 
require fi:equent updating. 
Heuristic Analysis: Attempts to identify 
a possible virus by looking for code that 
performs functions which in combination with 
each other are deemed to be suspicious. An 
example of a suspicious code firagment would 
be one that alters the first few bytes of an 
executable file in memory — this would be 
required so that an infected executable could 
run normally when infected with a virus. 
Behaviour Blocker/Monitor: Attempts to 
detect viruses based on patterns of virus 
activity. This approach has problems 
because many of the actions performed by 
a vims are perfectly legitimate under other 
circumstances. These methods may be 
ineffective if a tunnelling virus is infecting the 
system — such vimses are firequently able 
to bypass the methods used by a monitor to 
detect vims activity. 
Integrity Checker/Integrity Shell: Integrity 
checking involves collecting a database of 
signatures for each file which is likely to 
be the target of a vims infection (such as 
application programs). If at a later date 
this signature can be determined to have 
changed, then the file has been altered, 
possibly as a result of being infected by a 
vims. This method will not detect viruses 
before infection takes place. There are a 
variety of enhancements to the basic method 
outlined here which must be implemented 
(for example, a companion virus does not 
necessarily modify the item it "infects". So 
integrity checkers must attempt to identify 
the presence of a companion virus by other 
means). An integrity shell [4, pp. 83-93] is a 
more sophisticated approach which involves 
checking every object on which some object 
X (which the user wishes to use in some way) 
depends. 
An integrity checker is an example of a generic 
anti-virus program — it is not targeted at a specific 
virus or class of viruses and so will rarely need 
updating. Integrity checking issues are extensively 
discussed in papers by Bontchev [3] and Radai [9]. 
There are a variety of other ways to help prevent 
virus infections. For example, as the great major-
ity of PC virus infections are boot sector viruses, 
changing the order in which the computer searches 
its disk drives for a bootable disk is an effective 
defense in many cases (an apparently common set-
ting is to attempt to boot a floppy disk before 
attempting to boot the hard disk). Precautions 
will still have to be taken to deal with multipartite 
and other non-boot sector viruses, of course. 
Cohen outlines a number of strategies that 
will prevent or hinder computer viruses spreading 
throughout a computer system or computer 
network [4, pp. 57-64]. The most interesting 
of these approaches is that of limited sharing. 
The best that can be done to limit sharing in a 
transitive information network that implements 
sharing is to base the structure on a "partially 
ordered set", or POset. Information can flow in 
only one direction, for example, from Host A to 
Host B but not from Host B to Host A. This 
effectively limits the possible range of a viral 
infection, and also helps to trace the origin of any 
suspected infection, as the source of the infection 
would be one of a limited number of machines 
which had access to all of the machines on which 
the infection was ultimately detected. 
The use of a "vaccine" against certain computer 
viruses is a technique no longer widely practiced. 
Most viruses check a potential infection target to 
make sure it is not infected by that particular type 
of virus (to prevent multiple infections), so infec-
tion by a particular virus could be prevented by 
marking executables so that they appeared to be 
already infected (hence the name "vaccine"). The 
large number of viruses and the fact that some 
virus' identification techniques are mutually con-
tradictory means that this technique is no longer 
workable. 
8 Problems with and Attacks 
Against Anti-Virus Measures 
Virus scanners need updating with great frequency 
because of the speed with which new viruses are 
created and released. They are popular for a num-
ber of reasons: 
• A scanner is usually straightforward to use. 
• When a virus is detected it can often be pos-
itively identified, and many scanners include 
facilities for "disinfecting" infected files. 
• A scanner is the most reliable means of de-
tecting a known virus in a new file; other tech-
niques are not necessarily applicable (for ex-
ample, an integrity checker cannot be used to 
check a newly-obtained program for viruses, 
because there is no way of determining what 
the signature of an uninfected program should 
be). 
A scanner will often perform poorly when attempt-
ing to detect unknown viruses. 
Polymorphism was at one time an effective 
attack against scanners which merely searched 
for strings of bytes known to characterise certain 
viruses. Cohen states that "until several years 
after the MtE was spreading in the world, no 
scanner was able to pick up over 95% of infections" 
[4, p. 73]. The situation has improved greatly in 
recent times — most good scanners are capable of 
detecting the majority of polymorphic viruses. 
As mentioned in Section 7, stealth viruses may 
cause problems if the virus is present in memory 
when using a virus scanner or integrity checker, 
as files presented for inspection may appear clean 
when in fact they are not. Or a variety of fast 
infector stealth virus may infect many files opened 
for checking. This represents a serious cleanup 
problem in an environment with many executable 
files. So an attempt must be made to identify such 
viruses in memory. 
Activity monitoring programs require updating 
as well, to cope with new virus behaviours. There 
are some varieties of virus behaviour which are not 
readily detectable by a monitor — such as infect-
ing only files which are about to be modified in 
any case. One particular virus, the "Darth Vader" 
virus, was designed to avoid alerting an activity 
monitor program by attaching itself only to certain 
files as they were copied [3] — the executable object 
was modified while its code was present in memory 
awaiting being written to disk. This also presented 
an effective attack against integrity checkers at that 
time. 
Activity monitors may also flag legitimate ac-
tions as suspicious, since the functions used by com-
puter viruses have legitimate uses as well. They 
might also be bypassed by a tunnelling virus or 
disabled in memory [3, 9]. 
Slow infectors, infecting only when executables 
are being legitimately altered, are a concern for 
integrity checking software. The virus infection 
may go unnoticed, because the integrity checker 
doesn't have any signatures in its database with 
which to compare that of the (new) file. An exam-
ple of a common legitimate change to an existing 
executable file is the addition of patches to the file 
by an updater program. Radai [9] suggests that it 
would be possible to detect the presence of a slow 
virus by creating a series of small executable files in 
the hope that one will be infected by a slow virus. 
This will not establish which other newly-created 
or modified objects are infected with the slow virus, 
however. 
Programs which cause modifications to their 
own executable code will also cause problems for 
integrity checkers. 
Integrity checkers will not be effective against 
all types of viruses. As integrity checking is usually 
applied only to hard disks (its application to floppy 
disks is not practical, as the contents of a floppy 
disk are frequently modified) a virus which infects 
fioppy disks only and ignores hard disks would go 
unnoticed [9, 3]. The "Brain" virus, an early DOS 
virus, is an example of a virus which ignores hard 
disks. 
Finally, integrity checkers need to be carefully 
constructed so that the database of checksums is 
not easily compromised by a virus. For example, 
a virus might attempt to forge an entry in the in-
tegrity checker's signature database for a program 
which is a target of infection. 
9 Recent Work 
9.1 Companion Viruses and the 
Macintosh 
Macintosh viruses infect application files, the Sys-
tem file (a file present on every bootable Macin-
tosh disk which holds many resources used by the 
operating system) or system extensions (small files 
containing executable code which load every time 
the Macintosh is started up and which add extra 
functionality to the operating system). A very few 
viruses which no longer work under recent releases 
of the operating system infected the Macintosh by 
more unusual means. 
The Macintosh does not have any features 
which correspond to the preference of DOS to 
execute .COM files before .EXE files of the same 
name (when the selection is not made explicit). 
Nor does it feature the concept of a "path" 
along which the operating system searches for 
applications to execute if the desired application 
is not in the current directory, as DOS does. So 
a companion virus which does not actually alter 
the target application is not implementable in the 
same manner as under DOS. 
However, it is possible to produce a virus with 
many of the same characteristics as a companion 
virus by manipulating a Macintosh disk's Desk-
top Database. Each disk or disk partition will 
usually have its own Desktop Database, storing 
information about the application files on that disk 
or disk partition. This attack seems not to have 
been explored to date. 
Macintosh files have both a file type (for ex-
ample, 'TEXT' denotes a plain text file) and a cre-
ator. Each application should have a unique cre-
ator code, with which the files that the application 
creates are marked. The "Finder" (the part of the 
Macintosh operating system which is responsible 
for presenting the graphical user interface and man-
aging user interactions) stores information about 
file creators which allows it to determine what ap-
plication should be executed ("launched") when 
a document icon is double-clicked, and what icon 
should be displayed for a file of a certain type and 
creator. This information is a part of the infor-
mation stored by the Finder in a disk's Desktop 
Database. 
When there is more than one application 
present with the same creator, then the Finder 
launches the application with the most recent 
creation date when documents are double-clicked. 
Applications which are launched as the result of a 
user double-clicking a document icon are sent by 
the operating system what is referred to as a high 
level event or Apple Event, detailing which 
document or documents are to be manipulated. 
A viral application, with a more recent 
creation date than the infected application, would 
be launched by the Finder before the target 
application, and would then have an opportunity 
to infect further applications (for example, any 
application currently running which has not 
already been infected, or perhaps by scanning 
the directory tree for uninfected applications, 
processing only a few directories at a time so as 
to avoid detection), or to perform other a<:tions. 
The viral application would then pass control to 
the infected application. The Apple Event which 
details the documents to be processed can easily 
be passed on to the target application, so that 
there is little outward evidence that anything 
unusual has taken place. 
This method of infection seems to function well 
on hard drives with single and multiple partitions, 
and should infect Macintosh file servers as well. 
The ability of such a virus to conceal itself is 
limited, being restricted to setting the position of 
its document icon displayed by the Finder to some 
point off the edge of the display window. Such a 
defense is readily overcome with no special tools. 
More work needs to be done on the passing 
of Apple Events by the viral application to the 
target application (although problems in this area 
are not a major handicap — an infected application 
may perform strangely when launched, but will 
subsequently behave normally). An Apple Event 
will sometimes require that a reply be returned by 
the receiving application. These replies can only 
be generated by the infected application, so some 
means must be found for the viral application to 
pass the reply to the reply event's intended desti-
nation. 
Like companion viruses of DOS, this attack 
avoids altering any existing executable code or 
system resources. 
9.2 Macro Viruses 
A traditional virus can be quite difficult to write, 
as there are many factors which must be considered 
if the virus is to work successfully and be able to 
avoid detection on a wide range of systems running 
a variety of software products. 
Simple macro viruses, however, are not ham-
pered by many of the same considerations. As an 
exercise, a number of very simple macro viruses 
were implemented by Horton. A first attempt re-
quired only a single macro, AutoClose. This at-
tempt was very crude and would be easily detected 
by an alert user, as infecting a document when it 
was closed (causing the AutoClose macro to run) 
required that the document be saved to disk with 
the viral macro attached. 
A later, slightly more sophisticated offering was 
implemented using two macros, AutoOpen and 
FileSaveAs. The AutoOpen macro would be 
activated whenever an infected document is opened 
in Word. If Word's Normal template is not al-
ready infected, the virus then infects the Normal 
template, which is a global macro file visible by 
all documents, by copying the viral macros to the 
template. 
From this point on, whenever the user selects 
Save As . . . from the File menu, the FileSaveAs 
macro (now attached to the Normal template) is 
activated instead. It performs the same tasks as the 
usual menu option, with the exception that before 
the document is saved it is converted to a template 
to which the viral macros are then attached. 
Neither of the two macro viruses created im-
plemented any "payload" macros, although the ad-
dition of a simple payload would be trivial. The 
viruses are not remarkable for the techniques they 
employ, which are found in other macro viruses. 
The first implementation attempt of a macro 
virus was accomplished in approximately eight 
hours by a computer science graduate previously 
unfamiliar with Microsoft Word and WordBasic. 
No documentation was available other than the 
"Help" system of Microsoft Word and a freely 
available description of some common macro 
viruses ([15]). 
The second attempt required another hour, and 
was sufficiently sophisticated that it would be able 
to replicate unnoticed. A greater familiarity with 
WordBasic would be required to write anything 
more sophisticated, but the exercise illustrates the 
fact that macro viruses, because of their ease of 
construction, permit a much wider pool of com-
puter users to write computer viruses in a very 
short space of time. 
Macro viruses are quite widespread and so sam-
ples are often easy to obtain. Furthermore, under-
standing the code of a macro virus (assuming that 
the macros are not marked as ExecuteOnly) is very 
much less difficult than interpreting the assembly 
language in which non-macro viruses are typically 
implemented. The study of techniques used to im-
plement other macro viruses is one straightforward 
method of improving virus writing. 
More sophisticated macro viruses might 
target specific computer systems by attempting 
to "drop" a non-macro filesystem virus into 
the target system, or perform other operating 
system dependent actions. This would require 
greater familiarity with WordBasic or other macro 
languages than are demonstrated in a simple 
macro virus, such as the ones created as a part of 
this exercise. 
10 Summary 
This paper has presented a definition of computer 
viruses as the term is commonly used, as well as 
attempting to explain the meaning of some other 
terms, such as "worm", which are often closely 
associated with viruses. The various types of 
viruses that currently exist and various methods 
used by those viruses for infection have been 
explained, and the types and numbers of viruses 
likely to be found in the wild have been considered. 
Some ways in which macro viruses operate within 
Microsoft Word 6 are discussed 
The various ways viruses currently use to hinder 
detection and delay analysis once they have been 
detected were discussed. Commonly available anti-
virus measures were explained, as well as faults and 
problems that these methods are known to have. 
Finally, some recent work on the ease of imple-
mentation of simple macro viruses and the imple-
mentation of a companion virus-type attack for the 
Macintosh was discussed. 
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Appendix B 
Source code for Sequence Search 
A 
* Instructions for use: 
* 
* Compile this source file to generate an executable, run it to 
* eventually produce results. Program must be configured at 
* compile time. 
* 
* Compile-time configuration: 
* 
* The following symbols may be defined: 
* 
* N: an integer, the length of each sequence. Must be odd. 
* XN: an integer, the count of -\-ve and -ve X's. 
* YN: an integer, the count of -\-ve and -ve Y's. 
* 
* Note that only certain combinations of XN and YN are supported. 
* The following combinations have been used extensively: 
* (XN, YN): (1, 9) 
* (4, 9) 
* (1, 16) * 
* The code should compile on UNIX or Macintosh using most major 
* compilers. 
* 
* The compiler used must support the type 'unsigned long long' 
* to get 64-bit unsigned integers. 
*/ 
#def i n e _GNU^OURCE 
# inc lude < s t d i o . h> 
# i n c l u d e < s t d l i b . h> 
# in c lude < s t r i n g . h> 
# inc lude < t ime . h> 
# in c lude < l i m i t s .h> 
#undef NDEBUG 
# inc lude < a s s e r t . h> 
/mefine ^RINT.COUNTS-
# i f d e f macintosh 
# i f d e f _MWERKS_ 
# in c lude <SIOUX.h> 
#end i f 
#include <Sound.h> 
#include <Speech.h> 








# d e f i n e BILLION ((float)1000000000) 
# i f n d e f N 
# d e f i n e N 15 
# e n d i f 
# d e f i n e H N ( ( N - l)/2) 
A 
* Actual numbers are used to represent X's and Y's. 
* These numbers should be small and have no common 
* factors. 
*/ 
# d e f i n e X 2 
# d e f i n e Y 9 
# i f n d e f XN 
# d e f i n e XN 1 
# e n d i f 
# i f n d e f YN 
# d e f i n e YN 9 
# e n d i f 
A 
* 'unsigned long long' is a cumbersome type. Simplify 
* its name. 
*/ 
typedef unsigned long long uLL; 
typedef int tPSumArr[HN]; 
#de f i n e MAX jy[B 15 
A 
* Number of precalculated partial sums that will fit into 
* a MAXMB block of memory. 
* / 
/mefine MAXJSEQ ((MAXMB * 1024 * 1024) / sizeofitPSumArr)) 
# d e f i n e MAX_SEQ ((30 * 1024) / sizeof(tPSumAiT)) 
# i f d e f macintosh 
# d e f i n e TIMEFUNCQ clockQ 
# d e f i n e TIMERJIES CLOCKS_PER_SEC 
# e n d i f 
#ifdef Unix 
// mefine TIMEFUNQ) gethrvtime() 
// Mefine TIMERJiES 1000000000 
# d e f i n e TIMEFUNC() MyUnixTimerQ 
# d e f i n e TIMER_RES 1 
# e n d i f 
# i f n d e f ID_STRING 
# i f de f macintosh 
# i f d e f MPW_C 
#defineID_STRING "MPW [Mac]" 
# e n d i f 
# i f d e f __MWERKS_ 
#defineID_STRING "Metrowerks [Mac] " 
# e n d i f 
# e n d i f 
#ifdef Unix 
#ifdef hnux 
#def ine ID_STRING " Linux [ ? ] " 
#else 




# i f (defined(_-MWERKS_) && (__MWERKS_ < 0x2100)) 
# d e f i n e DODGY_M[WERKS_LONG_LONG 
# e l s e 
# d e f i n e UNIXXONGJLONG 
# e n d i f 
int main( void ); 
¡ntsym[] = { X , -X, Y,-Y, 0 } ; 
# i f ((XN== 5) && (YN==20)) 
// Symbol counts for (5, 20). 
#def i n e NUMBER_COUNTS 48 
int SymCounts[][2][4] = { 
1,0, 11, 7 } , {3 , 1 , 0 , 2 } } , 
1, 0, 10, 6 }, { 3, 1, 1, 3 } }, 
1,0, 9, 5} , {3, 1 , 2 , 4 } } , 
1,0, 8, 4} , {3, 1 , 3 , 5 } } , 
1,0, 7, 3} , {3, 1 , 4 , 6 } } , 
1,0, 6, 2} , {3, 1,5, 7 } } , 
1, 0, 5, 1 }, { 3, 1, 6, 8 } }, 
1,0, 4 ,0 } , {3, 1,7, 9 } } , 
2, 1,11, 7 } , {2 , 0, 0 , 2 } } , 
2, 1, 10, 6 }, { 2, 0 , 1 , 3 } } , 
2, 1,9, 5} , {2, 0, 2 , 4 } } , 
2, 1,8, 4} , {2, 0, 3 , 5 } } , 
2, 1,7, 3} , {2, 0, 4 , 6 } } , 
2, 1, 6, 2 }, { 2, 0, 5, 7 } }, 
2, 1, 5, 1 }, { 2, 0, 6, 8 } }, 
2, 1 ,4 ,0} , {2, 0, 7 , 9 } } , 
0,1, 11, 7} , {1 ,3 , 0 , 2 } } , 
0,1, 10, 6} , {1 ,3 , 1 , 3 } } , 
0,1, 9, 5} , {1 ,3 , 2 , 4 } } , 
0,1, 8, 4} , {1 ,3 , 3, 5 } } , 
0,1, 7, 3} , {1 ,3 , 4 , 6 } } , 
0, 1, 6, 2 }, { 1, 3, 5, 7 } }, 
0, 1, 5, 1 }, { 1, 3, 6, 8 } }, 
0.1, 4 ,0} , {1 ,3 , 7 , 9 } } , 
1,2, 11,7}, {0, 2, 0 , 2 } } , 
1, 2, 10, 6 }, { 0, 2, 1, 3 } }, 
1,2, 9 , 5 } , { 0 , 2, 2 , 4 } } , 
1,2, 8 , 4 } , { 0 , 2, 3 , 5 } } , 
1,2, 7 , 3 } , { 0 , 2, 4 , 6 } } , 
1, 2, 6, 2 }, { 0, 2, 5, 7 } }, 
1, 2, 5, 1 }, { 0, 2, 6, 8 } }, 
1,2, 4 , 0 } , { 0 , 2, 7 , 9 } } , 
1,0, 7, 11}, {3, 1 , 2 , 0 } } , 
1,0, 6, 10}, {3, 1 , 3 , 1 } } , 
1,0, 5, 9} , {3, 1 , 4 , 2 } } , 
1,0, 4, 8}, {3, 1 , 5 , 3 } } , 
{ { 1 , 
{ { 1 . 
{ { 1 , 
{ { 2 , 
{ { 2 , 
{ {2 , 
{ { 2 , 
{ { 2 , 
{ { 2 , 
{ {2 , 
{ { 2 , 
}; 
# e n d i f 
0, 3, 7 }, { 3, 1, 6, 4 } }, 
0, 2, 6 }, { 3, 1, 7, 5 } }, 
0, 1, 5 }, { 3, 1, 8, 6 } }, 
0, 0 , 4 } , {3, 1 , 9 , 7 } } , 
1,7,11 } , { 2 , 0, 2 , 0 } } , 
1, 6, 10 }, { 2, 0, 3, 1 } }, 
1 , 5 , 9 } , { 2 , 0, 4 , 2 } } , 
1 , 4 , 8 } , { 2 , 0, 5 , 3 } } , 
1,3, 7 } , {2, 0, 6 , 4 } } , 
1, 2, 6 }, { 2, 0, 7, 5 } }, 
1, 1, 5 }, { 2, 0, 8, 6 } }, 
1, 0, 4 }, { 2, 0, 9, 7 } } 
# i f ((XN == 9) && (YN == 9)) 
// Symbol counts for (9, 9). 
# d e f i n e NUMBER_COUNTS 16 


















# e n d i f 
6, 3, 0, 0 }, { 0, 0, 6, 3 
6, 3, 1, 1 }, { 0, 0, 5, 2 
6, 3, 2, 2 }, { 0, 0, 4, 1 
6, 3, 3, 3 }, { 0, 0, 3, 0 
5, 2 , 0 , 0 } , { 1 , 1 , 6 , 3 
5, 2,1, 1 } , { 1 , 1,5,2 
5, 2, 2 , 2 } , { 1 , 1,4, 1 
5, 2, 3, 3 }, { 1, 1, 3, 0 
4 , 1 , 0 , 0 } , { 2 , 2, 6,3 
4, 1, 1, 1 }, { 2, 2, 5, 2 
4, 1, 2, 2 }, { 2, 2, 4, 1 
4, 1, 3, 3 }, { 2, 2, 3, 0 
3, 0, 0, 0 }, { 3, 3, 6, 3 
3, 0, 1, 1 }, { 3, 3, 5, 2 
3, 0, 2, 2 }, { 3, 3, 4, 1 
3, 0, 3, 3 }, { 3, 3, 3, 0 
# i f ((XN==4) && (YN==9)) 
// Symbol counts for (4, 9). 
// Mefine NUMBER.COUNTS 16 
// Ignoring the negation of the B-sequence. 
#def i n e NUMBER.COUNTS 8 
int SymCounts[][2][4] = { 
{ { 3 , 1 ,0 ,0} , {0 ,0 , 6, 3 } } , 
{ { 3 , 1 , 1 ,1} , {0 , 0, 5 , 2 } } , 
{ { 3 , 1 , 2 , 2 } , { 0 , 0, 4 , 1 } } , 
{ { 3, 1, 3, 3 }, { 0, 0, 3, 0 } }, 
{ { 2 , 0 , 0 , 0 } , {1 ,1 , 6, 3 } } , 
{ { 2 , 0 , 1 , 1 } , { 1 , 1 , 5 , 2 } } , 
{ { 2 , 0 , 2, 2} , { 1 , 1 , 4 , 1 } } , 
{ { 2 , 0 , 3, 3} , {1 ,1 , 3 , 0 } } , 
/ * 
* OK: The only difference between these sequence counts and the 
* previous set is that the counts of symbols in the B-sequence 
* are swapped for -ve and -\-ve symbols. 
* But consider how the sum [Sum]BiBi-\-j works: 
* -ve * -ve = -\-ve 
* -\-ve * -\-ve = -\-ve 
* -ve * -j-ve = -ve 
* -\-ve * -ve = -ve 
* I get -ve's when I multiply symbols of dissimilar sign. But I 
* get exactly the same -ve's if the sign of each symbol in the 
* sequence was reversed anyway! 
* / 
{ { 3 , 1 , 0 , 0 } , { 0 , 0 , 3 , 6 } } , 
{ { 3, 1, 1, 1 }, { 0, 0, 2, 5 } }, 
{ { 3 , 1 , 2 , 2 } , { 0 , 0 , 1 , 4 } } , 
{ { 3, 1, 3, 3 }, { 0, 0, 0, 3 } }, 
{ { 2 , 0 , 0 ,0 } , { 1 , 1 , 3 , 6 } } , 
{ { 2, 0, 1, 1 }, { 1, 1, 2, 5 } }, 
{ { 2, 0, 2, 2 }, { 1, 1 , 1 , 4 } }, 
{ { 2, 0, 3, 3 }, { 1, 1, 0, 3 } } 
}; 
# e n d i f 
# i f ((XN == 1) && (YN == 9)) 
// Symbol counts for (1, 9). 
_ ^ 
#def i n e NUMBER_COUNTS 4 
int SymCounts[][2][4] = { 
{ { 1 , 0 , 1 ,1} , {0 ,0 , 5, 2 } } , 
{ { 1, 0, 3, 3 }, { 0, 0, 3, 0 } }, 
{ { 1 , 0 , 2 , 2 } , { 0 , 0 , 4 , 1 } } , 
{ { 1, 0, 0, 0 }, { 0, 0, 6, 3 } } 
}; 
# e n d i f 
# i f ((XN == 1) && (YN == 16)) 
// Symbolic counts for (1, 16). 
#def i n e NUMBER_COUNTS 7 
int SymCounts[][2][4] = { 
{{1,0, 0,0},{0, 0, 10,6}}, 
{ { 1, 0, 1, 1 }, { 0, 0, 9, 5 } }, 
{ { 1 , 0 , 2 , 2 } , { 0 , 0, 8 , 4 } } , 
{ { 1, 0, 3, 3 }, { 0, 0, 7, 3 } }, 
{ { 1 , 0 , 4 , 4 } , { 0 , 0, 6 , 2 } } , 
{ { 1, 0, 5, 5 }, { 0, 0, 5, 1 } }, 
{ { 1 , 0 , 6 , 6 } , { 0 , 0, 4 , 0 } } 
}; 
# e n d i f 
A * How many symbols in each sequence for each class of 
* sequences to be tested? 
* / 
int SymSums[NUMBER_COUNTS][2]; 
# i f de f macintosh 
static int gHasSpeech = 0; 
static Str255 gSpeechString; 
static void HasSpeechMgr( void ) { 
long feature; 
OSErr err; 
err = Gestalt(gestaltSpeechAttr, &feature); 
if (err == noEir) 
gHasSpeech = feature & (1 gestaltSpeechMgrPresent); 
else 
gHasSpeech = 0; 
} 
static void MySpeakString( Str255 string ) { 
short activeChannels; 
if (gHasSpeech) { 
activeChannels = SpeechBusyO; 
SpeakString(string); 




static void MySpeakNumber( long number) { 






static void PrintSequence( int sequence[] ) { 
int i; 
for (i = 0; i < N; ++i) { 



















static int NextSequence( 
int MaxSymCounts[], 
int MaxSyms, 






register int i, lastval, countsum, bFinding; 
A 
* If the last non-zero element in the sequence is not the 
* last element, shift it along. 
* / 
if (pos < N-1) { 
// sequence [pos+1] = sequence [pos]; 
// sequence [pos-\—\-] = 4; 
i f (pos^O){ 
sequence[pos+l] = sequence [pos]; 
sequence[pos++] = 4; 
} 
else { 
--(Counts [sequence [0] ]); 
sequence[0] = 4; 
pos = -1; } } 
else { 
~(Counts[sequence[pos]]); 
sequence[pos] = 4; 




while ((pos > 0) && (sequence[pos] == 4)); 
i f ( p o s > 0 ) { 
countsum = MaxSyms - 1; 
do{ 
bFinding = 0; 
/ * 
* Advance a symbol from one non-zero symbol to 




lastval = sequence[pos]; 
--(Counts [lastval]); 
-countsum; 
sequence [pos] = 4; 
¡f(pos ==0) 
return -1; 
for (i = lastval+1; i < 4; ++i) { 
if(Counts[i] ^ MaxSymCounts[i]) { 
+-i-(Counts[i]); 




if ((i == 4) && ((pos + MaxSyms - countsum) > N)) { 




while ((pos > 0) && (sequence[pos] == 4)); 
if (pos > 0 ) 





* Fill in the rest of the sequence with the remaining symbols. 
* / 
if (pos > 0) { 
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { 
while (Counts[i] < MaxSymCounts[i]) { 







assert(pos < N); 
return pos; 
} 





int sequence[] ) 
int i, pos, min; 
min = INTJVIAX; 
/* 
* Set the first (fixed) symbol in the sequence to be the 
* one that occurs the fewest times greater than zero, as 
* this will greatly reduce the number of rotationally 
* equivalent sequences that must be considered. 
* / 
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { 
if ((MaxSymCounts[i] > 0) && (MaxSymCounts[i] < min)) { 
min = MaxSymCounts[i]; 
pos = i; 
} } 
sequence[0] = pos; 
++(Counts[pos]); 
pos = 0; 
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { 
whUe (Counts[i] < MaxSymCounts[i]) { 
sequence [-H-pos] = i; 
++(Counts[i]); } } 
assert((pos < N) && (pos > 0)); 
return pos; 
static void PrintSequenceUsingIndex( 
unsigned long search Jdx, 
int MaxSymCounts[], 
int MaxSyms) 
{ int i, sequence[N], pos, Counts[4], index; 
memset(Counts, 0, sizeof(Counts)); 
for (i = 0; i < N; ++i) 
sequence[i] = 4; 
index = 0; 
pos = InitSequence(MaxSymCounts, Counts, sequence); 





static void EvaluateSums( int sequence[], int sums_of.products[]) { 
register int i, j, 1, sum_of.products; 
for (i = 0; i < HN; ++i) { 
sum.of.products = 0; 
l = i; 
forG=0;j < N ; ++j) { 
++1; 
// MUCH better than 7 (I > = N) * N1 
i f ( l > N ) 
1-=N; 
sum.of.products += sym[sequence[j]] * sym[sequence[l]]; 
} 
sums.of.products [i] = sum.of.products; 
// assert((sum.of.products < (1 « 29)) && (sum.of.products > 
(1 « 29))); 
} 
} 
static void PrintsymbolCounts( int SymbolCounts[] ) { 
inti; 
printfC ("); 
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { 
printfC %d", SymbolCounts[i]); 











if ((SymSums[pair][0] > N) || (SymSums[pair][l] > N)) { 
// Should never happen, but be sensible if it does. 
*CountA = *CountB = 0; 
} 
memset(Counts, 0, sizeof(Counts)); 
for (i = 0; i < N; ++i) 
sequence [i] = 4; 
for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { 
sequence_count = 0; 
pes = InitSequence( SymCounts[pair][i], Counts, sequence ); 
while (pos > 0) { 
++sequence_count; 
pos = NextSequence( SymCounts[pair][i], SymSums[pair][i], Counts, 
sequence, pos); } 
if(i ==0) 
*CountA = sequence_count; 
else 
*CountB = sequence.count; 
} } 
static unsigned long AllocatePSuniArray( 
uLL total-sequences, 
tPSumArr **prodsums ) 
{ unsigned long bytes_to_allocate, sequences_per_chunk, chunks; 
if (total-sequences > MAX_SEQ) { 
chunks = (total-sequences / MAX-SEQ) + (((total-sequences % MAX-SEQ) ^ 0) ? 
1:0) ; 
sequences-per.chunk = MAX_SEQ; 
} else { 
sequences-per-chunk = totaLsequences; 
chunks = 1; 
} 
bytes-to-allocate = sizeof(tPSuniArr) * sequences-per-chunk; 
*prodsums = (tPSumArr *)malloc(bytes_tO-allocate); 
if (*prodsums == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Damn! Couldn't allocate the required 
memory. ")' 
exit(l); 




static int ComputePartialSums( 









unsigned long sequence.count; 
sequence-count = 0; 
if (prodsums / NULL) { 
if(*posPtr < 0 ) { 
// Initialise the sequence if (pos < 0) when function called. 
memset(Counts, 0, (sizeof(int) * 4)); 
for (i = 0; i < N; ++i) 
sequence [i] = 4; 
*posPtr = InitSequence( MaxSymCounts, Counts, sequence ); 
} 
while ((*posPtr > 0) && (sequence_count / sequences_per_chunk)) { 
EvaluateSums( sequence, prodsums [sequence.count] ); 
++sequence_count; 
*posPtr = NextSequence( MaxSymCounts, MaxSyms, Counts, sequence, 
*posPtr); } } 
return sequence.count; 
} 
static tPSumArr *ComputeAllSums( 








tPSumArr * prodsums; 
unsigned long bytes; 
m 
bytes = sizeof(tPSumArr) * totaLsequences; 
if (bytes > (20 * 1024 * 1024)) { 




prodsums = (tPSumArr *)malloc(bytes); 
if (prodsums ^ NULL) { 
printf("%lu b y t e s a l l o c a t e d . \ n " , b y t e s ) ; 
memset(Counts, 0, sizeof(Counts)); 
for (i = 0; i < N; ++i) 
sequence[i] = 4; 
i = 0; 
pos = IiiitSequence( MaxSymCounts, Counts, sequence ); 
while (pos > 0) { 
EvaluateSums( sequence, prodsums[i]); 
-H-i; 
pos = NextSequence( MaxSymCounts, MaxSyms, Counts, sequence, pos ); 
} } return prodsums; 
} 
# i f defined(unix) 
static time.t MyUnixTimer( void ) { 






* Print time in seconds as hours, minutes and seconds. 
* / 
static void PrintTime( unsigned long long seconds ) { 
unsigned long long minutes, hours; 
minutes = seconds / 60; 
hours = minutes / 60; 
minutes %= 60; 
seconds %= 60; 
# i f d e f DODGYJVlWERKS_LONG_LONG 
if (hours ^ 0 ) printf("%Lu hours ", hours); 
if (minutes ^ 0) 
printf(" %Lu m i n u t e s ", minutes); 
if ((seconds ^ 0) 11 ((hours == 0) && (minutes == 0))) 
printf("%Lu s e c o n d s seconds); 
# e n d i f 
# i f d e f UNIX_LONG_LONG 
if (hours ^ 0 ) 
printf( " % 1 l u h o u r s ", hours); 
if (minutes ^ 0) 
printf("%llu m i n u t e s ", minutes); 
if ((seconds ^ 0) 11 ((hours == 0) && (minutes == 0))) 
printf(" % 1 l u s e c o n d s ", seconds); 
# e n d i f } 
static void CheckSequences( void ) { 
int i, j, 1, m, which_seq, sum_of_products, sums_of_productsBS[HN]; 
int bSequencePrinted; 
unsigned long mincount, 
sequenceA_idx, 
sequences _per .chunk, 
found_sequence_count; 
uLL sequence-counts [2], 
sequences_examined; 







tPSumArr * prodsums; 
# i f d e f macintosh 
clockJ whole-Start, start, stop; 
# e n d i f 
# i f d e f Unix 
time.t whole-Start, start, stop; 
# e n d i f 
int *tmp; 
found_sequence_count = 0; 
sequences-examined = 0; 
bSequencePrinted = 0; 
whole_start = TIMEFUNCQ; 
fflush(stdout); 
totalJoops = 0; 
for (m = 0; m < NUMBERXOUNTS; ++m) { 
# i f d e f macintosh 
My SpeakNumber(m+1 ) ; 
# e n d i f 
printfC P r o c e s s i n g %d of %d . . . ", (m+1), NUMBER_COUNTS); 
PrintSymbolCounts(SymCounts [m] [0] ); 
Prints ymbolCounts(SymCounts[m] [ 1 ]); 
/* 
* Only process a particular combination of symbols when 
* the total number of symbols in each sequence is less 
* than or equal to the size of the sequence. 
* / 
if ((SymSums[m][0] > N) || (SymSums[m][l] > N)) { 
printf(" S k i p p e d . . . t o o many symbol s . \n") ; 
continue; 
} 
CountSequences(m, &(sequence_counts[0]), &(sequence_counts[l])); 
# i f d e f DODGY_MWERKSJLONG_LONG 
printf(" (%Lu X %Lu = %.2f b i l l i o n ) \n",sequence_counts[0], 
sequence_counts[l], (sequence_counts[0] * sequence_counts[l]) / BILLION); 
# e n d i f 
# i f d e f UNIX_LONG_LONG 
printf(" (%l lu X %l lu = %.2f b i l l i o n ) \n",sequence_counts[0], 
sequence_counts[l], (sequence-counts[0] * sequence_counts[l]) / BILLION); 
# e n d i f 
fflush(stdout); 
start = TIMEFUNCO; 
// Clear out the old sequence. 
for(j = 0; j < N ; ++j) 
sequenceB[j] = 4; 
// Clear initial counts of symbols. 
memset(CountsB, 0, sizeof(CountsB)); 
posA = -1; 
loops = 0; 
sequenceAJdx = 0; 
if (sequence_counts[0] > sequence_counts[l]) { 
/* 
IM 
* There are fewer possible sequences for the second of 
* the two variable counts that make up this pair Allocate 
* a chunk of memory to hold the precomputations for the 
* second, and iterate over the first. 
*/ 
sequences_per_chunk = AllocatePSumArray(sequence_counts[l], &prodsums); 
which_seq = 0; 
} 
else { 
sequences_per_chunk = AllocatePSumArray(sequence_counts[0], &prodsums); 
which_seq = 1; 
} 
do{ 
mincount = ComputePartialSums(sequences_per_chunk, prodsums, 
sequenceA, &posA, CountsA, SymCounts[m][l-which_seq], SymSums[m][l-which_seq]); 
posB = InitSequence( SymCounts[m][which_seq], CountsB, sequenceB ); 
if (mincount == 1) { 
tmp = prodsums [0]; 
while (posB > 0) { 
for (i = 0; i < HN; ++i) { 
++loops; 
sum_of_products = 0; 
l = i; 
f o r a = 0 ; j < N ; ++j) { 
+ + 1 ; 
¡ f ( l > N ) 
1-=N; 
sum_of_products += sym[sequenceB|j]] * 
sym[sequenceB [1]]; 
} 
if (tmp[i] + sum_of_products ^ 0) 
break; 
} 
if(i == HN){ 
if (IbSequencePrinted) { 
PrintSequence(sequenceB); 
PrintSequenceUsingIndex(sequenceA_idx, 
SymCounts[m] [ 1 -which_seq], SymSums[m] [ 1 -which_seq]); 






posB = NextSequence( SymCounts[m][which_seq], 




while (posB > 0) { 
/* 





* Add sums of products for current sequence to 
* precalculated sums of products for the other 
* sequence. 
* / 
for (i = 0; i < mincount; ++i) { 
tmp = prodsums[i]; 
f o r ( j = 0 ; j < H N ; ++j) { 
++loops; 




¡ f ( j== HN){ 
if (IbSequencePrinted) { 
PrintSequence(sequenceB); 
PrintSequenceUsingIndex((sequenceA_idx + i), 
SymCounts[m][ 1 -which_seq], SymSums[m] [ 1 -which_seq]); 







posB = NextSequence( SyinCounts[m][which.seq], 
SymSums[m][which.seq], CountsB, sequenceB, posB ); 
} 
} 
sequenceA_idx += mincount; 
} 
while (posA > 0); 
free(prodsums); 
prodsums = NULL; 
totaLloops += loops; 
# i f d e f DODGYjy[WERKS_LONG_LONG 
printfC'This: %Lu (%.2f billion) Total: %Lu (%.2f 
billion) \nMoops, (loops / BILLION), totaLloops, (totaLloops / BILLION)); 
#endif 
# i f d e f UNIX_LONGiONG 
printfC'This: %llu (%.2f billion) Total: %llu (%.2f 
billion) \n",loops, (loops / BILLION), totaLloops, (totaLloops / BILLION)); 
#endif 
bSequencePrinted = 0; 
stop = TIMEFUNCO; 
printfC'Finished %d of %d: (m+1), NUMBER.COUNTS); 
PrintTime((stop - start) / TIMER-RES); 
printfC \n"); 
# i f d e f DODGYJV[WERKS_LONG_LONG 
printf("Sequences examined so far: %Lu (%.2f billion) \n", 
sequences.examined, (sequences-examined / BILLION)); 
#endif 
# i f d e f UNIX_LONGXONG 
printf(" Sequences examined so far: %llu (%.2f billion) \n", 






if (prodsums NULL) 
free(prodsums); 
stop = TIMEFUNCO; 
printfC \n"); 
printf("Total sequences found: %lu\n", found_sequence_count); 
# i f d e f DODGYJVIWERKS_LONG_LONG 
printfC Total sequences examined: %Lu (%.2f billion) \n", 
sequences-examined, (sequences-examined / BILLION)); 
#endif 
# i f d e f UNIXJLONGiONG 
printfC Total sequences examined: %llu (%.2f billion) \n", 
sequences-examined, (sequences.examined / BILLION)); 
#endif 
printfC Time taken: "); 





* Printout a table of counts of sequences per symbol arrangement 
* for sequences A and B, the total number of sequences for each 
* pair of arrangements, and the total number of sequences across 
* all pairs. 
* / 
static void PrintCountSequences( void ) { 
int i,j; 
uLL sequence_count, totaLsequence_count; 
uLL sequence_counts[2]; 
totaLsequence.count = 0; 
for (i = 0; i < NUMBER_COUNTS; ++i) { 
A 
* Skip it if there are too many symbols per sequence for 
* either sequence in the pair 
* / 
if ((SymSums[i][0] > N) || (SymSums[i][l] > N)) { 
PrintSymbolCounts(SymCounts[i][0]); 
PrintSymbolCounts(SymCounts[i] [ 1 ]); 
printf("Skipped . . . t o o many symbo l s p e r s e q u e n c e f o r 
t h i s N . \ n " ) ; 
continue; 
} 
CountSequences(i, &(sequence_counts[0]), &(sequence_counts[l])); 
fora = 0 ; j < 2 ; ++j) { 
PrintSymbolCounts(SymCounts[i][j]); 
# i f d e f DODGYJViWERKS_LONGXONG 
printf( " % -15Lu ", sequence_counts|j]); 
# e n d i f 
# i f d e f UNIX_LONG_LONG 
printf( " % - 1 5 1 1 u ", sequence.counts[j]); 
# e n d i f 
fflush(stdout); 
} 
sequence_count = sequence_counts[0] * sequence_counts[l]; 
# i f d e f DODGYJVlWERKS-LONGiONG 
printf( " = %Lu ( % . 2 f b i 11 i o n ) \ n ", sequence_count, (sequence_count / 
BILLION)); 
# e n d i f # i f d e f UNIXXONG_LONG 
printf("= %l lu (%.2f bi l l ion)\n",sequence_count, (sequence_count / 
BILLION)); 
# e n d i f totaLsequence_count += sequence_count; 
} 
# i f d e f DODGYJVIWERKSXONGXONG 
printf("\nTotal sequences = %Lu (%.2f billion) \n", 
total_sequence_couiit, (totaLsequence.count / BILLION)); 
#endif 
# i f d e f UN1XJLONGJ.ONG 
printf("\nTotal sequences = %llu (%.2f billion) \n", 
totaLsequence_count, (totaLsequence.count / BILLION)); 
#endif 
printfC \n") ; 
} 
int main( void ) { 
int i , j ,k; 
# i f d e f _JV[WERKS__ 
SlOUXSettings.columns = 120; 
#endif 
printfC"Start sequence finding . . . (%d, %d) , N = %d 
( %s ) \n\n", XN, YN, N, ID_STRING); 
fflush(stdout); 
# i f defined(macintosh) && !defined(DISABLE_SPEECH) 
HasSpeechMgrO ; 
#endif 
for (i = 0; i < NUMBER_COUNTS; ++i) { 
f o r a = 0 ; j < 2 ; ++j) { 
SymSums[i][j] = 0; 
for (k = 0; k < 4; ++k) 
SymSums[i]|j] += SymCounts[i][j][k]; 
} 
if ((SymSums[i][0] + SymSums[i][l]) + (XN + YN)) { 
fprintf(stderr, "Damn! Tabulated symbol counts are 















Complete tables of Hadamard matrices 
derived from Williamson matrices for orders 
12 through 148 
t n N ? fii Â2 1^4 
3 12 1 1 1 l - 2 o ) i 
5 20 1 2 + 1 ^ + 32 + 32 1 1 1 - 2 0 ) 1 1 - 2 0 ) 2 
7 28 1 2 + 1 2 + 12 + 52 1 1 l + 2o)i - 2O)2 1+2O)3 
7 28 12 + 32 + 32 .^32 1 1 - 2 o ) i 1 -2O )2 1 - 2 O ) 3 
9 36 1 2 + 1 2 . ^ 3 2 . ^ 5 2 1 
1 
1 
1 + 2 O ) i - 2 O ) 2 
1 - 2 O ) 2 
1 -2O )4 
1 + 2o) I + 2O ) 3 - 2O ) 4 
1 + 2O)3 
9 36 32 + 32 + 32 + 32 1 - 2 c o i 1 - 2 O ) 2 1 - 2 O ) 3 1 - 2 O ) 4 
11 44 12 + 32 + 3 2 ^ 5 2 1 + 2 c o i - 2 c o 2 1 - 2 O ) 4 1 - 2 O ) 5 1 + 2O)3 
13 52 1 2 + 1 2 + 1 2 . ^ 7 2 1 1 1 + 2O) I + 2O ) 5 - 2O ) 4 
-2O)6 
1 - 20)2 - 20)3 
1 2 + 1 2 + 52 + 52 
1 1 + 2 0 ) 4 - 2 0 ) 5 1 + 2o)6 - 2o)i 1 - 20)2 - 20)3 
13 52 1 + 2 ( 0 4 - 2 0 ) 3 1 + 2 0 ) 6 - 2 0 ) 2 1+2O)I 1 + 2o)5 
13 52 32 + 32 + 32 + 52 1 - 2 0 ) 2 1 - 2 O ) 4 1 + 20)5 - 2o)i - 2q)3 1+2O)6 
15 60 1 2 + 1 2 + 3 2 + 7 2 1 1 1 + 2O>7 - 2o)i - 20)5 1 + 2o)2 - 20)3 - 2O)4 
12 + 32 + 52 + 52 - 2 0 ) 6 15 60 1 
1 + 2 o ) 7 - 2 O ) I 
1 - 2 0 ) 5 
1 - 2 o ) 3 
1+2O)6 
1+ 2o ) 2 
1 + 2O)I+2O)3 + 2O)4 
- 2 0 ) 2 - 20)7 
1+2o)4 + 2O)5-2O)6 
12 + 32 + 32 + 72 1 + 20)6 - 20)4 1 + 2o ) 5 - 2O) I -2O)3 1+2O)7 1+2O)2 17 68 1 
1 
1+2O)6 + 2o)7-2O)3 
1 + 2O)6 - 20)4 
1 + 2 o ) 5 - 2 O ) 2 
1 - 2 o ) 2 
- 2o ) 5 
- 2o ) 4 
1 + 2 o ) 7 - 2 O ) I -2O )3 
1 + 2o)3 - 2o)i - 2o)8 
1 - 2 O ) 8 
1-2(02- 2o)8 
1 - 2o)6 - 2oyj 
1 - 2o)i - 2o)4 
32 + 32 + 52 + 52 
-20)5 
17 68 1 - 2 O ) 2 1 - 2 O ) 8 1 + 2o ) 5 + 2O)6-2O)I 1 + 2o ) 3 + 2O)7-2O)4 
Table C.l: Hadamard matrices of orders 12, 20, 28, 36,44, 52, 60 and 68 from Williamson Matrices 
t n f i i + l i i i + l ^ i + f i i N? 1^3 1^4 
19 76 1 1 1 + 2O) I + 2O ) 8 - 2 0 ) 3 1+2O )2 + 2O )6-2O )4 
- 2 0 ) 5 - 20)7 - 2(09 
1 + 2C04 - 2C08 1+2C02-2C05 l + 2 o ) i 1 + 2 o ) 7 - 2 O ) 3 - 2 O ) 6 
- 2 0 ) 9 
12 + 5 2 ^ 5 2 ^ 5 2 
1 + 2C08 - 2C02 l + 2 ( j 0 7 - 2 c 0 4 1+2O )3+2O )6 -2O)9 1 - 2o)i - 2o)5 
19 76 1 1+2COI + 2CO4--2O)2 1 + 2 0 ) 6 + 20)8 - 2 0 ) 3 1 + 2O)7 + 2O )9-2O )5 
1 1+2C08 + 2C09--2O)3 1+2O)4 + 2O)7 -2O)5 1 + 2O) I+2O ) 6 -2O ) 2 
1 + 2C05 + 2C09-2C03 1 + 2C02 + 2C08 --2O)7 1+2O)6 l + 2 o ) i 
-2C04 
19 76 32 + 32 + 32 .^72 No solutions. 
21 84 1 2 + 1 2 + 1 2 + 92 1 1 1 + 2O)7 + 2O)9 • -2O)5 1 + 2O) I + 2O ) 2 + 2O)4 
-20 )6 +2o)8 - 2o)3 - 2o)io 
1 + 2C09 - 2C03 1+2co8-2co io 1 + 2O ) 4 - 2O ) 5 1+2O ) I +2O ) 2 + 2O)7 
-2o )6 
1 + 2C02-2C03 1 + 2coio - 2c06 1 + 2O)8 - 2O)9 1 + 2 o ) I + 2 O ) 4 + 2O)5 
12 + 32 + 52 + 72 
-2o )7 
21 84 1 + 2c08-2C06 1 + 2C02 - 20)4 --2o)io 1 + 20)5 + 20)7 - 2 0 ) 9 1 - 2o)i - 2O)3 
1 + 2C09 - 20)5 1 + 2C02 - 20)4 -•2o)io 1+2O)6 + 2O)7--2O)8 1 - 2o)i - 2O)3 
1 + 2c05-2C04 1 + 2(02 + 2coio--2O)6 l + 2 o ) i 1 - 20)3 - 20)7 
-2C08 - 20)9 
21 84 32 + 5^ + 5^ + 52 1 - 2 0 ) 7 1+2C03 + 2C05- 20)8 1+2o)4 + 2O)6--2O)2 1 + 2 o ) I + 2 O ) 9 - 2 O ) i o 
23 92 1 ^ + 1 2 + 32 + 92 1 +2C09+2C0II -2C04 1 + 2 0 ) 5 - 2 ( 0 7 1 + 2 o ) I - 2 O ) 3 - -20)10 1+20 ) 2 + 20)6 
-2C08 
23 92 32 + 32 + 52 + 72 No solutions. 
Table C.2: Hadamard matrices of orders 76, 84 and 92 from Williamson Matrices 
t n N? 
25 100 1^ + 1^+72 + 72 1 1 1 + 2O)6 + 2O)I2 - 2 0 ) 2 1 + 2O)8 + 20)9 - 20)1 
-20)3 - 20)5 - 20)7 - 2 O ) 4 - 2 O ) I O - 2 o ) I I 
1 + 2C03 - 2(09 1+2(04-2(012 1 - 2o)i - 20)7 1+2O)6 + 2O)8-2O)2 
-2o)5 - 2 o ) i o - 2 o ) i i 
1 + 20)3 - 2C07 1 + 2(04 - 2(0i 1 + 2O)8 - 2O)9 - 2O)io 1 + 2O)6 - 20)2 - 2O)5 
12 + 32 + 32 + 92 
-20)11 -20)12 
25 100 1 1 + 2 ( 0 1 + 2 ( 0 2 - 20)3 1 +2O)7 + 2 O) I I -2O)4 1+2O)5 + 2O)IO 
-2(08 - 2(09 -2O)6 - 20)I2 
1+2(06-20)11 1 + 2(03 - 2(0i - 20)12 1 + 2O)4 - 20)7 - 20)9 1 +2O)2 + 2O)5 + 2O)IO 
-2O)8 
1+2(02 + 2(010--2 (0 i 1 - 2 ( 0 5 1 +2O)9 + 2 O) I I -2O)3 1+20)6 + 20)I2 
12 + 52 + 52+72 -2(08 - 2 0)4 - 20)7 25 100 1+2(05-2(010 1+2(06 + 2(011 -2O)2 1 + 20)4 + 2O)9 + 20)I2 1 - 20)1 - 2O)3 
52 + 52 + 52 + 52 
-2O)7 - 2O)8 
25 100 1 + 2 ( 0 1 + 2 ( 0 2 - -2(03 1 +2(06 + 2(09- 20)10 1 +2O)7 + 2 O) I I -2O)4 1 + 2O)8 + 2O)I2 - 2O)5 
1 + 2(0i + 2(09 --2(06 1+2(07 + 2(012--20)8 1 + 2Q)2 + 2O)5 - 2O)4 1+2O)IO + 2O)II -2O)3 
12 + 12 + 52+92 
1 + 2(0i + 2(09 --2(06 1+2(07 + 2(012--20)8 1 +2O)3 + 2O)5 -20)11 1 + 2O)4 + 20)10 - 2O)2 
27 108 1 1 1+2O)6 + 2O)8 + 2O)IO 1 + 2O)4 + 20)5 + 20)7 
+2O)i3 - 2 o ) i -2O)2 +2O)I2 - 2O)3 - 2O)9 
-20)11 
1 + 2(0i + 2(03 --2(04 1+2(02 + 2(012--2o)io 1 + 2O)7 + 2O)8 - 20)6 1 +2O)5 + 2O)I3 
-2(09 -2(011 
1+2(09 + 2(013 • -2(05 1+2(03-2(010 1 + 2O)2 1 + 2O)I + 2O)6 + 2O)7 
27 12 + 32 + 72 + 72 
-2(08 +2o)ii -2O)4-2O)I2 
108 1 + 2(02 + 2(05 -•2(07 1 + 2(09 - 2(0io --20)11 1 + 2O)3 - 2O)4 - 2O)6 1 - 2 o ) i - 2 (0 i2 
-2(08 -20)13 
1 + 2(09 - 2(04 1+2(011-2(05 --20)7 1 + 2O)8 + 2O)I3 - 2o)i 1 - 20)2 - 20)I2 
32 + 32 + 32+92 
-2O)3 - 2O)6 - 2o)io 
27 108 No solutions. 
27 108 32 + 52 + 52 + 72 1 + 2(0i - 2(04 - 2(06 1+2(010 + 20)13 -20)11 1 + 2O)2 + 20)5 - 20)12 1 + 2O)7 - 2O)3 - 2O)8 
-2O)9 
Table C.3: Hadamard matrices of orders 100 and 108 from Williamson Matrices 
t n N? 
29 116 12 + 32 + 52 + 92 1+2C02 + 2C06 +2(012 1 + 2(07 + 2(0io - 2(03 l+2(0i 1+2(013+2(014 -2(04-2(09-2coi i -2(05 - 2(08 
29 116 32 + 32 + 72 + 72 No solutions. 
31 124 1 2 + I 2 + I 2 + 1 1 2 1 1 1 + 2(03 + 2(04 + 2(05 
-2(06 - 2(08 - 2(012 
1+2(07 + 2(010 + 2(015 
-2(0i - 2(02 - 2(09 
-2(0ii -2(013-2(014 
31 124 1^ + 52 + 72 + 72 No solutions. 
31 124 32 + 32 + 52 + 92 1+2(04-2(010-2(015 1+2(013-2(02-2(014 1 + 2(0i + 2(03 + 2(07 1+2(08 + 2(09 + 2(011 
52 + 52 + 52 + 72 -2(05 - 2(06 -2(012 31 124 No solutions. 
33 132 12+12 + 32+112 1+2(01+2(014-2(013 1+2(02 + 2(05 + 2(011 1 +2(012-2(03-2(07 1 - 2(04 - 2(0io - 2(Oi5 
12+12 + 72 + 92 -2(016 -2(06 - 2(08 - 2(09 33 132 1+2(03+2(014-2(02 1+2(011+2(016-2(06 1+2(01-2(05-2(012 1+2(04 + 2(09+2(013 
12 + 52 + 52 + 92 
-2(0io -2(08 -2(015 -2(07 
33 132 1+2(01+2(010-2(08 
-2(015 
1+2(05+2(012-2(07 
1+2(04 + 2(013-2(07 
1+2(010 + 2(016-2(02 
1 + 2(012 + 2(OI4 - 2(02 
1+2(04 + 2(06 + 2(09 
1+2(03+2(05+2(011 
+2(0I6 - 2(06 - 2(09 
1+2(03+2(08+2(011 
32 + 52 + 72 + 72 
-2(015 -2(0i -2(OI3 -2(014 
33 132 1+2(012-2(07-2(011 1+2(014 + 2(015-2(05 1+2(02-2(04-2(010 
-2(016 
1 + 2(0i + 2(09 - 2(03 
-2(06-2(08 -2(013 
Table C.4: Hadamard matrices of orders 116, 124 and 132 from Williamson Matrices 
t n N ? m 
35 140 12 + 32 + 3 2 + 1 1 2 N o solutions. 
35 140 12 + 3 2 . ^ 7 2 ^ 9 2 N o solutions. 
35 140 32 + 52 + 52 + 92 N o solutions. 
37 148 1 2 + 1 2 + 5 2 ^ 1 1 2 1 1 1 + 2(0i + 2(03 + 2(05 1 + 2 ( 0 i i + 2 ( 0 1 4 - 2 ( 0 2 
+2(010 + 2 ( 0 1 7 + 2(018 - 2 ( 0 6 - 2(07 - 2(08 
- 2 ( 0 4 - 2(09 - 2(0I2 - 2 ( 0 1 3 
12 + 72 + 72 + 72 
- 2 ( O I 5 - 2 ( O I 6 
37 148 1 1 + 2c05 + 2(07 - 2coi 1 + 2 ( 0 4 + 2 ( 0 1 3 - 2 ( 0 9 1 + 2 ( 0 3 + 2 ( 0 1 8 - 2 ( 0 8 
- 2 c 0 2 - 2c06 - 2C0I2 - 2 ( 0 i o - 2 ( 0 I 4 - 2 ( O I 7 - 2 ( 0 i i - 2 ( O i 5 - 2 ( O I 6 
37 148 32 + 32 + 3 2 + 1 1 2 N o solutions. 
37 148 32 + 32 + 72 + 92 N o solutions. 
3 7 148 52 + 5 2 + 7 2 + 72 1 + 2 C 0 2 + 2 C 0I5+2 C 0I7 1 + 2 C 0 9 + 2C0I2 + 2C0I6 1 - 2 ( 0 3 - 2 ( 0 1 8 1 + 2 ( 0 8 + 2(011 - 2 ( 0 i 
-2COI3 -2COI4 -2CO4 - 2coio - 2 ( 0 5 - 2(06 - 2(07 
1 + 2C03 + 2C04 + 2C07 1 + 2 C 0 5 + 2 ( 0 1 3 + 2 C O I 8 1 + 2(OI6 - 2(02 - 2(09 1 + 2 ( 0 1 5 - 2 ( 0 1 2 - 2 ( 0 1 4 
- 2 c o i - 2 c o i i - 2 ( 0 6 - 2(08 - 2 ( 0 1 0 - 2 ( 0 1 7 










32+32 + 12 + 12 
32+32+32 + 12 
52 + 12 + 12 + 12 
12 + 12+52+32 
32+32+32+32 
12+32 + 32+52 













1 - 1 — 1 -
1 — 1 1 — 
1 1 - 1 — 1 - 1 
1 1 - 1 — 1 - 1 
1111—111 1—11— 
1 1 - 1 — 1 - 1 




1-1 1-1—1—1— 1—11— 
1-11 11-
1 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 
11-1-11-1-1 
11 1 
t n l^i+fii+iui+jiii N? Solution 13 52 11—1—1—1 11—1—1—1 1—1-11-1— 1111-1—1-111 1—1-11-1— 1 1111 11—1 1—1 
52 + 52 + 12+12 1-111-11-111-13 52 11-1-1111-1-1 111-11—11-11 1—111111— 
12+12 + 12 + 72 11-1-11-1—1 13 52 1-1—1111—1-1—111111— 11-1—11—1-1 
52 + 52 + 12 + 32 1 1—1 15 60 1-1 11 1-1-1 11 1-111—1 1—11 
32 + 72 + 12 + 12 1-11-1111-11— 15 60 11-11-1—1-11-1 11-1111—1111-1 11-11 11-1 1-1—1111-1-111-11 11-11 1-1111-11-1111-1—11-11-11— 1-1—1111—1-1-1-11-11-11-1-1111—1111—111 1-1—11—11—1-1 111111 
Table C.6: Hadamard matrices from Williamson matrices for orders 12 through 60; alternative representation 
t n fii+l^i+fii-i-iai N? Solution 
17 68 + + + 1 11—11 
1—11-1—1-11— 
11-1—1 1-1-1 







1 mil l 
11-1-11—11-1—1 




t n N? Solution 










1 m m 
11-1-1111—1111-1-1 











52 + 52 + 52 + 12 
1-1—11-1111-11—1-
19 76 No solutions. 
Table C.7: Hadamard matrices from Williamson matrices for orders 68 and 76; alternative representation <1 <1 
t n N? Solution 
21 84 111-1—111—111—1-11 
111-1—111—111—1-11 
111-111-1 1-111-11 




1 — 1 - 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 - 1 — 
11-111—1-11-1—111-1 
111-111-1 1-111-11 
111-11 1111 11-11 
1-1 11-11-11 1-
21 84 32 + 12 + 72 + 52 1-1—111 1 1 1 - 1 -
1 — 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 
1-1 11—11 1-
1111-1-11 11-1-111 
1-1—111 1 1 1 - 1 -
1 — 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
1-1 11—11 1-
1111-11-1—1-11—111 
111-1 11 1-11 
11 11-11—11-11 1 
1-1—1 11 1 - 1 -
1111-1-1—11—1-1-111 
21 84 92 + 12 + 12 + 12 11-11111-1—1-11111-1 
1 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 - 1 — 1 
1 1 1 1 - 1 1—1 1 - 1 1 1 
23 32 + 32 + 72^52 
1—1111—11 1111— 
92 111-111-1 1-111-11 
1 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 - 1 1 - 1 - 1 1 11 
1-11-11—111111—11-11-
23 12 + 12^92^32 
11 1 1 - 1 1- 1 1 1 
92 No solutions. 










1^+T + V + V 
12 + 52 + 52 + 72 
12 + 32 + 32 + 92 
52 + 52 + 52 + 52 
N? Solution 
1 1 - 1 1 - - 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 
1 1 - 1 1 - - 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 
1 - 1 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 1 -11-1-1—mill—1-1—1 1—1-1-11 11-1-1— I-1—1-1—11—1-1—1— II-11-11 1 111-11-1 1-1111—11—11—1111-I—1-11 1 111-1— II-1—1- 1 1-1—1-1 1—11-1—111—111—1-11— 1-1111—1—11—1-1111-111—1-1—11—11—1-1—11 1-1-1-11111—11111-1-1— 111-111—1-11-1—111-11 111—1—1—1—1—11 1-1111—11—11—1111-111-111—1-11-1—111-11 1-11-111-11—11-111-11-1-11-1-1 1-1-11— 11—1-11-1111-11-1—1 1-1—11—11111111—11—1-1-111-11—1-11-1—11-111-1-1 111—111 1-1—1-1—11111111—1-1— 1-1-11—1—11—1—11-1-I—1111—1—1—1111— II-1111—1-1111-1—1111-1 1-1—1111-1111-1111—1— 111—11-111111-11—11 111-1-1-11—11—11-1-1-11 111-111-1-1—1-1-111—11 
t n N? Solution 1-1—111—111111—111—1-111—1—1111—1111—1—11 11-1—1-11111111-1—1—1 1111-1-1-1—11—1-1-1-111 1-11111—1-11-1—11111— 11-111—111 111-111-1 11-1—1-11111111-1—1—1 
72+72 + 32+12 1111-1-1-1—11—1-1-1-111 27 108 1—11111-1-1111-1-11111— 1—11111-1-1111-1-11111— 111-11-1—11—11—1-11-11 1—1—1-111—11—111-1—1— 1-1-11-111—1111—111-11-1-11-1-1-11-11-11-11-11-1-1-1 1111-11 n i l 11-111 nil—11—1—1—11—111 1111-1111—1—1—1111-111 111—11-111-11-111-11—11 11-1—11-1-1-11-1-1-11—1-1 1-111—1—1111—1—111-27 108 92+52 + 12+12 1—1—111 111—1— 1-11-1—11—11—1-11-1-1-111—1—11—1-111-1-1111-1—1—1—1—1—1-111 1—1—1—1-11-1—1—1— 1—1-111—11—111-1— 11-1—1—111—111—1—1-1 1-1 11-111111-11 1-27 108 32 + 32 + 32+92 No solutions. 27 108 32+52+52+72 1-1-1111—1—11—1—1111-1-111-1-1—1 1—1-1—11 11 1—1-1111-1—1 1 1111-1—111—11—111—1-111 
Table C.9: Hadamard matrices from Williamson matrices for orders 100 and 108; alternative representation <1 so 
t n N? Solution 
29 116 + + P + 11—1—1-111-1111-111-1--1--1 
1111-11-1 111111—1-11-111 
1-1 11-1-111111-1—11 1-
111 1 1 - 1 - 1 1-1—11 11 
29 116 72 + 72 + 3^ + 32 No solutions. 
31 124 52 + 52 + 52 + 72 1 - 1 1 1 - 1 — 1 11 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 — 
1 - 1 1 1 - 1 — 1 11 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 — 
1 111-1-1—11—1-1-111 
m i l l — 1 - 1 - 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 - 1 — 1 1 1 1 1 
31 124 52 + 92 + 32 + 32 No solutions. 
31 124 72 + 72 + 12 + 52 11-1 11111-1-11-1-11111 1-1 
11111—111-1—1—1—1-111—1111 
1 111-11-1-1 1 - 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 1 — 
11-11—1 11 11 1 - 1 1 - 1 
31 124 l2 + l2 + l2 4-112 No solutions. 
33 132 72 + 72 + 32+52 1-1—1 111—11—111 1 - 1 -
11 1-11—1-1 1-1—11-1 1 
1111-1-1 1—1 1—1 1-1-111 
111-11 111-11—11-111 11-11 
33 132 12 + 12+92 + 72 111-1 111-1—11—1-111 1-11 
11-11-1-11 11 11 11-1-11-1 
1—111 1-111111111111-1 111— 
92 + 52+52 + 12 
11-1 1 1 - 1 - 1 1 - 1 — 1 1 - 1 - 1 
33 132 1—111—1—111111111111—1—111— 
11-1-1-1—111-1-11-1-111—1-1-1-1 





1 — 1 1 1 — 1 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 1 — l i l -
33 132 32 + 112 + 12 + 12 i l í 1-1-1—11—11—1-1-1 11 
111—1—1—1 1— 
11—1 11-1-111111-1-11 1—1 
1-11—1-1—1111—1111—1-1—11-
Table C.IO: Hadamard matrices from Williamson matrices for orders 116, 124 and 
132; alternative representation 
t n N? Solution 
35 140 9 2 + 5'^+ 5 ^ + 3'̂  No solutions. 
35 140 12 + 32 + 72 + 92 No solutions. 
35 140 112 + 32 + 32 + 12 No solutions. 
37 148 32 + 32 + 72 + 92 11-1-1 1 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 1 1 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 
11-1-1 1 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 1 1 1 ~ 1 ~ 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 
1 — 1 1-11-111 111-11-1 1 — 
1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 - 1 — 1 — 1 1 1 1 — 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 
37 148 112 + 32 + 32 + 32 1 - 1 1 1 - 1 1 11 1 1-111— 
11111-1 11 11 11 1-1111 
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 1 — 1 — 1 1 1 1 — 1 — 1 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 — 
1 - 1 1 - 1 1 — 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 — 1 1 - 1 1 — 
37 148 72 + 72 + 72 + 12 No solutions. 
37 148 12 + 12 + 52 + 112 No solutions. 
37 148 72 + 72 + 52 + 52 1 11-1111-1 1-1111-11 
1 - 1 - 1 — 1 - 1 1 — 1 - 1 — 1 - 1 — 1 1 - 1 — 1 - 1 -
1-11 11-11—11111111—11-11 11-
111—111-1—1—111—111—1—1-111—11 
1 1 — 1 1 -1 -11 -11-11-1 -1 1 — 1 
1 - 1 1 - 1 1 1 11 11 111-11— 
1-1111-1-11—1-1—11—1-1—11-1-1111-
1 - 1 1 1 - 1 111-111111-111 1-111— 
Table C . l l : Hadamard matrices from Williamson matrices for orders 140 and 148; alternative representation 
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